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Abstract	  
 The Urfaust, composed in the early 1770s, is the first draft of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe’s (1749-1832) masterpiece, Faust, Teil I (1808).  While this early draft is 
relatively unexamined in its own right, an examination of this work in the context of its 
original creation offers insights into Goethe’s creative processes at the time in relation to 
the Enlightenment poetic debates of the eighteenth century, through which literary critics, 
such as J.C. Gottsched (1700-1766) attempted to define the rules by which poetic 
construction should operate.  In examining the Urfaust, one can see how Goethe’s poetic 
aims transcended those of the Enlightenment debate, going far beyond the Enlightenment 
critics of Gottsched, such as J.J. Bodmer (1698-1783) and J.J. Breitinger (1701-1776) in 
making the case for additional room for the fantastic in poetic construction. 
 Goethe’s criticism of the limits of the Enlightenment to know and explain reality 
via reason and language leads him to a different approach to the mythological, one based 
on the primacy of image to language in approximating nature, in which the poet is free to 
construct a new mythology based on the manipulation of images into a new narrative.  In 
Georg von Welling’s (1652-1727) cabbalistic work he finds a cosmogony rich with 
images, images that he borrows and transforms in creating his own new Faust mythology.  
In Welling, Goethe finds the counterpole to Gottsched, whose image-rich language 
provides Goethe with inspiration to respond to the poetic debates of the Enlightenment 
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Goethe’s Urfaust and the Enlightenment: 




1.1 Scope of Project 
 
 Composed in the early 1770s, the Urfaust is the first draft of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe’s (1749-1832) Faust, Teil I (1808), arguably the most read and studied work in 
the German literary canon.  In spite of its role as the foundation to this later masterpiece, 
the Urfaust, discovered by Erich Schmidt in 1887, remains relatively unexamined as a 
work in its own right.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that Goethe had not chosen to 
publish it in that form, as opposed to many other works from his Sturm und Drang 
period.  Due to Faust I’s tremendous success in the decades preceding this discovery, 
there had already been seven decades of well-established Faust research and reception 
prior to this discovery. 
 There are several scholars who have published important work on the Urfaust, yet 
their work does not focus upon the work in relation to the thesis of this dissertation.  
Included among these scholars are Ulrich Gaier, Ernst Grumach and Werner Keller.  
Gaier has provided the most thorough critical annotated edition of the Urfaust: Goethes 
Faust-Dichtungen Band I Urfaust (1989).  Grumach addresses the Urfaust specifically in 
his edited volume, Beiträge zur Goetheforschung (1959).  In the first part of his 
“Faustiana” chapter, called “Zum Urfaust,” he addresses the Urfaust in terms of 
documenting the dating of its production (268-275).  Keller’s “Goethes Urfaust – 
historisch betrachtet,” first published in 1994 and again most recently in Schriften der 
Goethe-Gesellschaft 69 (2009) addresses the origins of the “Erdgeist” concept used in the 
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work, drawing on the influence of Renaissance magicians such as Agrippa and 
Paracelsus. 
 Several studies specifically regarding or related to the Urfaust published in the late 
1960s also merit mention here.  Eudo Mason’s Goethe's Faust. Its Genesis and Purport 
(1967), treats the Urfaust as part of his overall study of the development of Faust I.  
Valters Nollendorfs’ Der Streit um den Urfaust (1967) provides an excellent overview of 
the discovery and publication of the text in the late nineteenth century, and builds on 
Grumach’s research regarding the influences within the text itself.  Helgard Reich’s Die 
Entstehung der ersten fünf Szenen des Goetheschen 'Urfaust' (1968) provides analysis of 
the development of five scenes of the work, doing specific text analysis to look for 
origins of the work.  In addition, Rolf Christian Zimmermann’s Das Weltbild des Jungen 
Goethe, first published in 1969, addresses the theory of the influences of hermeticism 
upon the young Goethe, a theme that is certainly relevant to the production of the 
Urfaust, and one that does tie into this study, even if not specifically in concert with the 
parameters or the ultimate views of this dissertation. 
 My dissertation seeks to address the Urfaust anew from the perspective of the 
debate in recent decades among Goethe scholars who are seeking to define Goethe’s 
relationship to the Enlightenment.  In doing so, the intention is not merely to show that 
the Urfaust can be viewed as a key to understanding Goethe’s relationship to the 
Enlightenment, but also to situate the Urfaust, as a work, in the poetic debates of the 
Enlightenment, in order to explore Goethe’s response to those debates in their original 
context.  This is of extreme importance to Goethe scholarship, given that Goethe’s work 
related to Faust has long been received within a tradition that relates to the finished work 
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in the early nineteenth century, and situates Goethe’s position vis-à-vis the Enlightenment 
within a teleological view of the development of German literature popularized by 
thinkers such as Schelling and Hegel at that time.   
 
1.2 The Reception of Goethe’s Faust in Relation to the Enlightenment 
 The most recent authoritative and monumental study of the history of Faust 
reception by Rüdiger Scholz (2011) is quite persuasive in its thorough examination of 
how Schelling and Hegel influenced later understanding of Faust.  The scope of Scholz’ 
work reinforces the claim of this dissertation that the Urfaust as a work in its own right 
has been relatively under-examined, not merely by virtue of the demonstration of the 
influence of Schelling-Hegel on the reception of Faust in general, but also by virtue of the 
fact that in this wide-ranging study of the history of Faust reception, the Urfaust itself 
gets little attention.  In the first volume of the Scholz study, within a section entitled “Der 
idealistische Ansatz,” Scholz establishes how the philosophical approaches to Goethe 
taken by both Schelling and Hegel in Jena at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
inform the understanding of Goethe’s Faust by succeeding generations of Faust scholars 
over the next two centuries.  The approach of these scholars to Goethe/Faust is shown as 
the basis for the genre classification of Faust, the philosophical and teleological approach 
to Faust within the history of ideas, and the elevation of Goethe to national genius that 
ensued. 
 Schelling treats Faust as one of the central mythological poems of modernity -- 
indeed, it is to Schelling that the original genre classification of Faust as “Gedicht” as 
opposed to “Drama” is owed (Scholz 56, 66).  This, one must note, is the Faust of the 
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1790 fragment, given that Schelling’s comments are made in the 1798-1803 timeframe 
(Scholz 56).  Schelling’s view of modern myth in general (a category that he applies to 
the works of Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare and Goethe) informs his view of Faust as 
being part of the teleological process of ending the opposition between “Gattung” (the 
world of the ancients is the world of “Gattungen”) and the individual (the world of the 
modern is the world of the “Individuen”), in which history and time are sublated in the 
eternal Being of the Absolute.  The Faust-myth is, then, for Schelling, not a pure myth of 
the absolute, but a historical myth of the German people, related through the historical 
subject of Goethe.  The genre classification of poetry stems from the hierarchy of genre 
classifications within Schelling’s philosophy, in which poetry is the highest form of art, 
most near to philosophy, as the most ideal and infinite form of art (58). 
 In Hegel’s philosophy the opposition between “Gattung und Individuum” is also 
emphasized, and while his own comments address the Faust work as a whole less 
specifically than those of Schelling, he does make reference to lines from Faust involving 
the Erdgeist and Mephisto in his 1807 Phänomenologie des Geistes, without actually 
naming Goethe or the Faust itself (59-60).  Scholz points out the thematic consistencies 
in Hegel’s treatment of the relationship of the individual to itself, to “Gattung” and to 
“Substanz” in Hegel’s work, as wells as his philosophical examination of pairs of 
opposites (including, among others, Natur und Geist), as being consistent with the views 
articulated dramatically in Faust.  This has led many scholars to view the works as 
somehow complementary of each other.  Scholz: “Dadurch scheint, ähnlich wie bei 
Schellings Kunstphilosophie, Goethes Faust eine Veranschaulichung der abstrakten 
philosophischen Ideen Hegels oder, umgekehrt, die philosophische Argumentation eine 
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Deutung der Ideen des Faust-Dramas” (62). 
 Without his commenting on the accuracy of such characterizations -- for as Scholz 
points out, he is merely explaining the interpretations in context (63-4) -- Scholz provides 
a good description of how the dialectical thinking of idealistic philosophers informed the 
reception of Faust, and indeed, in the history of genre classification, led to the eventual 
description of Faust as “Weltbibel” in 1842 (65).  Not only that, but the teleological 
understanding of Faust by Schelling and Hegel also informs the popular understanding of 
Goethe’s work as ending the Enlightenment (“Mit Schellings und Hegels Positionen der 
Auslegung wird die Geschichte der Aufklärung gekappt” 66).  The author of this 
dissertation would also like to thank Professor Wynfried Kriegleder of the University of 
Vienna, with whom he privately discussed the notion of Goethe/Faust reception in light 
of this sort of teleological view of literary history, in connection with the Gervinus’ 
influence upon the predominant view of German literary history stemming from the 
1840s until the present.  These discussions in April of 2012 were quite helpful in 
preparing the author for understanding the work that Scholz presented.  Additional recent 
scholarship concerning this discussion of the development of the prevailing view of 
German literary history is found in Jürgen Fohrmann’s Das Project der deutschen 
Literaturgeschichte (1989). 
 
1.3 Goethe’s Relationship to the Enlightenment via Faust 
 In light of this traditional view of Goethe and Faust, it is most interesting to note 
that in the past thirty years, the consensus among scholars concerning Goethe’s 
relationship to the Enlightenment has begun to splinter.  The dominant viewpoint of the 
	  
	   6	  
twentieth century, that Goethe should be viewed as an “Überwinder der Aufklärung,” 
reinforced by such important figures in Goethe scholarship as Friedrich Gundolf (1880-
1931), has been challenged from a number of angles that are themselves not all of one 
accord. In Gundolf’s Goethe, originally published in 1930 and then reprinted in 1963 by 
the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft in Darmstadt, the Faust-work is addressed in 
terms very much aligned with the view of the view of Goethe as one seeking to 
overthrow the Enlightenment, opening its treatment of the work, as it does, with the 
following passage concerning the Titanist view of the work: “Nun war noch ein Sinnbild 
seines titanischen Urerlebnisses übrig: der Faust: von allen das gemäßeste, d.h. dasjenige 
was sich von vornherein weitaus am meisten mit seiner eignen Seele, seiner Lage, seinem 
Bestreben, seinen Gefühlen und Zuständen decken könnte.  Um aus Faust herauszureden, 
um sich in Faust hineinzubilden, […] (129).”  Furthermore, Gundolf describes Faust in 
terms that evoke fundamental opposition to Kantian philosophy: 
“Aber nicht nur der Titanismus an sich war mit dem Faustsymbol 
auszudrücken, [...]. [...]  Form oder Zeichen dieses Lebenshungers, der nicht 
nur die negative Seite des schöpferischen titanischen Expansionstriebes ist 
sondern eine eigne Funktion des Goethischen Lebens, ist zunächst das Leiden 
an der Existenz schlechthin, nicht nur an bestimmten zeitlichen Formen der 
Existenz: das transzendente Gefühl des Ungenügens welches hervorgeht aus 
dem Widerstreit zwischen der räumlichen und zeitlichen Beschränktheit 
unsrer irdischen Lebensformen mit dem unendlichen Lebensgehalt der Welt .. 
[sic] die Unmöglichkeit sein Ich als Form zum All zu erweitern“ (131). 
In more recent times, however, some have even attempted to portray Goethe as a 
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champion of the Enlightenment, in a radical departure from the previous consensus, while 
others have attempted to find within Goethe elements of awareness of, sympathy for, or 
influence from Enlightenment thought.  Goethe’s Faust has been cited by various 
scholars of differing viewpoints on this question as a text that is of great importance in 
shedding light on Goethe’s relationship to this influential intellectual movement of his 
time.  Gottfried Willems (1990) cites Faust in his argument that the Enlightenment is to 
be found on virtually every page of Goethe’s work (Willems 23).  Gerhard Schulz (1988) 
uses Faust to challenge the dominant view of Gundolf (and of H. A. Korff, Schulz’s 
mentor) regarding the alleged anti-Enlightenment viewpoint of Goethe: Faust is, for him, 
a work that shows some internal affinities to the view of the individual articulated by 
Enlightened thinkers such as Kant (Schulz 183).  More recently, Helmut Koopmann 
(2008) has argued that Faust shows a definite tension between Goethe and the 
Enlightenment, arguing among other points, that already in the “Prolog im Himmel” there 
is an unmistakable nod toward the Enlightenment in the words of Mephistopheles 
regarding man as “der kleine Gott der Welt,” taking its view of man, as it were, from the 
theodicy of Leibniz (Koopmann 161).  At the same time, like Schulz, Koopmann sees in 
the use of Renaissance motifs in Faust by Goethe a subtle critique of the Enlightenment 
(Koopmann 167, Schulz 183-189). Indeed, both Schulz and Koopmann argue in such a 
way as to support the more general conclusions regarding Goethe and the Enlightenment 
offered by Rudolf Vierhaus, who argues that Goethe’s relationship to the Enlightenment 
defies easy categorization (Vierhaus 1985 11). Vierhaus’ approach centers less on 
specific works, such as Faust, than it does on Goethe’s direct engagement of 
Enlightenment themes and thinkers, and clears the way for scholars such as Schulz and 
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Koopmann to argue that Goethe’s relationship to the Enlightenment was somewhat 
ambiguous, in that his approach to these themes and thinkers cannot be categorized 
monolithically under the rubric of a strictly defined relationship to the Enlightenment: the 
hostility in Goethe’s response to the Enlightenment poetics of Gottsched and Sulzer, is 
not found in his engagement with the thought of Kant, for example (Vierhaus 1996-1999 
86). 
 
1.4 Goethe and the Enlightenment: an Examination of Urfaust  
 An important aspect of the current study that sets itself apart from those mentioned 
above is the attempt to view this question from within the context of the Urfaust itself.  
The reason for doing so will become clear in the exploration of the poetic debates of the 
eighteenth century, debates which were leading up to and contemporaneous with the 
work on the Urfaust, and give one the context in which to view the Urfaust itself as a 
vehicle for Goethe to respond to those debates in his own poetic fashion.  This is also 
significant from the standpoint of attempting to re-examine Goethe with respect to his 
relationship with the Enlightenment by viewing the Urfaust in its original context, and 
not that of the work that eventually resulted from it, decades later, and which served as 
the basis for the reception by Faust scholars in the ensuing centuries.  If one is to further 
the recently renewed debates on Goethe’s relationship to the Enlightenment, on which 
nearly all of the above cited scholars agree that Faust is of signal importance, it would 
behoove one to re-examine the development of the work in its earliest form from this 
standpoint as well.  This dissertation seeks to fill this void in the debate. 
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1.5 Method 
 The approach to this works seeks to situate understanding of the Urfaust in respect 
of both 1) the poetic debates of the time, which are relevant to both the form and content 
of the work itself, and also 2) to how Goethe’s known use of the Renaissance 
neoplatonist/hermeticist tradition informs his response to those debates by means of his 
approach to myth in the work.  The history of Faust reception has been predominantly 
centered not on this first draft, but on the finished work of 1808.  This approach, 
however, of necessity overlooks the fact that many of the most relevant questions for the 
understanding of the meaning and impetus behind the work are to be found in analysis of 
Goethe’s activities and influences from this earlier period.  Whereas Schelling and Hegel 
may have had fascinating insights of the relevance of the final work to its historical 
moment, the cost to scholarship of the teleological view of literary history, in which the 
finished Faust I towers above the literary landscape that follows for decades and even 
centuries, the context in which Goethe began his work decades before is often ignored, 
and even in some instances, has scarcely been examined closely, in spite of the mountain 
of scholarship related to the seminal final work. 
 
1.5.1 The Urfaust: Response to Enlightenment Debates on Poetics 
 Goethe’s work will be placed in the context of the Enlightenment poetic debates of 
the eighteenth century, with special attention being paid to figures such as Gottsched, 
Bodmer, Breitinger and Sulzer.  The use of “magic” as a theme or topic of dramatic 
construction by Goethe represents not only a direct contradiction of poetic principles laid 
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out by Gottsched, but also is done in a way that transcends even the arguments against 
Gottsched by his Enlightenment opponents.  This dissertation will demonstrate that 
Goethe’s Urfaust includes a dramatic, as opposed to discursive, response to the poetic 
debates in question, and will do so by arguing for a previously undiscovered use of genre 
in the play itself, that of the commedia dell’arte.  This is significant not only from the 
standpoint of Goethe’s engagement with this specific genre as a means of response to the 
Enlightenment debates of his time, but it also forms the basis for his known and 
documented engagement with this same genre later in his career.  This early use of 
commedia dell’arte by Goethe, when taken together with the poetic definition of poetry 
offered in the “Luzifer-Mythos” described in Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit, show that 
the Urfaust was more than simply a result of a philosophical attempt to solve challenges 
posed by Enlightenment thought, but also an early attempt by Goethe to redefine the 
nature of Gattungen, an effort whose fruition was not to be in explicit definitions, such as 
in an Enlightenment approach, but was to be realized from within the poetic work itself. 
 
1.5.2 The Urfaust as an Example of Goethe’s Approach to Myth-making 
 The second major aspect of this study is focused upon the approach to myth-
making that Goethe uses in his construction of the Urfaust.  The need to overcome limits, 
a prominent theme in the Urfaust itself, was also a driving force for Goethe in his 
development of a new myth-making approach.  Once again, Goethe’s approach is at once 
informed by, and also demonstrates a need to transcend the limits placed upon myth-
making by the Enlightenment.  In this section, I will begin with an exposition of early 
views of the Enlightenment with respect to myth, namely by examining the idea of myth 
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as error (as developed from Fontenelle to Gottsched).  In this regard, there are several 
points of discussion that can be developed that have great thematic relevance to the 
Urfaust: 1) the idea of myth as errant imagination; 2) a discussion of the weak spot of 
Enlightenment tradition regarding the Unknown; and finally 3) an explanation of how the 
discussion of myth helps one to see the crux of the debate between Gottsched and 
Bodmer-Breitinger.  With respect to the last of these three points, a dichotomy emerges 
within Enlightenment thought with respect to myth-making: either reason is used to 
reduce the sphere of the imagination to that which is deemed natural according to 
abstract, reasoned truths (Gottsched), or reason allows a space for the imagination to play 
within mythology, being able to distinguish between fact and fiction, which ideally would 
allow for an expansion of the freedom of the imagination in concert with the development 
of reason (Bodmer).  What the two views hold in common is that either the restriction or 
the freedom of the imagination is tied directly to the premise that reason, and reason 
alone, is the arbiter of truth.  It is merely a question of whether one takes the “errors” of 
mythology as a direct threat to reason (Gottsched) or not (Bodmer), that determines one’s 
position regarding mythology.  One aspect of eighteenth century German Enlightenment 
thought that becomes clear in this regard is the acceptance (and indeed, the assumption) 
of eternal truth that is derived through logic and reason.  That such is 1) knowable, and 2) 
forms the limits of the imagination, are challenged directly by the premises of Goethe’s 
Urfaust, in which the eternal truth is beyond the grasp of the scholar and reason itself is 
seen as limited, and indeed, limiting, in this regard.  It seems only natural, then, that 
Goethe’s responses to Enlightenment debate would come couched in mythology as 
opposed to discursive thought.) 
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1.5.3 Enlightenment Myth-making with Respect to the Faust Theme 
 The existence of a Faust fragment by Lessing provides a concrete example that one 
can use in contrast to Goethe’s Urfaust, which has been done to varying degrees by 
Petsch (1911), Guthke (1960), Baron (1982) and Henning (1989) among others.  
Lessing’s Faust fragment shows the limits of reasoned truth, raising the question of how 
to relate reason and moral truth.  The relationship of reason and knowledge to the 
question of good and evil is shown to be ultimately unresolved in his discussion of the 
various devils with whom Faust speaks.  Lessing’s contribution to the understanding of 
Goethe’s efforts is to show the potential of the Faust theme as a challenge to Gottsched’s 
poetics, while at the same time showing how this potential is limited within certain 
constraints of Enlightenment thought.  
 
1.5.3.1 Goethe’s reading of Georg von Welling 
 In his autobiographical work Dichtung und Wahrheit Goethe makes explicit 
reference to the importance of Georg von Welling’s Opus Mago-Cabbalisticum et 
Theosophicum during his youthful convalescence in Frankfurt in the early 1770s.  Among 
the esoteric, mystical and Pietist works consulted during this time and mentioned years 
later in Goethe’s autobiography, Welling’s work stands out by its mention as a work with 
which the young Goethe had struggled to understand, but with which he had been 
apparently fascinated.  Goethe’s engagement with this work, contemporaneous to his 
early conception of the Faust legend in the Urfaust, has been noted by scholars, but the 
extent of its influence has been largely ignored or overlooked, or has been the subject of 
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speculation concerning purported mystical and esoteric leanings of Goethe in that period 
or throughout his life.  This work seeks to fill in the gaps of information left by the 
former, without engaging in the speculation of the latter, by means of examining 
Goethe’s use of Welling within the context of the Enlightenment poetic debates regarding 
the appropriateness of myth as a vehicle for dramatic construction, and in terms of the 
very approach to construction of myth itself. 
 
1.5.3.2 Goethe’s Common Sources with Welling and “Totalization” 
 Goethe’s interest in Welling must be taken in the context of his other readings from 
the period of his Frankfurt convalescence with the von Klettenberg circle, and in doing 
so, one will see that many of the most significant influences upon Welling were also 
being read by the young Goethe at the same time: notably the Renaissance alchemist 
Paracelsus and the Pietist theologian Gottfried Arnold.  Due to these common influences, 
Goethe’s approach to myth-making combines with the Faust material in a unique manner, 
and can be contrasted with the approach of Lessing, for example, who also opposed 
Gottsched’s prohibition of the use of the Faust theme, and who had himself tried to 
construct his own Faust myth within the parameters of Enlightenment thinking.  The use 
of the term “totalization” here refers to the scope of Faustian knowledge, which is meant 
to be transcendent and all-encompassing. 
 The intellectual development of this totalization idea within the Urfaust shares with 
Welling various traces, such as the influences of Pietists (most specifically Gottfried 
Arnold), heresy, Paracelsus/Agrippa/Trithemius, and Neoplationism, all of which set up 
Goethe’s unique viewpoint and, ultimately, form his lasting approach to the 
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Enlightenment.   The significance of this investigation is that it seeks to grasp the manner 
in which Goethe developed his method of getting beyond the problem in Lessing’s 
approach.  One aspect of this development is certainly Goethe’s questioning of the 
legitimacy of morality as a limiting factor to the question of knowledge, but this aspect is 
grounded in a deeper understanding of history, and namely, in the distortion of history by 
the Church and its persecution of heretics, which had the effect of dismissing the 
Renaissance magician as heretical.  Faust’s totalization of knowledge in the Urfaust, is 
therefore, a “heretical” act.  In contrast to Lessing, the process of “totalization” used by 
Goethe builds awareness of the limits of the Enlightenment into his myth.  Indeed, there 
is a sense that he is, in fact, building a mythology around the limits of knowledge and 
reason in order to transcend them.  In order to do so, Goethe reaches back to pre-
Enlightenment sources of knowledge for inspiration. 
 Goethe himself writes in Dichtung und Wahrheit that he was influenced at the time 
of his early work on Faust by the work of Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714), whose Kirchen- 
und Ketzergeschichte he praises in a passage that expressly connects this interest to his 
desire to construct his own religion.  Using Goethe’s own words from Dichtung und 
Wahrheit as a roadmap, I will attempt to reconstruct the intellectual development 
underlying Goethe’s totalization from a concrete basis in his studies of the “heretical” 
figures mentioned in Arnold’s work to the dramatic representation of neoplatonism 
present in the Urfaust. 
 In this chapter I will attempt to establish a timeline for the development of the 
totalization idea, by looking at the specific “heretical” sources that Goethe would have 
been consulting at the same time that he discovered a method to get beyond the 
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Wissensdrang paradox that Lessing encountered. 
 
1.5.3.3 Revisiting the “Luzifer-Mythos” in the Context of Welling 
 By establishing the sequence in the timeline of Goethe’s “totalization” approach to 
the Faust theme, one can better understand the importance of Welling to Goethe, not 
merely as a source for material, but also in terms of how, exactly, that material is 
appropriated and used by Goethe.  Welling’s own use of a “Luzifer-Mythos” differs 
markedly from Goethe’s later adoption of a similar concept: whereas for the former, such 
a construct is offered as the basis for a cosmogony, for the latter, the creation of such is a 
conscious act of myth-making, indeed, even an attempt at establishing a morphology of 
mythical construction itself.  This shows that Goethe is not merely overcoming 
Enlightenment limits, whether in the form of transcending debates between Gottsched 
and his Swiss opponents, or in resolving the problems in the limited approach to the Faust 
theme that resulted from Lessing’s Enlightenment viewpoint – it also represents Goethe’s 
incorporation of the Enlightenment view of myth into his treatment of pre-Enlightenment 
sources, in that ideas such as the “Luzifer-Mythos” are clearly viewed as constructs as 
opposed to statements of truth about the nature of reality. 
 
1.5.3.4 Goethe’s Overall Use of Welling in the Urfaust 
 In this section, I will begin by noting that Goethe uses Welling in a way different to 
that recognized by the differing camps of scholars, who argue either for a limited 
influence (limited to Macrcosm/Erdgeist, etc.), such as Schöne, Trunz, Sauder, Nisbet, or 
for the more mystical approach (tying Goethe to one or another esoteric tradition via 
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Welling by way of Doctor Metz), such as Zimmermann, Gray, Grumach. 
 The key concept tying everything together here is that the extensive use of Welling, 
which I argue need not be mystical in nature (that is, inherently linked to the furtherance 
or adherence to any particular esoteric tradition or cosmogonic system), and inscrutable 
to Enlightenment thought  -- but rather mythological in nature – for use in building a 
mythic construct that attempts to transcend the limits that he sees in Enlightenment 
thought. 
 The mystical view seems to imply that Goethe is hiding his arguments in myth, 
whereas the mythological view allows one to see that Goethe uses myth to transcend the 
limits of rational Enlightenment debate (very much in line with the concerns expressed 
openly in the Urfaust). 
 In this sense, Goethe’s “overcoming” of the Enlightenment might really be better 
understood as his attempt to transcend the limits imposed on thought by the 
Enlightenment, not as a way of invalidating or arguing against reason or for something 
mystical, but ultimately as a way of making clear the limits of rational thought to those 
who employ it; it could be said that, in this sense, he is establishing the limits of what can 
and cannot be claimed by rational thought, which, in itself, is not anti-Enlightenment, but 
very much what some Enlightenment philosophers themselves (most notably Kant) set 
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2 Goethe’s Response to Enlightenment Debates on Poetics and the Urfaust 
 In eighteenth century Enlightenment Germany, debates concerning the rules for 
poetic construction were quite intense, perhaps none more so than that between J.C. 
Gottsched (1700-1766), the self-styled Horatian critic and arbiter of literary rules from 
Leipzig, and two of his chief antagonists, both from Switzerland, J.J. Bodmer (1698-
1783), author, critic and the first German translator of Milton’s Paradise Lost, and J.J. 
Breitinger (1701-1776), author and philologist.  These debates were especially pointed 
when considering the relationship of das Wunderbare and das Warscheinliche, and also 
the scope and role of the poet’s imagination in poetic composition.  Goethe’s response to 
this debate will be shown to be fundamentally poetic, as opposed to discursive in nature, 
and this will be shown on two levels: first, the development of the idea of the “Luzifer-
Mythos” that Goethe mentions in connection with this debate, when writing his 
autobiography Dichtung und Wahrheit years later, which shows a more abstract level 
informing Goethe’s disagreement with the positions of not only Gottsched, but also 
Bodmer and Breitinger, and secondly, Goethe’s use of the commedia dell’arte within the 
Urfaust as a concrete example of the fact that his desire to respond to this debate on a 
poetic, rather than discursive, level, factored directly into his composition of the Urfaust. 
 
2.1  Gottsched and the Suitability of Magic for Dramatic Construction 
 Without recapitulating the entirety of Gottsched’s poetics, it is perhaps first 
instructive and helpful for those seeking to find the tension between Goethe’s approach 
and that of Gottsched to note that the core themes of the Urfaust had previously been 
utterly rejected by Gottsched as unsuitable for the theatre.  Goethe’s choice of the 
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dramatic form to address the philosophical issues present in the Urfaust, therefore, is an 
implicit challenge to Gottsched, whose poetics proscribe the possibility of such subject 
matter as proper material for dramatic consideration.  In the fourth chapter of the first 
book of his Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst (1730), entitled “Von den dreyen 
Gattungen der poetischen Nachahmung, und insonderheit von der Fabel,” Gottsched sets 
out to define the rules for “enlightened” dramatic construction, and proceeds to set 
forward a complex definition of when an “unbelievable” (“unglaublich”) story or plot is 
allowed, with one of his conditions being its plausibility (“Wahrscheinlichkeit”).  The 
unbelievable is allowed only to the extent that the poet is able to make it plausible: 
Gottsched gives the example that one could not write a drama in a modern context in 
which talking trees and animals took part, given its implausibility to the modern viewer, 
but if one were to posit a mythical past in which such contingencies were possible, 
dramatic freedom would allow their portrayal (Gottsched 206-207).  He directly follows 
this argument by differentiating between epic and dramatic fables, making explicit 
mention, among other this, of the unsuitability of tales of magic to the drama of the 
present, given their implausibility to the eye: 
Denn die theatralischen Fabeln leiden nichts, als was wahrscheinlich ist, 
wie Horatius in seiner Dichtkunst sehr fleißig erinnert: hingegen die 
epischen können gar wohl auch unwahrscheinliche Fabeln von Thieren 
und leblosen Dingen brauchen. Tausend Dinge lassen sich gar wohl 
erzählen; aber den Augen läßt sich nichts vorstellen, als was glaublich ist. 
Die vormaligen Zeiten der Einfalt des menschlichen Geschlechts, haben so 
viel von Zaubereyen, und Wundergeschichten erzählet und geglaubt, und 
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auf die Nachwelt fortgepflanzet; daß es uns nicht schwer ist, zu glauben, 
daß durch eine übermenschliche Kraft, alles möglich ist, was nur nicht 
widersprechend ist. So wird des Homers redendes Pferd, nur durch die 
Kraft der Minerva möglich, oder glaublich, wenn man es in die alten 
Zeiten setzet. Wer aber entweder dasselbe, oder Bileams Eselinn auf die 
Schaubühne bringen, und sie dadurch gleichsam in unsre Zeiten versetzen 
wollte: Dem würde Horaz zurufen: 
 
QUODCUMQUE OSTENDIS MIHI SIC, INCREDULUS ODI. 
(Gottsched 207-8) 
 
In this very same vein, Gottsched returns to the theme in the fifth chapter of the same 
book (“Von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie”), in which he again mentions magic, and 
specifically lumps the Faust theme in with those “Alfanzereyen” that he deems unsuitable 
themes for dramatic construction: 
Eben das kann von den Zaubereyen und bösen Geistern gesagt werden. 
Auch ein seichter Witz ist geschickt, einen Hexenmeister auf die 
Schaubühne zu stellen, der einen Zaubersegen nach dem andern 
hermurmelt, einen astrologischen Ring mit Characteren verkauft, diesen 
unsichtbar, jenen unbeweglich, einen andern unkenntlich macht, ja wohl 
gar ein halb Dutzend junge Teufel herzubannet. Das Mährchen von D. 
Fausten hat lange genug den Pöbel belustiget: Und man hat ziemlicher 
maßen aufgehört, solche Alfanzereyen gerne anzusehen. (Gottsched 240) 
This, Gottsched continues, is directly related to the notion that the poet should not 
dramatise that which is not believable, condemning Italian and even French theatre for 
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being guilty of falling into this practice and citing Horace as his authority for why these 
themes were not worthy oft he poet, and mentioning the absurdity of Andreas Gryphius’ 
(1616-1664) 1663 absurdist comedy Herr Peter Squenz: 
Daher muß denn ein Poet große Behutsamkeit gebrauchen, daß er nicht 
unglaubliche Dinge auf die Schaubühne bringe, vielweniger sichtbar 
vorstelle. Die italiänische Schaubühne, und das THEATRE DE LA 
FOIRE zu Paris wimmeln von solchen Hexereyen: ja auch das bessere 
französische Theater fängt schon an auf solche Alfanzereyen zu verfallen, 
wie man aus einigen neuern Stücken z.E. LE ROI DE COCAGNE, und 
L'ORACLE, erhellet. Horaz hat dieses auch längst verbothen, wenn er 
will, daß man die Progne nicht in einen Vogel, den Cadmus nicht in eine 
Schlange verwandeln solle; imgleichen, daß niemand auf der Schaubühne 
einer Hexe das aufgefressene Kind lebendig wieder aus dem Leibe solle 
ziehen lassen. Das wäre eben so viel, als wenn ich Bileams Eselinn redend 
einführen, oder den Edelmann vor den Augen des Schauplatzes zum 
Schweine wollte werden laßen. Wer nicht weis, wie lächerlich dieses ist, 
der darf nur den Peter Squenz des Andreas Gryphius nachlesen, wo so gar 
die Wand und der Brunn, der Mond und der Leue, als redende Personen 
aufgeführet werden. (Gottsched 240-241) 
Gottsched finishes this passage by returning to the previously cited quotation from 
Horace, forming a tight connection between the previously cited argument and this later 
passage: 
Da kann es denn wohl mit Recht heißen: 
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  QUODCUNQUE OSTENDIS MIHI SIC, INCREDULUS ODI. 
Denn es ist gewiß, daß dergleichen Dinge, die man bey einer bloßen 
Erzählung eben nicht für ungereimt gehalten haben würde, ganz und gar 
ungläublich herauskommen, wenn wir sie mit eigenen Augen ansehen, 
und also das Unmögliche, so darinn vorkömmt, in voller Deutlichkeit 
wahrnehmen können.  (Gottsched 241)  
Here Gottsched, in his desire to craft a poetics for the German theater based upon an 
Enlightened, pro-French neoclassicist point of view, disavows the long history of the 
Faust myth within German literature as an outdated superstition: most importantly for the 
argument of this thesis, Gottsched sets out to deny the very possibility of using this myth 
in any useful manner whatsoever in a modern, Enlightened context. 
 
2.2 Anti-Gottschedian Influences: Bodmer and Breitinger 
 In response to Gottsched’s inveighing against the possibility of the fantastic in 
drama in passages such as the previously cited (“Von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie”), 
several important anti-Gottsched poetic critics emerged in decades prior to Goethe’s 
work, upon whose criticism Goethe later drew.  The most important of these for Goethe 
were the pair of professors from Zurich, Johann Jacob Bodmer (1698-1783), and Johann 
Jacob Breitinger (1701-1776).  In his essay, “Der junge Goethe über den alten Bodmer” 
(1993), Klaus Hurlebusch notes that these two opponents of French neo-classicist poetics 
stood principally for a greater freedom of the imagination within the limits of reason and 
morality that Gottsched wanted to impose on German dramatists (Hurlebusch 369-370). 
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 Both Bodmer and Breitinger drew upon the Leibnizian concept of possible worlds 
in articulating this freedom of the imagination, most likely through Christian Wolff’s 
popularization of this idea (Zeller 132-136).  Wolff explained Leibniz’ concept “in a 
comparison with a novel that creates a possible world by arranging the plot in such a way 
that nothing improbable takes place”: in such a creation the poet becomes like a God of a 
new world (Zeller 134).  It is in this sense that both Bodmer and Breitinger value the 
imagination as the key faculty of the poet, and this imagination must, in their view, be 
liberated from the likes of Gottsched and his rules for poetic construction. 
 In the seventh book of the second part of Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe refers to 
“die Schweizer,” whose criticisms of Gottsched he read in his student days in Leipzig: 
Nun zur Kritik! und zwar vorerst zu den theoretischen Versuchen. Wir 
holen nicht zu weit aus, wenn wir sagen, daß damals das Ideelle sich aus 
der Welt in die Religion geflüchtet hatte, ja sogar in der Sittenlehre kaum 
zum Vorschein kam; von einem höchsten Prinzip der Kunst hatte niemand 
eine Ahndung. Man gab uns Gottscheds »Kritische Dichtkunst« in die 
Hände; sie war brauchbar und belehrend genug: denn sie überlieferte von 
allen Dichtungsarten eine historische Kenntnis, sowie vom Rhythmus und 
den verschiedenen Bewegungen desselben; das poetische Genie ward 
vorausgesetzt! Übrigens aber sollte der Dichter Kenntnisse haben, ja 
gelehrt sein, er sollte Geschmack besitzen, und was dergleichen mehr war. 
Man wies uns zuletzt auf Horazens »Dichtkunst«; wir staunten einzelne 
Goldsprüche dieses unschätzbaren Werks mit Ehrfurcht an, wußten aber 
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nicht im geringsten, was wir mit dem Ganzen machen, noch wie wir es 
nutzen sollten. 
 Die Schweizer traten auf als Gottscheds Antagonisten; sie mußten doch 
also etwas anderes tun, etwas Besseres leisten wollen: so hörten wir denn 
auch, daß sie wirklich vorzüglicher seien. Breitingers »Kritische 
Dichtkunst« ward vorgenommen. Hier gelangten wir nun in ein weiteres 
Feld, eigentlich aber nur in einen größeren Irrgarten, der desto ermüdender 
war, als ein tüchtiger Mann, dem wir vertrauten, uns darin herumtrieb. 
Eine kurze Übersicht rechtfertige diese Worte. (HA 9: 261-2) 
To be sure, Goethe does not claim to have been deeply impressed by either Bodmer or 
Breitinger, but their mention in direct consequence of his mention of Gottsched’s poetics 
in Dichtung und Wahrheit would suggest that their critiques of Gottsched remained with 
him in some sense many years after he read them.  Indeed, the importance of these 
thinkers for an examination of Goethe’s challenge to Gottsched in the Urfaust is further 
suggested by Goethe’s remark in Dichtung und Wahrheit, that seems on one hand 
dismissive of the Swiss professors yet at the same time a tacit acknowledgement of their 
importance to the development of his ideas when young: 
 Doch wir dürfen unsere Schweizertheorie nicht verlassen, ohne daß ihr 
von uns auch Gerechtigkeit widerfahre. Bodmer, so viel er sich auch 
bemüht, ist theoretisch und praktisch zeitlebens ein Kind geblieben. 
Breitinger war ein tüchtiger, gelehrter, einsichtsvoller Mann, dem, als er 
sich recht umsah, die sämtlichen Erfordernisse einer Dichtung nicht 
entgingen, ja, es läßt sich nachweisen, daß er die Mängel seiner Methode 
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dunkel fühlen mochte. Merkwürdig ist z.B. seine Frage: ob ein gewisses 
beschreibendes Gedicht von König auf das Lustlager Augusts des Zweiten 
wirklich ein Gedicht sei? so wie die Beantwortung derselben guten Sinn 
zeigt. Zu seiner völligen Rechtfertigung aber mag dienen, daß er, von 
einem falschen Punkte ausgehend, nach beinahe schon durchlaufenem 
Kreise, doch noch auf die Hauptsache stößt, und die Darstellung der 
Sitten, Charaktere, Leidenschaften, kurz, des inneren Menschen, auf den 
die Dichtkunst doch wohl vorzüglich angewiesen ist, am Ende seines 
Buchs gleichsam als Zugabe anzuraten sich genötigt findet. 
In welche Verwirrung junge Geister durch solche ausgerenkte Maximen, 
halb verstandene Gesetze und zersplitterte Lehren sich versetzt fühlten, 
läßt sich wohl denken. Man hielt sich an Beispiele, und war auch da nicht 
gebessert; die ausländischen standen zu weit ab, so sehr wie die alten, und 
aus den besten inländischen blickte jedesmal eine entschiedene 
Individualität hervor, deren Tugenden man sich nicht anmaßen konnte, 
und in deren Fehler zu fallen man fürchten mußte. Für den, der etwas 
Produktives in sich fühlte, war es ein verzweiflungsvoller Zustand. (HA 9:  
263-264, emphasis mine) 
Given the caveats offered by Goethe in his dismissal of the Swiss critics, their 
consideration in his development of an anti-Gottsched position cannot be dismissed.  In 
the following sections, a brief overview of Bodmer’s and Breitinger’s criticism of 
Gottsched will be given, in order to provide a basis for comparison with what can later be 
seen in Goethe’s Urfaust. 
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2.2.1 Bodmer’s Von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie 
 Bodmer criticized the restriction of the imagination by French neo-classicists in 
his Von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie und dessen Verbindung mit dem 
Wahrscheinlichen, In einer Vertheidigung Johann Miltons Verlustes des Paradieses 
(1740).  Bodmer, a translator of Milton into German, saw in Milton’s religious work an 
example of the fantastic that could inspire German poets, rather than as something that 
should be forbidden as outside of neo-classicist rules: 
Ich habe diese Arbeit unternommen, so wohl meiner Hochachtung gegen 
diesen erhabenen Geist ein Genügen zu thun, und auch bey andern eine 
gleichmässige zu erwecken, als meine Lehren von dem Verwundersamen 
und dessen nothwendigen Verbindung mit dem Wahrscheinlichen, 
insonderheit in Absicht auf die unsichtbare Welt der Geister, auf eine 
angenehmere und lebhaftere Weise vorzutragen. Dieses vortreffliche 
Gedicht wird mir in der That die bequemsten Exempel lehnen, die ich bey 
deutschen Poeten vergebens suchen würde, meine Lehrsätze zu erklären, 
und die Einwürffe, die gegen diese Exempel gemachet worden, werden 
meinem Wercke eine neue Gestalt und Art geben, die es beleben, und 
zugleich in sehr absonderliche Aeste ausbreiten wird. (Bodmer 3) 
 
In the case of Bodmer, Milton’s work shows the poetic approach to the divine, and any 
attempt to regulate poetic expression in such a way as to forbid expression of the fantastic 
ignores the fact that God’s laws have nothing in common with laws composed by the 
human intellect: 
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 Die Wesen von einem höhern Stand und einer vornehmern Natur als die 
menschliche ist, würcken auf eine gantz andere Weise und nach eigenen 
Gesetzen; was das vor Gesetze seyn, bleibet uns gröstentheils verborgen, 
ausgenommen in so weit uns die Wercke selbst, die nach solchen Regeln  
verfertigt worden, einige dunkele Merckmahle und Spuren davon errathen 
lassen. Von dieser Art sind die Wercke Gottes insgesamt, unsere Kräffte 
fallen in der Erkänntniß derselben unendlich zu kurtz. Die heilige Schrifft 
selbst bezeuget von Gott, daß seine Wege nicht seyn, wie unsre Wege, und 
seine Gedancken nicht wie unsre Gedancken, in so weit, daß ofte vor Gott 
lauter Thorheit sey, was nach dem Dünckel des menschlichen Sinnes die 
gröste Weißheit ist. (Bodmer 4-5) 
Because God’s laws and the laws of the human intellect are so far removed from one 
another, poetic works in which the realm of the divine is portrayed are not to be judged 
by human laws, but by their own internal laws (Bodmer 6).  Bodmer sees Milton’s 
characterization of the French as a confirmation that their thinkers are too far removed 
from the fantastic, that their imagination is too restricted: 
Wenn ich insbesondere bedencke, wie schwer es den Franzosen vor 
andern  Nationen fällt, sich ihrer Gewohnheiten und Lebens-Arten zu 
entschlagen, und in die Sitten fremder, vornehmlich alter Völcker zu 
schicken, so befremdet es mich destoweniger, daß diejenigen, welche von 
dem verlohrnen Paradieß am schlimmsten geurtheilet haben, Franzosen 
gewesen sind. Wie schwer muß es Leuten von dieser wohlgesitteten, 
zierlichen und modischen Nation ankommen, sich in die Gewohnheiten 
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anderer Arten Geschöpfe, voraus solcher zu richten, die von der 
menschlichen Art so ungemein weit abweichen, als die guten und  bösen 
Engel, die Sünde, der Tod, die Geister in dem Chaos! (Bodmer 11) 
Bodmer is then the first important German critic to oppose French neo-classicism in the 
wake of Gottsched’s writings, and he does so by means of a defense of the imagination 
against Gottschedian rules. 
 
2.2.2 Breitinger’s Critische Dichtkunst: Das Wunderbare und das Warscheinliche 
 Breitinger’s Critische Dichtkunst (1740) also extolled the importance of freeing 
the imagination of the poet.  In its seventh section, “Von dem Wunderbaren und dem 
Wahrscheinlichen,” Breitinger carefully sets about defining the fantastic (“das 
Wunderbare”) and its relation to the plausible/probable (“das Warscheinliche”) and to the 
truth. 
 With respect to the fantastic, its apparent falseness is only an appearance, because 
its reality is contingent upon its possibility (here referring to the earlier cited Leibnizian 
sense of possible worlds): 
 Ich begreiffe demnach unter dem Nahmen des Wunderbaren alles, was 
von einem andern widerwärtigen Bildniß oder vor wahr angenommenen 
Satze ausgeschlossen wird; was uns, dem ersten Anscheine nach, unsren 
gewöhnlichen Begriffen von dem Wesen der Dinge, von den Kräften, 
Gesetzen und dem Laufe der Natur, und allen vormahls erkannten 
Wahrheiten in dem Licht zu stehen, und dieselben zu bestreiten düncket. 
Folglich hat das Wunderbare für den Verstand immer einen Schein der 
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Falschheit; weil es mit den angenommenen Sätzen desselben in einem 
offenbaren Widerspruch zu stehen scheinet: Alleine dieses ist nur ein 
Schein, und zwar ein unbetrüglicher Schein  der Falschheit; das 
Wunderbare muß immer auf die würckliche oder die mögliche Wahrheit 
gegründet seyn, wenn es von der Lügen unterschieden seyn und uns 
ergetzen soll. Denn wofern der Widerspruch zwischen einer Vorstellung 
und unsren Gedancken eigentlich und begründet wäre, so könnte eine 
solche keine  Verwunderung in uns gebähren, eben so wenig, als eine 
offenbare Lüge oder die Erzehlung von lediglich unmöglichen und 
unglaublichen Dingen den Geist des Menschen rühren und belustigen kan; 
und falls das Wunderbare aller Wahrheit beraubet seyn würde, so wäre der 
gröbeste Lügner der beste Poet, und die Poesie wäre eine verderbliche 
Kunst. (Breitinger 135-6, emphasis mine) 
Here, in attacking Gottsched, Breitinger seems aware of the attacks to which he himself 
might be subjected, namely, that a non-mimetic conception of poetry is a poetry of lies, 
an untenable conclusion for a moral theologian.  He sees poetic truth, however, not in 
terms of the knowledge displayed or recognizable mimesis, but in the feeling of wonder 
engendered by the work.  In this sense, the fantastic is not held in opposition to the 
plausible, as in the case of Gottsched, but rather, is viewed as a sort of a yet-to-be-
recognized plausible, which the poet attempts to make visible by means of this feeling of 
wonder: 
 Das Wunderbare ist demnach nichts anders, als ein vermummetes 
Wahrscheinliches. Der Mensch wird nur durch dasjenige gerühret, was er 
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gläubt; darum muß ihm ein Poet nur solche Sachen vorlegen, die er 
glauben kan, welche zum wenigsten den Schein der Wahrheit haben. Der 
Mensch verwundert sich nur über dasjenige, was er vor etwas 
ausserordentliches hält; darum muß der Poet ihm nur solche Sachen 
vorlegen, die ausser der Ordnung des gemeinen Laufes sind; und diese 
beyden Grund-Regeln, die einander so sehr entgegen zu laufen scheinen, 
mit einander zu vergleichen, muß er dem Wunderbaren die Farbe der 
Wahrheit anstreichen, und das Wahrscheinliche in die Farbe des 
Wunderbaren einkleiden. (Breitinger 136-137) 
With such a maneuver, Breitinger allows for a redefinition of the plausible, so that he is 
able to posit internally consistent potential worlds as plausible, shifting the emphasis 
from Gottsched’s recognition of nature in mimetic terms to a poetic license that 
encompasses both the plausible and the fantastic merely as actual and potential aspects of 
the substratum of all possible worlds.  In this sense, the Gottschedian view of 
Nachahmung der Natur as the foundation for a rule-based poetics is overturned, at least 
in any recognizable form, given that nature itself becomes redefined as a God-given 
potentiality, the actualization of which depends upon the poet: 
Weil aber die gegenwärtige Einrichtung der Welt der würcklichen Dinge 
nicht schlechterdings nothwendig ist, so hätte der Schöpfer bey andern 
Absichten Wesen von einer gantz andern Natur erschaffen, selbige in eine 
andere Ordnung zusammen verbinden, und innen gantz andere Gesetze 
vorschreiben können: Da nun die Poesie eine Nachahmung der Schöpfung 
und der Natur nicht nur in dem Würcklichen, sondern auch in dem 
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Möglichen ist, so muß ihre Dichtung, die eine Art der Schöpfung ist, ihre 
Wahrscheinlichkeit entweder in der Übereinstimmung mit den 
gegenwärtiger Zeit eingeführten Gesetzen und dem Laufe der Natur 
gründen, oder in den Kräften der Natur, welche sie bey andern Absichten 
nach unsern Begriffen hätte ausüben können. (Breitinger 139-140) 
By means of this redefinition, Breitinger is able to rescue much of the subject matter 
condemned as unfit for dramatic construction by Gottsched.  Nevertheless, he is careful 
to defend himself against the possible charge that by doing so, he is elevating superstition 
and untruth to the level of knowledge, a defense that he builds by employing a contrast 
between the method of the magician/sorcerer and that of the poet.   
 
2.2.3 The Poet versus the Magician 
 This differentiation is done in two steps.  First, there is careful restriction of what 
Breitinger means by the fantastic, vis-a-vis tales of magic, etc., and how they can play 
upon the ignorance of the masses: 
Es sind auch die Urtheile der Menschen von dem Wunderbaren und 
Wahrscheinlichen sehr ungleich und unterschiedlich: Alles dasjenige, was 
für die Gelehrten wahrscheinlich ist, ist es gleichermaassen für das 
gemeine Volck, aber nicht alles das, was für die Unwissenden 
wahrscheinlich ist, ist es auch allemahl für die belesenen Leute. Die 
Verwunderung und die Leichtgläubigkeit sind Töchter der Unwissenheit. 
Daher ließt der rohe und unwissende Pöbel gemeiniglich die 
abentheurlichsten Erzehlungen von Hexen, Zauberern, weisen Frauen, 
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Gespenstern, und die Romanen von den irrenden Rittern, mit dem  grösten 
Ergetzen, welches nicht geschehen könnte, wenn dieselben ihm 
ungläublich und unwahrscheinlich vorkämen; wo man die Kräfte der 
Natur nicht kennet, und nicht fähig ist, die weise Verknüpfung der 
Umstände unter einander, und mit den Absichten einzusehen, da ist man 
nicht geschickt, das Unwahrscheinliche zu entdecken: Hingegen je 
genauer einer die Gesetze und Kräfte der Natur und das Wesen der Dinge 
kennet, desto besser wird es ihm gelingen, das Wahrscheinliche genau und 
richtig zu bestimmen, und desto mehr Fertigkeit wird er in Unterscheidung 
des Abentheurlichen von dem Wunderbaren zeigen. (Breitinger 142) 
In so emphasizing the knowledge as the key for differentiating truth from falsity, 
Breitinger relies not upon a correspondence theory of truth, as in Gottsched’s poetics, but 
upon distinguishing between the attempts of the “adventurous” (“Abentheurlichen”) to 
prey upon the ignorant and the attempts of “fantastic”  to use the miraculous to tease out 
possible truth from what might otherwise be deemed impossible. 
 This leads Breitinger to address explicitly how the poet’s use of the fantastic is to 
be understood in contrast to the magician’s more adventurous pursuit: 
 Von dieser besondern Art der poetischen Vorstellungen, in welchen das 
Wunderbare mit dem Wahrscheinlichen künstlich verbunden ist, entstehet 
die bezaubernde Kraft der Dicht-Kunst. Die Zauberer täuschen uns auf 
eine angenehme Weise durch den geborgten Schein der Wahrheit und 
Würcklichkeit; der Poet hintergehet uns hingegen auf eine noch 
unschuldigere Weise zum Behuf der Wahrheit durch einen 
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angenommenen Schein der Falschheit: Es ist aber das menschliche 
Gemüthe so beschaffen, daß es beydemahl in Verwunderung gesetzet 
wird, es sey, daß wir die Unmöglichkeit dessen erkennen, was wir dem 
ersten Anscheine nach für wahr und möglich gehalten hatten, oder daß wir 
die Wahrheit und Möglichkeit dessen einsehen, was wir zuvor für falsch 
und unmöglich angesehen hatten. (Breitinger 142-143) 
Thus, although both the poet and the magician relate to truth in a way that goes beyond 
the simple correspondence theory of nature, in its appearances, and truth, in the 
Enlightened manner championed by Gottsched, for Breitinger the essential difference is 
that the poet does so with an innocent aim of finding truth where it would not otherwise 
be sought, whereas the magician is merely a manipulator of appearances. 
 The poet has, therefore, for Breitinger, an important role in knowledge that goes 
beyond that which is allowed by reason and the sciences.  The pursuit of the fantastic is 
nothing less than the pursuit of its source, and this Breitinger sees as fundamentally 
theological in its scope: 
 Wenn wir denn ferner aus der Welt dieser phantastischen Wesen, die 
alleine in dem Gehirne der Poeten erzeuget, und von dem Wahne der 
Menschen ernehret werden, in die unsichtbare Welt der Geister hinüber 
gehen, so eröfnet sich uns eine neue Quelle des Wunderbaren. Denn da die 
Götter und Geister in allen Religionen vor Wesen von einer andern und 
höhern Natur, als die menschliche ist, angesehen und geglaubet worden, 
da sie an sich uncörperlich und unsichtbar sind, da ihre Macht, ihre 
Wissenschaft und andere Vollkommenheiten alle menschlichen Begriffe 
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weit übersteigen, so müssen die poetischen Vorstellungen aus der Welt der 
Geister in dem höchsten Grade wunderbar seyn. Die Geheimniß-Lehren 
und Wunderwercke haben in allen Theologien dem  Scheine nach und in 
Vergleichung mit den Begriffen der menschlichen Vernunft etwas 
widersinnisches; und was die wahre Theologie insbesondere angehet, so 
gründet sich das Wunderbare in derselben auf den göttlichen Ausspruch: 
Meine Wege sind nicht wie eure Wege, und meine Gedancken sind nicht 
wie eure Gedancken. (Breitinger 154-155) 
In conclusion, Breitinger’s poetics serve to save the realm of the fantastic from 
Gottsched’s Enlightened purge of the same, in the hopes of keeping theological aims 
within the purview of poetic construction.  The fact that Breitinger shares Gottsched’s 
distaste for magicians is coincidental with his larger aims: whereas Gottsched opposes all 
forms of the fantastic as unnatural and, therefore, unfit for mimesis, Breitinger sees 
“magic” as an inauthentic form of pursuing the fantastic, in that it seeks not to unveil the 
miraculous but to befuddle its spectator by means of superstition. 
 
2.3 Goethe’s “Luzifer-Mythos” 
 Goethe’s choice of the Faust theme serves a more radical critique of Gottsched 
than that offered by Bodmer and Breitinger, and this is apparent when one considers how 
and why this theme was adapted in dramatic form to advance a philosophical argument.  
The Urfaust, then, as a drama, can be seen as a turning point in poetic theory.  Goethe 
indicates that his motives in writing the Urfaust involved the creation of a new myth, the 
so-called “Luzifer-Mythos.”  The use of drama to create mythology not only is a direct 
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challenge to Gottsched, but also, in this case, is fundamentally different from the 
perspective of Bodmer and Breitinger, because Goethe was not pursuing the miraculous 
in support of an orthodox theological position, but in order to undermine orthodoxy.  This 
is consistent with Goethe’s reported failed dissertation, which sought to undermine 
ecclesiastical authority (Boerner 36).  In Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe in the context of 
retroactively explaining his thoughts at the time that he was writing the Urfaust, speaks 
of Lucifer as a necessary being for the continuation of the divine process of creation: 
Ich mochte mir wohl eine Gottheit vorstellen, die sich von Ewigkeit her 
selbst produziert; da sich aber Produktion nicht ohne Mannigfaltigkeit 
denken läßt, so mußte sie sich notwendig sogleich als ein Zweites 
erscheinen, welches wir unter dem Namen des Sohns anerkennen; diese 
beiden mußten nun den Akt des Hervorbringens fortsetzen, und erschienen 
sich selbst wieder im Dritten, welches nun ebenso bestehend lebendig und 
ewig als das Ganze war. Hiermit war jedoch  der Kreis der Gottheit 
geschlossen, und es wäre ihnen selbst nicht möglich gewesen, abermals 
ein ihnen völlig Gleiches hervorzubringen. Da jedoch der Produktionstrieb 
immer fortging, so erschufen sie ein Viertes, das aber schon in sich einen 
Widerspruch hegte, indem es, wie sie, unbedingt und doch zugleich in 
ihnen enthalten und durch sie begrenzt sein sollte. Dieses war nun Luzifer, 
welchem von nun an die ganze Schöpfungskraft übertragen war, und von 
dem alles übrige Sein ausgehen sollte. (HA 9:351) 
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In this conception of Lucifer as the source through which God effects creation, Goethe 
means to create not merely a bridging figure between the infinite Godhead and creation 
but also a source of matter through a process of “concentration” (“Konzentration”): 
Aus dieser Konzentration der ganzen Schöpfung, denn sie war von Luzifer 
ausgegangen und mußte ihm folgen, entsprang nun alles das, was wir 
unter der Gestalt der Materie gewahr werden, was wir uns als schwer, fest 
und finster vorstellen, welches aber, indem es, wenn auch nicht 
unmittelbar, doch durch Filiation vom göttlichen Wesen herstammt, 
ebenso unbedingt mächtig und ewig ist als der Vater und die Großeltern. 
Da nun das ganze Unheil, wenn wir es so nennen dürfen, bloß durch die 
einseitige Richtung Luzifers entstand; so fehlte freilich dieser Schöpfung 
die bessere Hälfte: denn alles, was durch Konzentration gewonnen wird, 
besaß sie, aber es fehlte ihr alles, was durch Expansion allein bewirkt 
werden kann; und so hätte die sämtliche Schöpfung durch immerwährende 
Konzentration sich selbst aufreiben, sich mit ihrem Vater Luzifer 
vernichten und alle ihre Ansprüche an eine gleiche Ewigkeit mit der 
Gottheit verlieren können. (HA 9:351-352) 
In this conception of matter as concentrated, and thus, limited and cut off from the 
Godhead, Goethe mythologizes a connection between the Godhead and man to be based 
upon an expansion of the former to meet the latter, and the imitation of Lucifer by the 
latter in trying to re-establish the relationship of creation to the Godhead that had been 
lost: 
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 Diesem Zustand sahen die Elohim eine Weile zu, und sie hatten die Wahl, 
jene Äonen abzuwarten, in welchen das Feld wieder rein geworden und 
ihnen Raum zu einer neuen Schöpfung geblieben wäre, oder ob sie in das 
Gegenwärtige eingreifen und dem Mangel nach ihrer Unendlichkeit zu 
Hülfe kommen wollten. Sie erwählten nun das letztere, und supplierten 
durch ihren bloßen Willen in einem Augenblick den ganzen Mangel, den 
der Erfolg von Luzifers Beginnen an sich trug. Sie gaben dem unendlichen 
Sein die Fähigkeit, sich auszudehnen, sich gegen sie zu bewegen; der 
eigentliche Puls des Lebens war wieder hergestellt, und Luzifer selbst 
konnte sich dieser Einwirkung nicht entziehen. Dieses ist die Epoche, wo 
dasjenige hervortrat, was wir als Licht kennen, und wo dasjenige begann, 
was wir mit dem Worte Schöpfung zu bezeichnen pflegen. So sehr sich 
auch nun diese durch die immer fortwirkende Lebenskraft der Elohim 
stufenweise vermannigfaltigte; so fehlte es doch noch an einem Wesen, 
welches die ursprüngliche Verbindung mit der Gottheit wieder 
herzustellen geschickt wäre, und so wurde der Mensch hervorgebracht, der 
in allem der Gottheit ähnlich, ja gleich sein sollte, sich aber freilich 
dadurch abermals in dem Falle Luzifers befand, zugleich unbedingt und 
beschränkt zu sein, und da dieser Widerspruch durch alle Kategorien des 
Daseins sich an ihm manifestieren und ein vollkommenes Bewußtsein 
sowie ein entschiedener Wille seine Zustände begleiten sollte; so war 
vorauszusehen, daß er zugleich das Vollkommenste und 
Unvollkommenste, das glücklichste und unglücklichste Geschöpf werden 
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müsse. Es währte nicht lange, so spielte er auch völlig die Rolle des 
Luzifer. (HA 9:352) 
The human being thus plays the role of Lucifer in relating to the Godhead, in providing a 
locus for the struggle between expansion and contraction, between becoming (“Werden”) 
and being (“Sein”), in a process that Goethe attempts to universalize as common to all 
religions, as he concludes the eighth chapter of the second part of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit: 
 Die Absonderung vom Wohltäter ist der eigentliche Undank, und so ward 
jener Abfall zum zweitenmal eminent, obgleich die ganze Schöpfung 
nichts ist und nichts war, als ein Abfallen und Zurückkehren zum 
Ursprünglichen. 
Man sieht leicht, wie hier die Erlösung nicht allein von Ewigkeit her 
beschlossen, sondern als ewig notwendig gedacht wird, ja daß sie durch 
die ganze Zeit des Werdens und Seins sich immer wieder erneuern muß. 
Nichts ist in diesem Sinne natürlicher, als daß die Gottheit selbst die 
Gestalt des Menschen annimmt, die sie sich zu einer Hülle schon 
vorbereitet hatte, und daß sie die Schicksale  desselben auf kurze Zeit teilt, 
um durch diese Verähnlichung das Erfreuliche zu erhöhen und das 
Schmerzliche zu mildern. Die Geschichte aller Religionen und 
Philosophien lehrt uns, daß diese große, den Menschen unentbehrliche 
Wahrheit von verschiedenen Nationen in verschiedenen Zeiten auf 
mancherlei Weise, ja in seltsamen Fabeln und Bildern der Beschränktheit 
gemäß überliefert worden; genug, wenn nur anerkannt wird, daß wir uns 
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in einem Zustande befinden, der, wenn er uns auch niederzuziehen und zu 
drücken scheint, dennoch Gelegenheit gibt, ja zur Pflicht macht, uns zu 
erheben und die Absichten der Gottheit dadurch zu erfüllen, daß wir, 
indem wir von einer Seite uns zu verselbsten genötiget sind, von der 
andern in regelmäßigen Pulsen uns zu entselbstigen nicht versäumen. (HA 
9: 352-3) 
By identifying the universal aspects of the mythical in all religious traditions, Goethe is 
making a truth claim based not on the imitation of the natural (as in Gottschedian 
poetics), but also seems to be breaking free of the theological baggage of Bodmer and 
Breitinger, not merely because of this universal approach denies primacy to one religion 
(e.g. Christianity) over others, but because it brings the religious and the fantastic into the 
realm of archetypal forms inherent to human thought: the “Luzifer-Mythos” is not an 
attempt of a poet to imagine God’s laws that surpass the human intellect, but is instead a 
focus upon the archetypes used in religious myth-making as an illumination of the human 
intellect itself.  The attempt to draw out abstract universal conclusions about religion as a 
human phenomenon is, in itself, an argument that owes much to the reasoned approach of 
the Enlightenment, and opposes Gottsched not from an irrational basis, but from a dispute 
over knowledge itself: the fantastic myth is viewed not in opposition to knowledge, but as 
a source from which more universal conclusions might be drawn, by establishing a 
morphology of the fantastic. 
 When one takes Breitinger’s distinction between the poet and the magician into 
this context, Goethe’s comparatively radical critique of Gottsched becomes more 
apparent.  Breitinger’s poet was meant to employ the fantastic in imagining worlds 
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beyond the reach of the human intellect, pursuing the miraculous in an effort to show 
divine truth, and stood in opposition to the magician, the latter being viewed as an 
adventurous figure of superstition and falsehood.  Goethe, rather than offer a poetic 
theory in which myths are accepted or rejected along the lines of the debate between 
Gottsched and his Swiss critics, instead offers a poetic vision, a metaphor.  In doing so, 
he replaces the traditional division between the divine and the human with a picture of 
the human being at the center of a struggle between the concentrated powers of the 
intellect, in imitation of Lucifer, and the feeling or compulsion to expand toward the 
Godhead.  Therefore, the need for other possible worlds to encompass the divine or the 
fantastic is no longer necessary, for the human being is a microcosm of the universe 
including all of those possibilities. 
 Whereas Gottsched’s poetics excludes the fantastic, and Bodmer and Breitinger 
defend its otherworldly possibility, Goethe’s “Luzifer-Mythos” looks to the universal 
aspects of the fantastic in past traditions and other cultures, and attempts to give poetic 
expression to this numinous aspect of human thought, and indeed, as a human category of 
being.  By doing this, he poetically presents an integrated whole in place of the 
dichotomies of previous poetics.  Gottsched’s mimetic approach prized the plausible over 
the fantastic, while Bodmer and Breitinger were forced to allow for other possible worlds 
to account for the fantastic.  Rather than give an intellectual poetics, Goethe’s poetic 
vision presents a unity of the intellectual (the Luciferian contraction) with the imaginative 
(the expansion toward the Godhead), a unity concretized within the human being as a 
microcosm of all creation. 
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 That Goethe links this poetic metaphor, this myth, to the time in which he worked 
upon the Urfaust, gives one a basis for understanding why he chose to advance a 
philosophical argument by poetic means.  Goethe’s poetic metaphor reflects a sharp 
break not only from Gottsched, but also from Bodmer and Breitinger.  Whereas his 
predecessors all used rational argument and non-poetic means to discuss the possibilities 
of the fantastic and the poetic, Goethe avoids falling into that dichotomy, and defines the 
poetic by the poetic.  It is this approach that he takes in constructing the Urfaust. 
 
2.4 Goethe’s Non-discursive Response to the Debates 
 Another means of exploring the tension between Enlightenment poetics, 
especially Gottsched’s poetics, and Goethe’s Urfaust is the possibility that Goethe drew 
upon the Italian Renaissance theatrical commedia dell’arte in his choice of characters, 
types of text and scenarios within the play.  The term commedia dell’arte is a rather 
broad category used for a group of theatrical forms which arose in the Italian Renaissance 
during the latter half of the sixteenth century (Fischer-Lichte 130).  Indeed, if one were to 
attempt to define the genre, given its loose organization around commercial, as opposed 
to poetic, principles, one might say that the genre’s basis was more rhetorical than poetic 
in nature, and that such rhetoric was not aimed at exerting a positive moral influence, in 
classical Horatian terms, but rather at merely pleasing the audience. 
 It is important to note that the argument here is not to suggest that the commedia 
dell’arte represents the only concrete elements used in a non-discursive response to 
Enlightenment debates.  Goethe mentions his childhood fascination with the 
Puppenspiele of the mid-eighteenth century at several points early in Dichtung und 
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Wahrheit, passages that certainly bear relevance to his theatrical interest in the Faust 
theme (see here Goethe’s description of his exposure to puppet plays by his grandmother, 
HA 9:15, and his description of his continued interest in staging puppet plays as a child, 
HA 9:48-51).  The commedia dell’arte is, however, a previously unexamined element in 
Goethe’s Urfaust that, if anything, due to the thoroughgoing number of correspondences 
present, shows that Goethe’s opposition to Gottsched was depicted in a clever and 
persistent manner through dramatic elements themselves, as opposed to discursive 
argument. 
 
2.4.1 Gottsched as the Chief Enlightenment Critic of commedia dell’arte 
In Walter Hinck’s monumental study of the commedia dell’arte he comments 
upon the rhetorical function of the genre as follows: “Nicht Originalität, sondern 
Variation des Bekannten gilt als Kunst.  So teilt die Commedia dell’arte langhin ein 
Gesetz der Rhetorik: vorgegebene Themen in bereitgestellten Formen zur äußersten 
Wirkung zu führen” (Hinck 6).  Given the lack of emphasis within the genre on moral-
didactic aims or to poetic principles such as “Wahrscheinlichkeit,” neither of which were 
essential for (or perhaps more accurately, consistent with) the possibility of commercial 
success sought by the performances, it is easy to see that a critic such as Gottsched would 
have viewed such performances with disdain, written and performed as they were, for the 
“Pöbel.”  Hinck names Gottsched as the most outspoken enemy of the genre in all of 
German dramatic criticism: 
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Für uns im Vordergrund zu stehen hat die Frage, welche 
Wirkungsmöglichkeit  das Gottschedsche System noch dem Théâre italien 
und damit der Commedia dell’arte beläßt. 
Einem ersten Überblick stellt sich ein scheinbar eindeutiger Sachverhalt 
dar: eine bissige Polemik gegen die italienische Bühne durchzieht 
leitmotivartig Gottscheds Erörterungen zur Lustspieltheorie und wird an 
Intensität nur noch erreicht von der Polemik gegen das „ungereimteste 
Werk“ des menschlichen Verstandes, die Oper.  Noch nie und nie wieder 
hat die Commedia dell’arte in Deutschland einen so beredten Feind 
gefunden wie Gottsched. (Hinck 168-169) 
Indeed, in returning to an earlier cited passage from Gottsched, one notes the particular 
scorn he shows for Italian theater in the context of his dismissal of the Faust theme, along 
with magic in drama, as “Alfanzereyen”: 
Das Mährchen von D. Fausten hat lange genug den Pöbel belustiget: Und 
man hat ziemlicher maßen aufgehört, solche Alfanzereyen gerne 
anzusehen. Daher muß denn ein Poet große Behutsamkeit gebrauchen, daß 
er nicht unglaubliche Dinge auf die Schaubühne bringe, vielweniger 
sichtbar vorstelle. Die italiänische Schaubühne, und das THEATRE DE 
LA FOIRE zu Paris wimmeln von solchen Hexereyen: ja auch das bessere 
französische Theater fängt schon an auf solche Alfanzereyen zu verfallen, 
wie man aus einigen neuern Stücken z.E. LE ROI DE COCAGNE, und 
L'ORACLE, erhellet. (Gottsched 241) 
	  
	   43	  
Hinck mentions this quote, along with numerous others from Gottsched’s Versuch einer 
Critischen Dichtkunst, as well as Gottsched’s later Critischen Beyträgen (1734/5), in 
giving an exhaustive demonstration of how Gottsched’s opposition to Italian theatre, and 
specifically the commedia dell’arte, was based on many factors, including his notion of 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, his insistence upon moral principle even in comedy and satire, his 
understanding of the Ständeklausel as he derived it from Opitz, his strong opposition to 
the use of masks to represent character types (and the use of “types” in general for 
characters), and his stipulation of a teachable moral lesson as essential to the Fabel, etc. 
(Hinck 169-180). 
Gottsched is credited by scholars with having played a demonstrative role in the 
downfall of the commedia dell’arte genre, and even as the first important German critic 
of the form.  Wolfgang Krömer (1976) describes this role as follows: 
Drei Phasen des Kampfes gegen das Stegreiftheater sind erkennbar: 
Gottsched greift es im Namen der Wahrscheinlichkeit und des 
moralischen Nutzens an und verurteilt seine Typen und seine Zannikomik, 
ohne jedoch selbst abgerundete Charaktere geben zu können und ohne das 
Spektakuläre auszuschließen; Gellert strebt das rührende Lustspiel an und 
wendet sich somit gegen die moralische Indifferenz der Commedia 
dell’arte, will nicht den Schaden unverbesserlicher Typen verlachen 
lassen, sondern für die zu Charakteren gewordenen Personen interessieren; 
zuletzt reagiert der Realismus des 19. Jahrhunderts mit seiner 
Wirklichkeitstreue und -illusion auf die Typenhafitgkeit und die 
Phantastik des Stegreiftheaters. (Krömer 88-89) 
	  
	   44	  
Whether Gottsched can be credited specifically with bringing about the downfall of the 
form is debatable, but the demise of the genre is generally seen as being a consequence of 
the Enlightenment.  Fischer-Lichte notes in this regard: 
The extremely topical critique on the poor standard of the troupes is, 
therefore, to be viewed with some scepticism, as is Gottsched’s critique of 
the ‘decadence’ of the German wandering troupe.  The reason for the 
decline of the commedia dell’arte is much more likely to be found in the 
fact that, during the Enlightenment, it lost the specific function which had 
guaranteed its vitality and popularity since its beginnings more than one 
hundred years before. By the middle of the eighteenth century it had 
outlived itself. (Fischer-Lichte 130) 
Nevertheless Gottsched remains to this day the figure most associated with antagonism to 
the genre, and the fact that spirited defenses of the genre against his critique and that of 
Gellert persisted through the middle of the eighteenth century, from figures such as J.C. 
Krüger and even Lessing, indicate its importance in the debates on Gattungstheorie in the 
period (Krömer 89). 
 
2.4.2 Goethe and the Commedia dell’arte : Acknowledged and Inferred Influence 
 In seeking to establish the likelihood of Goethe’s use of commedia dell’arte in the 
development of the Urfaust, it is important first to note that Goethe’s later use of the 
genre has been well-documented with respect to Wilhelm Meisters Theatralische 
Sendung (1786) and Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795), and that this use was connected 
to long-running debates in the eighteenth century on guidelines for the German theater 
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(Holland 20).  The first important thing to note here is that Goethe, at least in the years 
following his Sturm und Drang period, made explicit reference to the commedia dell’arte 
genre in reflecting back on the debates about theater that spanned the eighteenth century.  
So one can establish that his disagreement with Gottsched, at least by that time, would 
have included a disagreement about the relative merit of this genre.   
 While it is with these works that Goethe’s interest in the genre of commedia 
dell’arte becomes explicit, the question of a possible interest at the time of the writing of 
the Urfaust can be inferred by looking at Goethe’s early comedic works, which were 
contemporaneous to his drafting of the Urfaust.  Here Walter Hinck’s work provides 
important clues to bolster this thesis, although he himself does not mention the Urfaust.  
First, Hinck notes that the eruption of interest in Shakespeare during the Sturm und 
Drang was primarily limited to its application to drama through tragedy, as opposed to 
comedy (Hinck 358-9).  While Hinck’s study shows a pervasive Italian influence upon 
Goethe’s comedic writing throughout the 1770s, it is his reference to Wolfgang Kayser’s 
work on connecting Goethe’s comedy “Die Mitschuldigen” (1769) to the commedia 
dell’arte tradition that is relevant to this study, because it would indicate a possible 
familiarity with and inclination toward that genre prior to the work on the Urfaust (Hinck 
360).  Hinck himself notes that the piece calls to mind the commedia dell’arte in respect 
to two of its facets: the burlesque and farcical character of the piece, and the principal of 
moral indifference in the treatment of crimes such as theft and attempted adultery, with 
moral neutrality being a characteristic of the commedia dell’arte that persisted in 
Goethe’s comedic works for his entire career (Hinck 359). 
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2.4.3 Commedia dell’arte and the Urfaust 
 At first glance, the proposed investigation of a relationship of the commedia 
dell’arte to the Urfaust might seem dubious, if for no other reason than the fact that this 
work is a tragedy.  But several convergent factors provide ample reason to consider it: 1) 
the fact that the use of the commedia dell’arte was opposed by Enlightenment dramatists, 
especially Gottsched; 2) the fact that Goethe was likely influenced by this form in the 
time immediately preceding his work on the Urfaust, and that he apparently considered it 
then as a worthy form of drama.  Is it possible that Goethe borrowed elements from this 
Italian comedic style from the Renaissance, a style derided by his antagonist Gottsched, 
in formulating a tragedy that used dramatic material held in equal disdain within 
Gottsched’s poetics? 
 The first important point to consider in answering this question is that one should 
not equate the term “commedia dell’arte” with a dramatic genre such as comedy.  
Fischer-Lichte explains that the term, historically considered, covers a broad scope of 
theatrical forms: 
The term commedia dell’arte does not embrace one, wholly specific 
theatre form; instead, it represents a much more general term for very 
different theatre forms. The troupes offered their performances at court, in 
private and public rooms and  in the market square. They performed fixed, 
written texts and improvisations; their repertoire included comedies, 
pastorals, tragedies, interludes (in amateur performances by the Academy 
or at court) and later even melodrama.  (Fischer-Lichte 130-131) 
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Therefore, the commedia dell’arte is not to be understood as incompatible with tragedy.  
Hinck’s study specifically focuses upon commedia dell’arte in connection with the 
German Lustspiel, so it is entirely understandable that he would not address the Urfaust 
even when discussing Goethe’s connection to this theatrical tradition.  However, if one 
looks at many of the commonly accepted stock characteristics of the commedia dell’arte, 
a case can be made that such a connection exists.  In doing so, the following 
characteristics of the commedia dell’arte bear examination for their possible inclusion in 
the Urfaust: the stock character role-types of the form, the types of text generally 
included within the form, and the typical structural elements of the form.  Fischer-Lichte 
and Krömer each give definitions of the characteristics that provide a good basis for this 
analysis.  Clearly, the Urfaust does not conform perfectly to the types, but the amount of 
overlap between the general tendencies of the commedia dell’arte and the roles, texts, 
and structural elements of the Urfaust is enough to suggest that Goethe’s awareness of 
the theatrical form found its way into the work. 
 
2.4.3.1 Stock Character Types in the Commedia dell’arte and the Urfaust 
 Of the three categories, perhaps the least evident in its influence from the 
commedia dell’arte would be the role of stock character types in the Urfaust, given that 
the specific Italian character types and specific Italian dialects common to that theatrical 
form that do not, of course, appear in the Urfaust.   Upon reflection, however, the 
relevance of stock character types as set forth in the commedia dell’arte may be seen as 
relevant, if one sees how Goethe may have adapted the role of masks and dialects to a 
non-Italian context.  Fischer-Lichte points out that the commedia dell’arte 
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characterisically used a limited set of roles, far fewer than the roles other forms of 
theatre, with the most basic roles described as follows: 
The basic stock of roles consisted of four masks, two elderly men, the 
Venetian merchant, Pantalone, and the Bolognese lawyer, Dottore, two 
zanni, or servants, from the region near Bergamo, Arlecchino and 
Brighella, and at least one or two couples, innamorati (young lovers), the 
Spanish Capitano – the braggart soldier – and a maid. Whilst the masked 
figures made use of local dialect, the lovers spoke pure Tuscany. The 
masked figures were not only distinguished by their  dialect and silk or 
leather half-masks, but also by a typified and characteristic  costume 
which informed the spectator as to the identity of the role as soon as the 
actor first appeared. The lovers, on the other hand, wore costly 
contemporary  clothes. (Fischer-Lichte 131) 
Here one notes the inclusion of masters and servants, and of the young lovers, both of 
which are quite relevant to the limited character-roles in the Urfaust.  Of the few other 
minor characters, one finds that there is indeed a soldier (Valentin) and a maid (Marthe). 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, while there is no provision for the use of 
masks made by Goethe in the stage directions, a variation on this is found in the ability of 
Mephisto to change his appearance and that of Faust.  (One mention of changing 
appearances in the stage directions does occur when Mephisto dons a cloak and a wig to 
speak to the student, but this is not so much a variation on the theme of masks as it is a 
veiled attack on Gottsched.)  In the case of Mephisto assuming the identity of Faust in the 
scene with the student, this is not so much for the purpose of becoming Faust, but rather 
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as a means of providing a caricature of the scholar, of playing to a character type.  In the 
case of changing Faust’s appearance, this “masking” distinguishes between Faust’s 
character as a lover to Margrethe/Gretchen and Faust as the “Dottore.”  Note that the 
name change of Margrethe to Gretchen reflects a sort of dual identity for the other lover, 
who wears a different name rather than a mask. 
 Goethe’s use of “masks” varies from the tradition of the commedia dell’arte in 
another important respect.  In the commedia dell’arte, the innamorati (lovers) were not 
masked (Krömer 30).   It is in Faust’s role as lover that he is “masked” for Gretchen, 
who, in turn, wears her new name as a sort of mask of her own identity.  Another possible 
variation upon the commedia dell’arte can be seen in the representation of the lovers’ 
speech.  While the traditional form, as noted previously in Fischer-Lichte, used a 
different dialect in the speech of the lovers, one sees instead of a different dialect in the 
Garten scene that Faust’s speech changes when he makes his declaration of love, in a 
manner that falls out of meter, as noted by Schöne, in the passage beginning with “Ja, 
mein Kind...”: 
Jetzt, nach dem Blumenorakel, das zu Margarethes Liebeserklärung wird, 
fallen Fausts erregte Sätze aus der metrischen Ordnung und klanglichen 
Bindung der (überwiegend im Madrigalvers gehaltenen) Szene heraus in 
eine rhythmisch ungeregelte und ungereimte Prosa.  Fünf heftige Akzente 
muß deren letzte 7silbige Zeile (1043) tragen.  (Schöne II: 880) 
The change in meter here is clearly connected with the love declaration, whether it is 
indicative of the influence of the commedia dell’arte and its difference in dialect for the 
lovers is a matter that cannot be proven, but could be suggested given the wider context. 
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2.4.3.2 Text types generally within the commedia dell’arte and the Urfaust 
 The texts within the commedia dell’arte generally fall within four categories: 1) 
tirate, 2) dialoghi amorosi, 3) bravure and 4) lazzi and burle. Fischer-Lichte defines each 
of these text types rather succinctly:  
1 tirate, a long complaint, accusation, eulogy or description which was 
sometimes directed to another role-type on the stage, such as when the old 
man gives his son advice, or when the maid turns to one of the suitors, or 
which is spoken as a thoughtful, reflective and argumentative monologue; 
2 dialoghi amorosi, a rhetorically brilliant exchange of feeling between 
lovers who find themselves in a certain situation; rejection, confession, or 
apology, often taken from the love poetry of the time or from the 
commedia erudita and Renaissance tragedy; 
3 bravure, masterful, rhetoric boasting by the Capitano, often an element 
of his dialogue with the servant, but more often carried out as part of a 
monologue;  
4 lazzi and burle, the witty play on words and movements, mostly used by 
the zanni when they interrupt the scene with comic action. (Fischer-Lichte 
130-131) 
There do seem to be correspondences within the Urfaust to these types.  Notably, the 
Urfaust could be said to open with a tirate-type monologue, as Faust delivers a long, 
thoughtful complaint in the Nacht scene.  The dialogues between Faust and Gretchen, 
such as the exchange in the Marthens Garden scene, are indeed rhetorical in nature, as 
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they find themselves in a theological discussion as a means of trying to justify their 
relationship. 
 The appearance of bravure, which are connected specifically to the master-
servant relationship, can be found in the boasting of Mephisto toward Faust and toward 
the Student, and in Mephisto’s brief monologues, such as that following his meeting with 
the Student.  Mephisto, as the bragging character in the play, would correlate to the 
Capitano of the commedia dell’arte: while the Capitano’s boasts are hollow, due to his 
intrinsic cowardice, the boasts of Mephisto are also somewhat hollow, in that his 
accomplishments are all based upon deception (for this aspect of the Capitano, see 
Krömer 40).  Indeed, one common element in the Capitano type, failure in romance, 
seems to have been transposed to Faust via Mephisto, again in spite of the boasting and 
promises of success. 
 The lazzi-burle element can be seen in the Auerbachs Keller scene, where 
Mephisto brings Faust into an encounter with drunken revelers at the pub.  This scene 
type is described by Krömer as “[...] z.T. scherzhafte Dialoge, z.T. kleine, häufig obszöne 
oder grobianische Szenen” (Krömer 43). 
 
2.4.3.3 Structural Elements within the Commedia dell’arte and the Urfaust 
 Perhaps the most relevant aspect of the commedia dell’arte that can be seen in the 
Urfaust is the use of various structural elements, that is to say, relationships in the 
character constellation of the work.  A set of fixed structural elements played a large role 
in the theatre of commedia dell’arte, which was, after all, often improvisational theatre.  
The fixed set of roles were important in allowing the improvisational troupes to perform a 
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large amount of scenarios, adapting the roles accordingly in various permutations 
(Fischer-Lichte 132).  Within this large number of scenarios, one finds a small number of 
archetypal patterns, and these are instructive in the consideration of possible influence of 
the genre upon Goethe’s Urfaust.   
 The three most common structural elements in commedia dell’arte, as identified 
by Fischer-Lichte, are particularly useful in looking at the Urfaust.  First, there is the 
opposition between young and old:  
Time and again, the old men seek to hinder marriage between two young 
lovers – whether out of greed, or because they themselves have an eye on 
the lady in question. This raises a further concretisation of the general 
opposition between old and young: an old character intends to marry a 
young girl who does not return his love, or he is already married to a 
young girl who takes on a young lover. (Fischer-Lichte 132) 
Here, one finds two variations upon this theme in the Urfaust.  First, Faust is actually an 
older man pursuing a younger woman, who only returns his love when she is under the 
illusion that he is someone other than who he is, the younger “Heinrich.”  Secondly, there 
is also the fact that Mephisto’s deceptions ultimately serve to thwart the possibility for 
love and happiness between Faust and Gretchen. 
  Secondly, there is widespread use of the master-servant relationship: 
The intrigues of the servants are often directed against their masters – 
whether these are the two older figures or the innamorati. Or else such 
intrigues are employed for their own private interests. In any case, the 
master–servant relationship is changed, modified, if not turned upside-
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down in various ways through the intrigues of the servants. (Fischer-
Lichte 132) 
Here the fact that the Faust-Mephisto relationship is based upon a bet, rather than the 
traditional Faustian devil pact, plays directly into the ambiguity of the master-servant 
relationship of the commedia dell’arte.  Mephisto “serves” Faust in helping him to obtain 
his moment of happiness, and in practical terms, to win Gretchen.  But this is clearly not 
a straightforward form of “help,” as Faust and Gretchen are undermined by his methods, 
which lead to the poisoning death of Gretchen’s mother, the death of Valentin, 
Gretchen’s act of infanticide, etc.  If Faust is the master whose will Mephisto serves, then 
he is clearly undermined. 
 Finally, there is the trajectory of the relationship between the two lovers: “The 
path to finding each other leads through a maze of disguises, deceptions and masking, 
through magic (in the pastoral) and even madness. It is only after the lovers have passed 
through a sequence of such transformations that the ‘right’ partners are united and a 
marriage can take place” (Fischer-Lichte 132).  Here the significant variation on the 
theme is that the love affair is ultimately doomed to failure, but the other aspects are all 
present in abundance, with the disguises, deceptions and masking of both Faust and 
Mephisto toward Gretchen, and the madness of Gretchen as a result of these intrigues. 
 
2.4.3.4 Commedia dell’arte and Faust I/II 
Another recent study has taken up the topic of the commedia dell’arte in Faust 
I/II.  Whereas Dieter Borchmeyer’s "Faust beyond Tragedy: Hidden Comedy, Covert 
Opera" (2011) treats the elements of the Faust works in their final form, convincingly 
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arguing for a use of commedia dell’arte elements and themes present, its focus is 
decidedly on the developments in Faust after the Urfaust, with the Sturm und Drang 
period receiving less attention, mentioned mainly in the following passage:  
“The Faust drama’s comedic counterpointing has of course precedents in 
the often droll sixteenth-century Faust book and in the burlesque scenes of 
its dramatic adaptations, above all those of the puppet theatre, which was 
Goethe’s first inspiration for Faust. In his ‘Sturm und Drang’ years he 
engaged intensively with the over-the-top comic theatre of the sixteenth 
century and composed his farces based on their model – such were 
Jahrmarktsfest zu Plundersweilen (Fair at Plunderweilen), Ein 
Fastnachtsspiel vom Pater Brey (A Carnival Play about Pater Brey) or his 
obscene fragment, Hanswursts Hochzeit (Hanswurst’s Wedding). They 
stand in clear opposition to courtly aristocratic norms of decency. But it 
was not only in comedy – where, according to the traditional rules of the 
separation of styles, creatureliness still held a more or less constricted 
right to express itself – but also in tragedy (Götz von Berlichingen) that 
Goethe programmatically flouted the model of sixteenth-century drama in 
defiance of the rules of decency and style.” (Borchmeyer 215-216)  
The context of the other works cited helps to support the contention of the use of 
commedia dell’arte in the period of the Urfaust, and while Borchmeyer’s focus is 
primarily on elements not included in the Urfaust but in later drafts, he points toward the 
Sturm und Drang period of Goethe’s work as the likely beginning of this interest.  This is 
helpful in showing the presence of a thoroughgoing, albeit relatively unrecognized 
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previous use of commedia dell’arte in the Urfaust, and furthermore, this in the context of 























	   56	  
3 Goethe’s Approach to Myth-Making in the Urfaust 
Goethe’s “Luzifer-Mythos,” as well as his development of the concrete use of 
commedia dell’arte in the Urfaust, each drew upon and grew out of his response to the 
poetic debates of Enlightenment literary theorists in the eighteenth century.  The actual 
relationship of myth and mythology to Goethe’s development of the Urfaust ultimately 
forms a rejoinder to the Enlightenment attempt to define the limits of poetry by means of 
reason.  In this respect, Goethe’s approach should be seen as a holistic yoking together of 
poetry and reason, rather than a rejection of reason in favor of poetry. 
Goethe’s approach to myth-making consciously takes the point of limit as perhaps 
its most defining characteristic: myth, for Goethe, is able to transcend the limits of our 
reason-based knowledge.  In this respect, the Urfaust, in which the limits of reason-based 
knowledge themselves are a chief focus of criticism, might be said to be not merely a 
myth, but part of Goethe’s implicit argument for mythology, with a fundamentally 
archetypal sort of mythic holism being put forth to argue poetically, rather than 
discursively, against Enlightenment critics of myth and mythology.  Goethe’s approach 
once again expands the debate of his time, in that views on myth within Enlightenment 
poetics, whether generally positive or negative, were predicated upon the idea of reason 
alone being the arbiter of truth.   
Gottsched received and further developed the Enlightenment view of myth as 
“error” from French Enlightenment sources.  While this view ran counter to the limited 
acceptance of myth by figures such as Bodmer, Goethe’s approach in the Urfaust itself 
breaks these accepted parameters of debate, and similarly to his “Luzifer-Mythos,” 
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represents an example of a poetic, rather than discursive response, in which Goethe forms 
his own mythology. 
 
3.1 The Relation of Mythology Poetic Debates of the Enlightenment 
 Could the impetus for Goethe’s use of mythology in the Urfaust have been more 
than a question of form itself (in the sense of choosing the poetic over the discursive 
approach), and, in fact, represent a rejection of Enlightenment views of mythology 
altogether?  It would seem that the rational, scientific basis of Enlightenment thinkers for 
the rejection of mythology goes hand in hand not merely with the development of the 
Urfaust as a mythology, but also with the themes of that mythology itself. 
 In looking, therefore, at the poetic debates regarding mythology and their role in 
the development of Goethe’s Urfaust, the following questions deserve consideration: 1) 
What constituted the basis of Enlightenment objections to “mythology” in principle?  2) 
How did these objections help illuminate the relationship between reason and the 
imagination for Enlightenment literary critics?  3) How does the opposition of 
Gottsched’s view to that of Bodmer/Breitinger on this point show the limits of 
Enlightenment thinking with respect to its priority given to reason?  4) How does 
Goethe’s view of mythology fundamentally differ from that of Enlightenment critics with 
respect to their views on the relationship between reason and imagination?  5) How does 
Goethe’s view in this respect differ in its relationship to the Unknown and to the limits of 
knowledge?  6) How do Goethe’s views on mythology fundamentally inform the Urfaust 
thematically? 
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 Most fittingly, Goethe’s poetic response to the Enlightenment gains its weight by 
virtue of the attempts of Enlightenment literary critics, such as Bernard le Bovier de 
Fontenelle (1657-1757) and J.C. Gottsched, to fuse together literature and science 
(Literaturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft).  Indeed, one might say that rather than 
use science as a microscope for the examination of literature, in the manner of those 
whom Goethe criticizes, Goethe reverses the view, and uses literature (in the form of 
mythology) to show the limits of this eminently rational worldview.   
 In carrying out a discussion of the role of mythology in Goethe’s Urfaust, it is 
first important to establish how the literary critics of the Enlightenment framed a view of 
mythological thinking from the perspective of theory, as a means of demonstrating that 
against which Goethe is reacting.  The debate on mythology was such a central motif 
within the discussion of Enlightenment poetics, and this helps to account for why 
Goethe’s lifelong interest in mythology was already quite well-developed by the early 
1770s.   Goethe’s conception of mythology formed not only a direct challenge to the 
Enlightenment literary critics through his use of themes within the Urfaust, but also 
through his manipulation of received dramatic imagery, e.g., as shown earlier by 
Renaissance theatre through the commedia dell’arte, and as will be later discussed with 
his use of neoplatonic and alchemical cosmogony (especially via Welling) in such a way 
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3.2 Critique of Mythology within Enlightenment Thought: Fontenelle 
 Perhaps the most important and influential figure in early Enlightenment thought 
on the question of the value of mythology is Fontenelle, whose influence on Gottsched is 
known and documented (Krauss 1963, Poser 1979, Bürger 1983).  For Fontenelle, the 
subject of myth, as any other, should be pursued first on the basis of reason, and in his 
work De l'origine des fables (1691-1699 , 1724), the original development of myth is 
explained as having its origin in the ignorance of past primitive peoples, who used 
familiar models from their lives to explain the wonders of nature: 
II faut prendre garde que ces idées, qui peuvent être appelées les systèmes 
de ces temps-là, étaient toujours copiées d'après les choses les plus 
connues. On avait vu souvent verser de l'eau de dedans une cruche: on 
imaginait donc fort bien comment un dieu versait celle d'une rivière; et par 
la facilité même qu’on avait à l’imaginer, on était tout à fait porté à le 
croire. Ainsi, pour rendre raison des tonnerres et des foudres, on se 
représentait volontiers un dieu de figure humaine lançant sur nous des 
flèches de feu: idées manifestement prises sur des objets très familiers. 
(Fontenelle 15) 
This use of the familiar to build metaphors for the explanation of the Unknown, is, for 
Fontenelle, however “natural” in the sense that it seems rather an obvious occurrence 
among various primitive people and also in other forms among later people whose 
transposition of personal experience onto the Unknown within nature continued, 
fundamentally unscientific in that it proceeds from a non-objective, non-experimental 
point of view.  This folly of the “poor savages” must be avoided today: 
	  
	   60	  
Cette philosophie des premiers siècles roulait sur un principe si naturel 
qu'encore aujourd'hui notre philosophie n'en a point d'autre; c'est-à-dire 
que nous expliquons les choses inconnues de la nature par celles que nous 
avons devant les yeux, et que nous transportons à la physique les idées que 
l'expérience nous fournit. Nous avons découvert par l'usage, et non pas 
deviné, ce que peuvent les poids, les ressorts, les leviers; nous ne faisons 
agir la nature que par des leviers, des poids et des ressorts. Ces pauvres 
sauvages, qui ont les premiers habité le monde, ou ne connaissaient point 
ces choses-là, ou n'y avaient fait aucune attention. Ils n'expliquaient donc 
les effets de la nature que par des choses, plus grossières et plus palpables, 
qu'ils connaissaient. Qu'avons-nous fait les uns et les autres? Nous nous 
sommes toujours représenté l’inconnu sous la figure de ce qui nous était 
connu, mais heureusement il y a tous les sujets du monde de croire que 
l'inconnu ne peut pas ne point ressembler à ce qui nous est connu 
présentement. (Fontenelle 15-17) 
Here it is important to stress that Fontenelle’s description assumes the folly of trying to 
approach the Unknown by means of myth: myth is here regarded as being fundamentally 
in error, just as one might approach a scientific hypothesis.  Its origin is likewise placed 
outside of the modern, scientific worldview, into the realm of “poor savages.”  This is 
important, not merely from the standpoint of excluding myth from the arena of rational, 
scientific debate, but also from the standpoint of establishing a basis for the connection of 
literature with science, an Enlightenment ideal that eventually became more clearly 
articulated in the work of the man who first translated Fontenelle into German, J. C. 
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Gottsched.  Poser points to the question raised by Enlightenment thinkers regarding the 
origin of myth itself.  In doing so he raises the descriptions of myth alongside the 
descriptions of fable in various philosophical lexicons of the eighteenth century, such as 
Johann Georg Walch’s Philosophisiches Lexicon (Leipzig,1773), the so-called 
“Zedlerisches Lexicon” (formally known as the Großes verständiges Universal-Lexicon 
aller Wissenschaften und Künste (Halle-Leipzig 1732-1754) and also the Dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1780) by Diderot and d’Alembert 
(with the definitions written in this last case by de Jaucourt) (Poser 132).  Poser notes in 
Enlightenment Gattungstheorie the tendency to group myths and fables together as being 
poetic in nature, as opposed to didactic or historical: 
[...] in der Aufklärung finden wir auch eine umfangreiche Literatur, die 
sich mit den Mythen auseinandersetzt.  Dabei werden unter Mythen und 
Fabeln (fabula) im engeren Sinne die sog. poetische Fabeln im Gegensatz 
zu philosophischen (wie Parmenides’ Lehrgedicht) oder historischen (wie 
die Legenden über Pythagoras) verstanden, also Götter-, Halbgötter und 
Heldenerzählungen heidnischer Völker [...]. (Poser 132) 
In this context, Poser identifies two main areas of discussion regarding myth within 
Enlightenment poetics: (1) the discussion surrounding how myths arise, and (2) the 
question of whether new myths, such as Milton’s Paradise Lost, were to be allowed at all 
(Poser 132-133).  While Poser’s study is concerned more with the former question, as 
opposed to this study’s interest in the latter, his investigation into the treatment of the 
former question yields important insight into the larger question of the Enlightenment 
treatment of myth, which can help form the basis for an understanding of Goethe’s use of 
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mythology in the Urfaust.  In looking at the former question cited by Poser, one finds that 
in looking at the source of fables and myths, the tendency of Enlightenment thinkers was 
to categorize its origins in “error,” mentioned with respect to Fontenelle above.  One sees 
this with consistency in the lexical sources cited by Poser, and his explicit citation of the 
Zedler lexicon’s explanation is instructive in how broadly this category of “error” was 
understood (Poser 133). 
 
3.2.1 Myth as an Error of the Imagination 
Furthermore, Fontenelle goes on to point out that the mythic approach has its 
failing precisely in the realm of human imagination to conceive the powers of nature that 
are unknown to man by means other than an anthropomorphized construct: 
De cette philosophie grossière, qui régna nécessairement dans les premiers 
siècles, sont nés les dieux et les déesses. Il est assez curieux de voir 
comment l'imagination humaine a enfanté les fausses divinités. Les 
hommes voyaient bien des choses qu'ils n'eussent pas pu faire: lancer les 
foudres, exciter les vents, agiter les flots de la mer; tout cela était 
beaucoup au-dessus de leur pouvoir. Ils imaginèrent des êtres plus 
puissants qu’eux, et capables de produire ces grands effets. Il fallait bien 
que ces êtres-là fussent faits comme des hommes. Quelle autre figure 
eussent-ils pu avoir? Du moment qu'ils sont de figure humaine, 
l'imagination leur attribue naturellement tout ce qui est humain; les voilà 
hommes en toutes manières à cela près qu’ils sont toujours un peu plus 
puissants que des hommes. (Fontenelle 17-18) 
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It is, according to this view, a shortcoming specifically of the imagination that one is 
unable to formulate an accurate understanding of nature.  Thus myth, for strict 
Enlightenment thinkers along the lines of Fontenelle, is, like religion, not merely false by 
virtue of the results of the metaphors generated by means of its reductive approach to the 
Unknown, but also more fundamentally it is methodologically false and unscientific by 
means of its basis in the imagination as opposed to direct study of nature. 
 
3.2.2 The Continuance of the Error of Myth through the Artistic Tradition 
 The “rational” view of myth as being born from error leads Fontenelle to warn of 
the danger of spreading error as myths become incorporated into the artistic tradition, in 
terms that might best be described as a logician’s warning that faulty premises will lead 
to faulty conclusions: 
Outre tous ces principes particuliers de la naissance des fables, il y en a eu 
deux autres plus généraux qui les ont extrêmement favorisées. Le premier 
est le droit que l'on a d'inventer des choses pareilles à celles qui sont 
reçues ou de les pousser plus loin par des conséquences. Quelque 
événement extraordinaire aura fait croire qu'un dieu avait été amoureux 
d'une femme; aussitôt toutes les histoires ne seront pleines que de dieux 
amoureux. Vous croyez bien l’un; pourquoi ne croirez-vous pas l'autre? Si 
les dieux ont des enfants, ils les aiment, ils emploient toute leur puissance 
pour eux dans les occasions; et voilà une source inépuisable de prodiges 
qu'on ne pourra traiter d'absurdes. (Fontenelle 26) 
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To this he appends a warning that tradition itself can take the form of blind adherence to 
error, which, when coupled with the former principle, leads to the extension of such error 
into infinity (Fontenelle 27-28).  The error of myth becomes, for Fontenelle, passed on as 
accepted culture and tradition, in a way that allows for them to continue outside of the 
original context of their creation, and this one sees in the arts.  Hans Blumenberg 
describes this aspect of Fontenelle’s thought in terms of the myths becoming 
“indispensable” to the culture by means of art: 
In his discussion of myth Fontenelle expressed the Enlightenment's 
amazement at the fact that the myths of the Greeks had still not 
disappeared from the world. Religion and reason had, it is true, weaned 
people from them, but poetry and painting had given them the means by 
which to survive. They had been able to make themselves indispensable to 
these arts. (Blumenberg 109) 
In this manner, one can see that in the “rational” view of Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Fontenelle, mythology is nothing more than error in its original and then a form of 
institutionalized error in its continued poetic and artistic tradition. 
 
3.3 Enlightenment Critique of Myth in Relation to its Approach to the Unknown 
 With the scientific and logical approach to the Unknown outlined by Fontenelle, it 
becomes clearer why the issue of the imagination and its relationship to poetic 
construction was such a burning issue for the literary critics of the German 
Enlightenment, and also why the crux of their debate centered around the use of the 
imagination in poetic construction, and specifically, in approaching the Unknown.  
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Nevertheless, the strident views of thinkers such as Fontenelle held within them the seeds 
of later skeptical criticism of the Enlightenment’s optimistic position with regard to the 
development of and progress within knowledge.  Peter Bürger frames this issue well in 
his description of the long-term effects of Fontenelle’s scientific reductionist view of the 
Unknown: 
Für Fontenelle sind die Mythen handgreifliche, lächerliche Irrtümer (des 
faussetés manifestes et ridicules), denen keinerlei Wahrheitsgehalt 
zukommt, die jedoch als Dokumente der Geschichte des menschlichen 
Geistes von Interesse sind.  Als phantastische Erklärung von 
Naturphänomen werde an ihnen das Prinzip jeglicher Erklärung 
erkennbar: die Reduktion des Unbekannten auf Bekanntes.  Auch die 
wissenschaftliche Erklärung erfasse nicht die Sache selbst, sondern biete 
nur ein adäquateres Modell zu deren Erkenntnis.  Der 
Wissenschaftsoptimismus der Frühaufklärung ist skeptisch gebrochen und 
damit human. (Bürger 41) 
While Bürger’s characterization of the inability of the scientific approach of the 
Enlightenment to get to the thing itself (die Sache selbst) is not explicitly a reference to 
the Kantian description of the noumenon (which would be rather das Ding an sich), it is 
an observation made, of course, with the understanding of the eventual Kantian critique 
of metaphysics that formed later Enlightenment thought, and corroborates the skepticism, 
even within Enlightenment circles, of the epistemological models adopted in the early 
Enlightenment.  It is also instructive for understanding the challenges facing early 
Enlightenment thinkers with respect to the treatment of myth, in a manner that arguably 
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exceeds that outlined by Bürger, and which is related to the core themes of the Goethean 
Faust myth: myth, as it were, could be defined by those early Enlightenment thinkers as 
the reduction of the Unknown to the Known, or alternately, as in the case of Goethe’s 
approach to the Faust myth in the Urfaust, could be rendered as the depiction of the 
Unknowable, or, at the very least, a depiction of the limits of the Knowable.  Goethe, in 
his Urfaust, seems to have already understood the flaw in the early Enlightenment 
approach as outlined by Bürger.  The lamentation of the Faust character in the Nacht 
scene speaks to this loss of scientific optimism, and specifically not in terms of what is 
Unknown versus that which belongs to the category of the Known, but of the ability to 
know anything itself with the sort of confidence that the Enlightenment proclaims, “daß 
wir nichts wissen können.”  
 If, indeed, as Bürger suggests, the reductionist approach to myth seen in the 
Enlightenment bears relationship to the eventual skepticism toward Enlightenment 
optimism regarding knowledge, Goethe’s approach to myth-making in the Urfaust 
becomes more than merely a dramatic response to the Enlightenment poetic debates with 
respect to the content and form of dramatic construction, but also, a fundamental 
challenge to the reductionism of Enlightenment thought itself, done so on the question of 
its approach to the Unknown by means of asserting the role of myth/mythology as having 
a role not encompassed within the scientific approach to knowledge, literature and art.  
The question one might ask here is whether Goethe is merely approaching the same idea 
from two different sides (Fontenelle saying that myth was born from ignorance, and 
Goethe arguing that myth is necessary for describing that of which man is ignorant), or of 
whether Goethe is arguing for something altogether more holistic in the approach to 
	  
	   67	  
myth, defining it not from the standpoint of the absence of knowledge, but from the 
standpoint of the limits of knowledge itself (that is, not merely in terms of categories of 
Known and Unknown, but, as is suggested in the above-cited line from the Nacht scene, 
of the Knowable and the Unknowable).  Upon examining Goethe’s comments regarding 
myth, one will see that it is not mere chance that Goethe found myth a proper choice for 
his response to Gottsched and others, nor is myth merely a vehicle for Goethe to evade 
discursive thought: in the nature of myth itself, one already has the ontological basis for 
the criticism of Enlightenment optimism and discursive thinking. 
For an interesting examination of the debate between Gottsched and Bodmer as it 
relates to the question of what is allowed of the poet’s imagination within this 
reductionist paradigm, see Poser’s analysis of the dispute between them on the question 
of Milton’s Paradise Lost, which was viewed as having too much poetic license by 
Gottsched, and allowable by Bodmer (Poser 141-142).  In a rather peculiar interpretation 
of the connection between the didactic function and the truth or probability of fable, 
Gottsched contrasts Milton with Homer, arguing that the latter’s depictions of gods and 
heroes meet the criteria of “wahre Geschichte” whereas the former’s Paradise Lost does 
not, in that the heroes of Homer are noble, and the hero of Milton is the devil (Gottsched, 
1. Teil, 1. Haupstück, §30 and 2. Teil, 1. Abschnitt, 4. Haupstück, §1-6, as cited in Poser 
141).  Here the probability of truth/nature relies upon a recognizable moral order, as 
opposed to a strictly materialist observation of nature. 
Bodmer, on the other hand, as recounted and quoted by Poser, argued for the 
freedom of the poet to use the imagination in such a way that the poetic license of the 
imagination was seen as safe and justified within a the moral order of monotheistic 
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Christendom, thereby allowing a poet such as Milton the use of mythology, given that the 
moral shortcomings of the polytheistic past were clear to rational thinkers. 
Gottsched’s response to Bodmer is to be understood on the basis of the dictates of reason: 
Homer is allowed to make use of those mythological aspects that are denied to Milton, on 
the basis of the cultural knowledge of his time.  Here one might separate out two aspects 
of Gottsched’s argument: there seems to be, for him, an objective truth accessible to 
reason, and the imagination is bound to whatever knowledge has been made available to 
that point by means of the objective truth discovered through this reason.  Plausibility in 
poetic/dramatic construction, therefore, seems to be ever more constrained by the 
advance of knowledge, meaning that Homer was allowed more than Milton due to the 
time in which he wrote, as seen in this paraphrase of Gottsched by Poser: 
Dies war von Gottsched im Grundsatz verneint worden, denn allzu oft hat 
„Homerus sich versehen und die Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht recht 
beobachtet“; doch weil zu Homers Zeiten „die Lehre von Gott noch in 
dicken Finsternissen gestecket hat“, konnte „damals dem Volke sehr 
wahrscheinlich klingen, was uns heute zu Tage sehr unwahrscheinlich 
vorkömmt.“ (Poser 142, see Gottsched Critische Dichtkunst, 1. Teil, 6. 
Hauptstück, § 5 and 6) 
The issue at stake in this debate is the role of the imagination versus the role of reason in 
guiding the poet.  Poser’s citation of Bodmer’s continued defense of Milton points out 
that Bodmer does not see imagination as a the threat to reason that is supposed in 
Gottsched’s work: 
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Bodmer dagegen betont das Recht der Phantasie, die „Früchte der 
Einbildungs-Kraft und des Witzes“ in die Dichtung einzubringen und 
mythologische Fabeln dann zuzulassen, wenn man sie „vor das anführet, 
was sie sind, nemlich vor ein Hirngespinst“, das nicht für wahr gehalten 
werden darf: „Wer sich daran [d.i. an der Fabel] ärgert, zeigt ein ehrliches 
Gemüth und einen guten Verstand“ -- nur zeigt er, daß er nichts von 
Dichtung versteht.  Was Bodmer hier gegen Gottsched verteidigt, ist 
nichts anderes als das Anrecht der Phantasie auf eine führende Rolle in der 
Dichtung.  Der Dichter ist vor allem ein Schöpfer, und seine Schöpfung, 
die Poesie, ist mit Vernunftkategorien letzlich nicht erfaßbar. (Poser 142) 
With this one seemingly comes to the crux of the argument between Gottsched and 
Bodmer regarding mythology: either reason is used to reduce the sphere of the 
imagination to that which is deemed natural according to abstract, reasoned truths 
(Gottsched), or reason allows a space for the imagination to play within mythology, being 
able to distinguish between fact and fiction, which ideally would allow for an expansion 
of the freedom of the imagination in concert with the development of reason (Bodmer).  
What the two views hold in common is that either the restriction or the freedom of the 
imagination is tied directly to the premise that reason, and reason alone, is the arbiter of 
truth.  It is merely a question of whether one takes the “errors” of mythology as a direct 
threat to reason (Gottsched) or not (Bodmer), that determines one’s position regarding 
mythology.  One aspect of eighteenth century German Enlightenment thought that 
becomes clear in this regard is the acceptance (and indeed, the assumption) of eternal 
truth that is derived through logic and reason.  That such is 1) knowable, and 2) forms the 
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limits of the imagination, are challenged directly by the premises of Goethe’s Urfaust, in 
which the eternal truth is beyond the grasp of the scholar and reason itself is seen as 
limited, and indeed, limiting, in this regard.  It seems only natural, then, that Goethe’s 
argument would come couched in mythology as opposed to discursive thought. 
 
3.4 Goethe’s Urfaust and the Use of Myth in Response to the Enlightenment 
 In treating the mythological aspect of the Urfaust as a response to the poetic 
debates of the Enlightenment, one must consider the general understanding of mythology 
that Goethe had as showing the limits of reason and knowledge, a viewpoint that was 
informed by both Hamann and Herder, and the development of a new mythology within 
the Urfaust itself.  This viewpoint, when examined along with Goethe’s distinction 
between Mythos and Mythologie, will help one to understand how and why a figure like 
the Erdgeist could have been developed in the Urfaust. 
 
3.4.1 The Limits of Reason and Knowledge 
 Goethe develops his idea of a “Luzifer-Mythos” in Dichtung und Wahrheit, as 
discussed previously. Goethe relates this myth in the context of discussing the definition 
of “Nachahmung” in the poetic debates of the eighteenth century and of placing the 
creative/imaginative role of the poet in parallel to that of Luzifer, in contrast to the 
creator role of poet and its parallel to God in Bodmer/Breitinger.  This is noteworthy on 
its face, for the simple matter that it places the Urfaust in the context of the poetic debates 
on mythology, by positing a mythic response as a valid response to the discursive 
arguments of the literary critics of the time.  Goethe would not be drawn into a 
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conceptual debate on poetics, but instead uses a dramatically constructed myth, and in 
this way, attempts to show the limits of knowledge and thinking within the 
Enlightenment; one sees this more clearly when looking at Goethe’s comment made to 
Riemer on 10 May 1806, nearing the time of the publication of Faust, Teil I., in which his 
perspective on mythology with respect to the Enlightenment is made explicit: 
Es ist lächerlich, wenn die Philister sich der größern Verständigkeit und 
Aufklärung ihres Zeitalters rühmen und die frühern barbarisch nennen. 
Der Verstand ist so alt, wie die Welt, auch das Kind hat Verstand: aber er 
wird nicht in jedem Zeitalter auf gleiche Weise und auf einerlei 
Gegenstände angewendet. Unser Zeitalter wendet seinen ganzen Verstand 
auf Moral und Selbstbetrachtung; daher er in der Kunst und wo er sonst 
noch thätig sein und mitwirken muß, fast gänzlich mangelt. Die Phantasie 
wirkte in frühern Jahrhunderten ausschließend und vor, und die übrigen 
Seelenkräfte dienten ihr; jetzt ist es umgekehrt, sie dient den andern und 
erlahmt in diesem Dienst. 
Die frühern Jahrhunderte hatten ihre Ideen in Anschauungen der 
Phantasie; unseres bringt sie in Begriffe. Die großen Ansichten des Lebens 
waren damals in Gestalten, in Götter gebracht; heutzutage bringt man sie 
in Begriffe. Dort war die Productionskraft größer, heute die 
Zerstörungskraft, oder die Scheidekunst. (Goethes Gespräche 27-28) 
This passage is also cited in Walter Killy’s “Der Begriff des Mythos bei Goethe und 
Hölderlin,” along with Killy’s comment, clearly establishing the relevance of the earlier 
context of the Urfaust: “Was hier gesagt ist, hat schon den Jüngling beschäftigt, ehe er 
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zur Universität ging, es besteht kein Anlaß, die Erinnerung zu bezweifeln, die Goethe an 
das letzte Frankfurter Frühjahr hatte und in Dichtung und Wahrheit erzählt” (Killy 212).   
There are very few direct quotes from Goethe regarding mythology as such, and Killy’s 
research collects the most relevant among them.  The quotes in this section and in those 
that immediately follow (sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3) are cited by Killy, and Killy’s research 
here must be acknowledged as having first pointed the author of this dissertation toward 
these references: it is in the additional context and analysis of said quotes, related 
specifically to the Urfaust, that this dissertation strives for originality. 
One sees in this quote several interesting arguments that relate not only to the 
poetic debates, but that relate those poetic arguments to the ideas at work in the Urfaust 
and later Faust work.  The apparent attack on the prejudiced view of Enlightenment 
thought in favor of reason is a nuanced one: despite the rhetorical ferocity of its opening 
(“die Philister”) and again in its final word (“Scheidekunst”), the gist of the argument is 
seen not in the disparagement of reason, for as Goethe notes, reason “ist so alt, wie die 
Welt,” but from the point of view that places reason ahead of the imagination in art, with 
the result being that the destructive, not productive powers, are used.  One need only 
think of the opening “Nacht” monologue from the Urfaust to see in the return to magic 
the same idea, namely, that something has been lost from the imagination in the 
unbalanced pursuit of knowledge (and art) via reason.  The statement in this comment to 
Riemer, “Die Phantasie wirkte in frühern Jahrhunderten ausschließend und vor, und die 
übrigen Seelenkräfte dienten ihr; jetzt ist es umgekehrt, sie dient den andern und erlahmt 
in diesem Dienst,” evokes the feeling evident in Faust’s character when he seeks to 
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invigorate his soul and, indeed, his knowledge, holistically via a turn to the magic of 
older times: 
  Dafür ist mir auch all Freud entrissen, 
  Bild mir nicht ein, was Rechts zu wissen,  
  Bild mir nicht ein, ich könnt was lehren,  
  Die Menschen zu bessern und zu bekehren; 
  Auch hab ich weder Gut noch Geld, 
  Noch Ehr und Herrlichkeit der Welt.  
  Es möcht kein Hund so länger leben!  
  Drum hab ich mich der Magie ergeben,  
  Ob mir durch Geistes Kraft und Mund / 
  Nicht manch Geheimnis werde kund. (HA 3:367-8) 
This marks not a mythological representation of the mythological point of view itself: 
Faust turns to the view of the world of “Gestalten” und “Götter” that presents the 
Unknown via the imagination creatively and holistically, as opposed to the limiting view 
of the rational Enlightenment, in which reason presents a boundary between what can be 
imagined.  The Unknown can only be represented as an absence of knowledge when one 
thinks in rational concepts (Begriffe). 
 
3.4.2 The Unknown 
 Indeed, one already sees in Goethe’s comments regarding his youthful 
disagreements with a friend in Frankfurt in 1766 that Goethe’s interest in poetry, religion 
and philosophy was a unified one: 
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Unsere wichtigste Differenz war jedoch diese, daß ich behauptete, eine 
abgesonderte Philosophie sei nicht nötig, indem sie schon in der Religion 
und Poesie vollkommen enthalten sei. Dieses wollte er nun keinesweges 
gelten lassen, sondern suchte mir vielmehr zu beweisen, daß erst diese 
durch jene begründet werden müßten; welches ich hartnäckig leugnete, 
und im Fortgange unserer Unterhaltung bei jedem Schritt Argumente für 
meine Meinung fand. Denn da in der Poesie ein gewisser Glaube an das 
Unmögliche, in der Religion ein ebensolcher Glaube an das 
Unergründliche stattfinden muß, so schienen mir die Philosophen in einer 
sehr üblen Lage zu sein, die auf ihrem Felde beides beweisen und erklären 
wollten; wie sich denn auch aus der Geschichte der Philosophie sehr 
geschwind dartun ließ, daß immer einer einen andern Grund suchte als der 
andre, und der Skeptiker zuletzt alles für grund- und bodenlos ansprach. 
Eben diese Geschichte der Philosophie jedoch, die mein Freund mit mir zu 
treiben sich genötigt sah, weil ich dem dogmatischen Vortrag gar nichts 
abgewinnen konnte, unterhielt mich sehr, aber nur in dem Sinne, daß mir 
eine Lehre, eine Meinung so gut wie die andre vorkam, insofern ich 
nämlich in dieselbe einzudringen fähig war. An den ältesten Männern und 
Schulen gefiel mir am besten, daß Poesie, Religion und Philosophie ganz 
in eins zusammenfielen, und ich behauptete jene meine erste Meinung nur 
um desto lebhafter, als mir das Buch Hiob, das Hohe Lied und die 
Sprüchwörter Salomonis ebenso gut als die Orphischen und Hesiodischen 
Gesänge dafür ein gültiges Zeugnis abzulegen schienen. (HA 9: 221) 
	  
	   75	  
Killy notes the latter part of this quote in his 1984 article “Der Begriff des Mythos bei 
Goethe und Hölderlin” (212).  Here I cite the quote in its greater context, in order to 
emphasize a larger point than that raised by Killy (who uses the part of the second 
paragraph to emphasize that Goethe had already been interested in mythology before 
leaving Frankfurt).  This reflection by Goethe on his Frankfurt time shows an openness 
and receptivity to mythology that predates even his encounters with Herder.  Most 
interestingly, the approach outlined here (admittedly by a much older Goethe) shows an 
inclination not only toward a holistic view of knowledge in which poetry, philosophy and 
religion were not separate categories, but also in which said knowledge could be 
approached without an axiomatic basis, but rather, through some sort of hermeneutic 
circle in which mythological texts were given the same sense of validity as strictly 
rational philosophy as a means of approaching truth. 
 Walther Killy notes the similarity between Goethe’s basic interest in mythology 
as a seventeen-year-old reflected in the above passage and in the more mature reflection 
of the twenty-eight-year-old Goethe in his review of text of a Spontini opera, in which 
ancient Athens was depicted: 
Der Gegenstand ist aus der heroischen Griechenzeit sehr glücklich 
gewählt; denn die Vortheile solcher Sujets sind sehr groß, indem sie 
bedeutende Zustände darbieten, edle große Bildung .. sodann auch eine 
gränzenlose Mythologie an die Hand geben zu dichterischer Ausbildung 
den Gegenstand blos aus dem Gesichtspunct reiner Menschlichkeit zu 
betrachten ... jener einfache Begriff muß herrschend im Bilde wohnen; [...] 
(Goethe WA I, 42-2, S.95, cited in Killy 212-213) 
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Here I have also used the given quote in a wider form than that used by Killy, due to the 
different emphasis in my work.  I have at this point only located this larger quote in a 
transcription from the Goethe-Wörterbuch at the University of Trier’s website.  From this 
passage it is clear that the appeal of Greek mythology to Goethe lay, in part, in its holistic 
and unlimited approach to poetry, an approach that was, in his view, close to nature itself.  
In this view, one might see the relationship of mythology to nature not as error, in the 
view of Fontenelle and Gottsched, but as an approach to the unlimited itself by means of 
the image of reality.  Here, the image precedes and is closer to nature than the concept.  
The abstraction of reason, therefore, used by Fontenelle, for example, to criticize 
mythology as an errant view of nature, is, in Goethe’s view, necessarily further removed 
from the nature it purports to understand. 
 In this respect, the young Goethe of the 1770s owes both Johann Georg Hamann 
(1730-1788) and J. G. Herder (1744-1803) for the development of such views.  The 
Pietist Lutheran Hamann’s “Aesthetica in Nuce: Eine Rhapsodie in kabbalistischer 
Prose” (1762) had already attacked Enlightenment aesthetic principles by means of a 
Christian “cabbalistic” prose appeal that leaned on the sort of interdisciplinary set of 
influences that appealed to Goethe: the title page cites the Book of Judges, The Book of 
Job, and Horace.  This essay was part of his work Kreuzzüge des Philologen, compiled 
between 1758 and 1763.  Here it is worth noting the mythological connection of Job to 
Faust, given that the young Goethe mentioned his interest in Job in the above-mentioned 
quote regarding his youthful discussion in Frankfurt.  In this short essay, Hamann extols 
the importance of the image and its primacy over language, and of poetry as the 
“Muttersprache des menschlichen Geschlechts” (Hamann 197).  For Hamann, the 
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primacy of poetry as man’s mode of relating to the world comes from its relationship to 
images and pictures -- and the primacy of image and picture for containing all truth is 
demonstrated by the mythical creation story of Genesis, in which the quintessential 
characteristic of man is that he is to have been created by God in his own image and 
likeness: 
  Sinne und Leidenschaften reden und verstehen nichts als Bilder. In  
  Bildern besteht der ganze Schatz menschlicher Erkenntniß und   
  Glückseeligkeit. Der erste Ausbruch der Schöpfung, und der erste   
  Eindruck ihres Geschichtschreibers; – – die erste Erscheinung und der  
  erste Genuß der Natur vereinigen sich in dem Worte: Es werde Licht!  
  hiemit fängt sich die Empfindung von der Gegenwart der Dinge an. 
Endlich krönte GOTT die sinnliche Offenbarung seiner Herrlichkeit durch 
das Meisterstück des Menschen. Er schuf den Menschen in Göttlicher 
Gestalt; – – zum Bilde GOttes schuf er ihn. Dieser Rathschluß des 
Urhebers löst die verwickeltesten Knoten der menschlichen Natur und 
ihrer Bestimmung auf. Blinde Heyden haben die Unsichtbarkeit erkannt, 
die der Mensch mit GOTT gemein hat. Die verhüllte Figur des Leibes, das 
Antlitz des Hauptes, und das Äußerste der Arme sind das sichtbare 
Schema, in dem wir einher gehn; doch eigentlich nichts als ein Zeigefinger 
des verborgenen Menschen in uns; – 
  Exemplumque DEI quisque est in imagine parua. (Hamann 197-198) 
In Hamann’s case, the appeal of the creator is not merely a religious argument, it is a 
statement about the act of creation itself, and one that can be read in light of the 
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insistence of Bodmer/Breitinger and others that the act of literary creation is parallel to 
the creator role played by God.  In this case, however, reason (or even language itself, as 
an abstraction) is not primary to the image.   
 
3.4.3 Image and the Distinction between Mythos and Mythologie: 1777 Diaries 
This idea of the primacy of image is something that Goethe explored in a more 
nuanced manner than Hamann, in a way described by Killy, who cites a passage from 
Goethe’s 1777 diaries: 
Von Anfang an hat Goethe, von Herder angeleitet, den Mythos auch 
historisch genommen: „Da Mythos erfunden wird, werden die Bilder 
durch die Sachen gros, wenns Mythologie wird werden die Sachen durch 
die Bilder gros.“  Dieser im Tagebuch von 1777 unvermittelt festgehaltene 
Satz statuiert eine ganze mythologische Theorie.  „Da Mythos erfunden 
wird“: in den uranfänglichen Zeiten der Mythogenese ging es darum 
schier unfaßliche Erscheinungen, überwältigende Erfahrungen, von denen 
der Mensch sich bedrängt sah, mit begreifender Imagination in Bildern 
faßlich und bennenbar zu machen.  Solche Bilder bewahrten Kraft und 
Macht der Phänomene [...].  
Wenn’s Mythologie wird: das heißt, wenn der gefundene Mythos in den 
Zusammenhang  der Bilderwelt tritt, welche ihn mit anderen Mythen 
erfindungsreich verbindet.  Dann werden die Sachen, derart zu Sprache 
und Anschauung  gebracht, groß, weil sie poetisch sinnvoll, begreiflich 
und bennenbar sind. (Killy 210-211) 
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The diary entry in question is from 5 April 1777 and reads in full: “agathê tychê 
gegründet! = Da Mythos erfunden wird, werden die bilder durch die Sachen gros, wenns 
Mythologie wird werden die Sachen durch die Bilder gros” (WA III:1 37).  This passage 
is particularly interesting in light of the discussion of myth presented earlier in the work 
of Fontenelle.  By contrasting Goethe’s position with that of Fontenelle on this point, one 
might see not only how he differs from the popular Enlightenment viewpoint regarding 
mythology, but also how his conscious working of the question of mythology on two 
levels engages with and is perhaps informed by the Enlightenment, unlike the Counter-
Enlightenment position of Hamann.  Goethe distinguishes from myth in the sense of 
mythos (as in the creation phase), in which the Unknown is approximated by means of 
mythic imagination, which builds up those images of the imagination (the view that leads 
Fontenelle and other Enlightenment thinkers to brand myth as error) and myth in the 
sense of mythology, in which the images are used to build the narrative object of 
discussion.  This sort of distinction, it seems, recognizes the hermeneutic circle in the use 
of mythology as a means of approximating nature: archetypes formed in the development 
of mythos as a means of understanding nature by giving meaning to the form and content 
of nature are then later used in the construction of mythology as a means of giving form 
and content back to the imagination of the poet.  In this sense, the poet can make use of 
archetypes without misunderstanding them as error, but in the full awareness that they 
represent forms that resemble nature -- in this way giving “natural” form to their poetic 
content.  Such ideas are also quite consonant with Karl Philip Moritz’ work Götterlehre 
oder mythologische Dichtungen der Alten (1791).  Moritz had had extensive 
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conversations on this subject with Goethe during his Italian travels in the 1786-1788 
period (Killy 210). 
 
3.4.4  The Unknown: Mythos, Mythologie and Erdgeist 
 In looking at this distinction between mythos and mythology, one sees Goethe’s 
Erdgeist as a prime example of such taking place within the Urfaust, in a way that shows 
more than simply the life of the magician, but also the mythic connection to nature 
through the image of the Erdgeist.  Faust’s summoning of the Erdgeist begins with the 
viewing of the image, and is followed by his awakened feeling of oneness with nature: 
  Er schlägt unwillig das Buch um und erblickt das Zeichen des Erdgeistes. 
  Wie anders würkt dies Zeichen auf mich ein!  
  Du, Geist der Erde, bist mir näher;  
  Schon fühl ich meine Kräfte höher,  
  Schon glüh ich wie vom neuen Wein. 
  Ich fühle Mut, mich in die Welt zu wagen,  
  All Erden Weh und all ihr Glück zu tragen, 
  Mit Stürmen mich herumzuschlagen / 
  Und in des Schiffbruchs Knirschen nicht zu zagen.  
  Es wölkt sich über mir –  
  Der Mond verbirgt sein Licht!  
  Die Lampe schwindet!  
  Es dampft! Es zucken rote Strahlen 
  Mir um das Haupt. Es weht / 
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  Ein Schauer vom Gewölb herab Und faßt mich an.  
  Ich fühls, du schwebst um mich,  
  Erflehter Geist!  
  Enthülle dich!  
  Ha! wie's in meinem Herzen reißt!  
  Zu neuen Gefühlen / 
  All meine Sinne sich erwühlen!  
  Ich fühle ganz mein Herz dir hingegeben!  
  Du mußt, du mußt! Und kostet' es mein Leben. (HA 3:370-1) 
In this viewing of the sign/image/sigil of the Erdgeist, one sees not only that the sign of 
the Erdgeist gives a form to that content and feeling/connection to nature, through which 
the Faust character is able to summon this connection, but also that the mythological 
characteristic of the image is represented.  Not only this, but this use of the Erdgeist by 
Goethe also marks the use of an existing “mythological” archetype itself from the 
cosmogonies of both Paracelsus and Giordano Bruno, among others.  Werner Keller 
explains the novelty in Goethe’s approach here, and while he does not emphasize the 
connection to mythology, Goethe’s use of the archetype as described by Keller is 
consonant with the theory of mythology described in his diary from 1777: 
Wir fragen: Wem wendet sich der Mensch der beginnenden Neuzeit zu, 
wenn er sich anschickt, das Innerste der Welt zu erkunden und ihm das 
Bild als Abbild – in vermaledeiter Buchform – nicht genügt?  Er 
konzentriert sich aufs Irdische.  Magische Mittel erzwingen die 
Selbstexplikation des Ergeists, der sprachfähigen spirituellen Kraft, die 
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das Dasein in seiner Polarität reguliert und über die Lebensganzheit von 
Werden und Vergehen gebietet, deren Identität sich im Gegensatz 
ununterbrochenen Gebärens und Sterbens manifestiert.  Der Erdgeist, der 
als Name schon bei Paracelsus (archeus terrae) und Giordano Bruno 
(anima terrae) erscheint, doch erst durch Goethe seine anschauliche 
Ausdeutung findet, repräsentiert die lebendig tätige Natur, die “wirkt,” 
ohne an ein Ende, und “schafft,” ohne an ein Ziel gelangen zu wollen.  
Verwandlung und Glut bilden die Attribute des polar strukturierten 
einheitlichen Seins, das als Zeitlichkeit erfahren wird.  Der 
Prozeßcharakter der Natur, deren immanente Dynamik, ist damit entdeckt, 
und der vergängenliche, zur Wandlung genötigte Mensch erfährt im Nu 
der ungreifbaren, entschwindenden Gegenwart, daß er als zeitliches 
Wesen immer mit der Zukunft zu tun hat, die er aber nur als 
Vergangenheit ganz verstehen kann. (Keller 317) 
Here Keller’s description of the sign as representing the “Prozeßcharakter” of nature is 
important in helping one to understand the power of the sign as opposed to the abstract 
concept: the sign is meant to encompass a totality, and in this way is prior to the 
abstractions that come from such a totality.  The second part of Goethe’s diary dictum 
comes into mind: “wenns Mythologie wird werden die Sachen durch die Bilder gros.”  In 
the context of the complete diary quote, Goethe’s approach in the Urfaust is not one of 
Mythos, but of Mythologie, in that he uses existing archetypes to invoke nature, as 
opposed to founding archetypes based on the study of nature.  In doing so, he evokes not 
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only nature as an abstract concept, in the manner of Fontenelle or Gottsched, but as a 
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4 Lessing’s 17. Literaturbrief and the Faust Motif 
 It is important here to note that Goethe was not the first to object to Gottsched’s 
positions on dramatic construction, not merely with respect to their theoretical basis, but 
also with respect to the specific value of the Faust material itself for dramatic 
construction.  In his “17. Literaturbrief” (1759) G.E. Lessing (1729-1781) challenges 
Gottsched’s assumptions about the need to follow a French neoclassicist model, and sees 
precisely in the Faust legend material relevant for creating drama after the model of 
Shakespeare (Lessing 5:70-73, Guthke 141-149, Baron 105, Henning 79-90).  Lessing 
himself attempted to develop a drama incorporating the Faust theme, and did so precisely 
in the context of mounting a challenge to Gottsched’s poetics, which helps to establish 
the fact that a conceptual link between poetic arguments against Gottsched and for the 
“turn to magic” is not mere happenstance, but seems, indeed, to have been something “in 
the air” of the times themselves.  Lessing’s disdain for Gottsched is as open and pointed 
as was Goethe’s, made clear in the letter’s opening: 
»Niemand, sagen die Verfasser der Bibliothek, wird leugnen, daß die 
deutsche Schaubühne einen großen Teil ihrer ersten Verbesserung dem 
Herrn Professor Gottsched zu danken habe.« 
Ich bin dieser Niemand; ich leugne es gerade zu. Es wäre zu wünschen, 
daß sich Herr Gottsched niemals mit dem Theater vermengt hätte. Seine 
vermeinten Verbesserungen betreten entweder entbehrliche Klei- 
nigkeiten, oder sind wahre Verschlimmerungen. (Lessing 5:70) 
In the course of the letter, Lessing raises the Faust theme as an example of the sort of 
native material available for German dramatists who might be able to challenge the 
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French neoclassical model in a manner similar to Shakespeare among the English 
(Lessing 5:72-73).  Indeed, he includes at the end of this letter a scene on the Faust theme 
that he had already composed, called “Faust und die sieben Geister” (while included at 
the end of the same letter, it is to be found, along with other fragments of Lessing’s 
aborted Faust manuscript not included in this letter, in Lessing 2:487-491).  What is 
relevant here to the question of the Urfaust as a philosophical argument is the way that 
Lessing, too, attempts in this Faust fragment to put forward a case for German drama, in 
opposition to the rules of Gottsched, by using the Faust material: this is, as it were, an 
Enlightenment attempt to use the Faust material while keeping a reason-based approach 
to morality and the question of good and evil. 
 
4.1 Lessing’s Devils and the Question of Moral Epistemology 
 In Lessing’s “Faust und die sieben Geister” scene, however, the problems posed 
for Enlightenment thinking with respect to knowledge of morality becomes apparent in 
his attempt to define the devils with whom his Faust character speaks.  Faust speaks with 
seven spirits from hell, questioning them in such a way as to differentiate between them 
with respect to the attribute of their speed (“Und welcher von euch ist der schnellste?”) 
(Lessing 2:487). The devils respond by giving metaphorical descriptions of their speed, 
each one outdoing his predecessor.  The seventh and fastest devil describes his own speed 
as “Nicht mehr und nicht weniger als der Übergang vom Guten zum Bösen.” (Lessing 
2:489).  When one compares this devil to the fifth devil, who for example, is “So schnell 
wie die Gedanken des Menschen,” and notes that Lessing’s Faust sees not only that the 
seventh devil is faster, but also remarks that the fifth devil is not necessarily fast, based 
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on the given description (“Aber nicht immer sind die Gedanken des Menschen schnell.  
Nicht da, wenn Wahrheit und Tugend sie auffordern.”), one sees a tension underlying 
Lessing’s description of knowledge with respect to thought: knowledge itself, especially 
on the important matters of truth and virtue is almost indescribably slow in comparison to 
the movement from good to evil.  The relationship between good and evil, then, is 
something that seems to operate in a sphere that surpasses human knowledge by 
implication: one might pass from good to evil more quickly than one might acquire 
knowledge.  This presumably would include the knowledge of good and evil itself, 
meaning that the passage from good to evil exists in a blind spot even for the self-aware 
thinker possessed of reason. 
 It is, in fact, the difficulty in defining clearly the pursuit of knowledge within a 
framework of good and evil that poses a sort of aporia preventing Lessing from 
completing his Faust project.  Guthke describes the issue at hand quite succinctly in terms 
of the paradox posed for Lessing in taking up the Faust motif:  
 Die eigentliche Paradoxie in Lessings Griff nach der Faustsage scheint  
 
 vielmehr die zu sein, daß für Lessing der Drang nach Wissen und  
 
 Erkenntnis eben nicht eine strafbare Sünde sein oder zu Sünde verführen  
 
 konnte, wie das in der Fausttradition der Fall war.  Darin war er Kind  
 
 seiner Zeit. (Guthke 143) 
 
This, rather than the use of entities from the spirit world, was the challenge to Lessing’s 
Enlightenment view posed by integrating the Faust tradition into a dramatic form within 
the confines of Enlightenment thought, even an Enlightenment perspective expanded 
from that offered by Gottsched. 
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4.2 Lessing’s Theodicy Problem 
 Indeed, for Lessing, as an Enlightenment thinker, the thirst for knowledge was not 
inherently bad, but was, rather a God-given attribute of man, leading to, as Guthke points 
out, a problem with theodicy in Lessing’s account (Guthke 146).  This argument can be 
traced back to the work of Robert Petsch, who explains in great detail the tension 
between an Enlightenment attitude toward reason and theodicy inherent in Lessing’s 
attempt to work with the Faust theme: 
Und wenn Lessing auch kein Renaissancemensch war, wenn er auch 
nichts von dem in sich verspürte, was wir seit den Tagen des Sturmes und 
Dranges eine Faustische Natur nennen, so mußte es doch seinem scharfen 
Auge als ein innerer Widerspruch erscheinen, daß jemand aus lauter Liebe 
zur Wahrheit endgiltig (sic) verloren gehen sollte; wie aber der Mensch 
aus lauter Vernunftstreben schließlich die Herrschaft seiner Vernunft über 
seine Leidenschaften einbüßt und aus einem exaltierten Gehirnmenschen 
zum Sinnesmenschen wird, mußte seinen experimentierenden 
psychologischen Tiefsinn erst recht anlocken. Die Lösung dieses Problems 
lag freilich nicht auf dem Wege der reinen Vernunft, sondern der 
Weltanschauung; indem er den Stoff  unter den Gesichtspunkt der Werte 
rückte, die seinem Innenleben Richtung gaben, begann das Ganze zu dem 
lebensvollen Bilde einer tragischen Handlung aufzuquellen.  Hier aber hat 
Lessing wie kaum ein andrer im 18.Jh. die letzten Gewißheiten Leibnizens 
in sich aufgenommen und nacherlebt. (Petsch 11-12) 
	  
	   88	  
Returning to the contrast between the fifth and seventh devils in the above-cited scene, 
the attempt to address this apparent conflict between human reason and morality for 
Lessing becomes more evident.  In his recognition of the superior “speed” of the seventh 
devil, Lessing’s Faust, while motivated by a desire for knowledge, implicitly 
acknowledges that human reason, while not morally “bad” in its pursuit of truth, is 
“slower” than temptation to evil on the moral level.  What is essential here with respect to 
this dissertation is the problem evident with respect to the Enlightenment and the Faust 
motif shown in Lessing’s attempt, for it is in recognizing this difficulty that one may 
come to see Goethe’s originality in dealing with this tension in the Urfaust.  The question 
of truth, which operates in Lessing’s work on two incompatible levels (that of the truth of 
reason and moral truth) faces an unbridgeable chasm, one that prevented Lessing from 
finding a philosophically coherent dramatic resolution. 
 
4.3 Goethe’s Avoidance of Lessing’s Paradox 
 The Wagner figure helps one to understand Goethe’s relationship to the 
Enlightenment not merely as a caricature of Gottsched, but also in the fact that it is by 
means of the Faust-Wagner dialogue that one sees how Goethe surpasses the 
Enlightenment problematic seen in Lessing’s aborted Faust project.  Wagner accepts the 
limits of knowledge imposed on man by virtue of his mortality, seeing knowledge 
progressing incrementally through reason: 
  WAGNER. Ach Gott, die Kunst ist lang  
  Und kurz ist unser Leben!  
Mir wird bei meinem kritischen Bestreben  
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Doch oft um Kopf und Busen bang.  
Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben,  
  Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!  
  Und eh man nur den halben Weg erreicht,  
  Muß wohl ein armer Teufel sterben. (HA 3:372-3 lines 205-212) 
Goethe’s Faust figure in the Urfaust, unlike Lessing’s, neither accepts nor recognizes as 
legitimate the apparent limits on the speed of man’s ability to acquire knowledge, for he 
wants a totalizing knowledge (here I adopt the term “totalization” as a term describing the 
total striving of Goethe’s Faust as described by Petsch 1911 and Guthke 1960), and is not 
content with the process of gaining knowledge within the apparent limits of 
Enlightenment man as a finite creature, and in this desire he rejects the Enlightenment 
view of Wagner with respect to learning and its relation to progress. Guthke remarks on 
the difference between Lessing’s Faust and the Faust of the Urfaust with respect to 
Wissensdrang:  
Die ganz verschiedene Voraussetzung, der andere Ansatz, erhellt ja schon 
daraus, daß Lessing das faustische Streben durchaus noch als 
Wissensdrang auffaßt, noch nicht als Goethesche totale Streben, das 
bereits im Urfaust wirksam ist.  Schon in den jeweiligen 
Beschwörungsszenen kommt das zum Ausdruck: Goethes Magier zitiert 
den Erdgeist, Lessings Doktor den Schatten des Aristoteles.  (Guthke 143)  
Indeed, Faust’s direct response to Wagner calls into question the use of previous 
knowledge (in the form of books or the written word) as the basis for making any 
progress in knowledge at all: 
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  FAUST. Das Pergament, ist das der heilge Bronnen,  
  Woraus ein Trunk den Durst auf ewig stillt?  
  Erquickung hast du nicht gewonnen, 
  Wenn sie dir nicht aus eigner Seele quillt. 
  […] 
  Mein Freund, die Zeiten der Vergangenheit  
  Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln.  
  Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt,  
  Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,  
  In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln. 
  Da ist's denn wahrlich oft ein Jammer!  
  Man läuft euch bei dem ersten Blick davon.  
  Ein Kehrichtfaß und eine Rumpelkammer,  
  Und höchstens eine Haupt- und Staatsaktion  
  Mit trefflichen pragmatischen Maximen,  
Wie sie den Puppen wohl im Munde ziemen. (HA 3:373 lines 213-216, 
222-232) 
The question of truth, which operates in Lessing’s work on two incompatible levels, that 
of the truth of reason and moral truth, is integrated in Goethe’s totalizing approach: pure 
reason is not viewed in idealized form, in conflict with morality, but as an impossibility 
for the limited human being, an impossibility that requires a transcendent experience of 
such a nature that traditional moral categories themselves become blurred.  By shifting 
the question to this sort of transcendence, Goethe’s Urfaust displays an awareness of the 
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limits inherent in an approach such as Lessing’s.  Whether Goethe himself was aware of 
Lessing’s own Faust project is not relevant, the point here is merely to emphasize the 
originality in Goethe’s approach to the Faust question with respect to these 
Enlightenment tensions. 
 
4.4  The Holistic Alternative to “Dead” Knowledge: Totalization 
 The response of Faust to Wagner on the question of knowledge not only 
illustrates the limits of the Enlightenment approach to reason, it also alludes to an 
alternative approach to knowledge hearkening back to the Renaissance, and implicitly 
connects the prejudices of Enlightenment thinkers such as Gottsched to the historical 
persecution of Renaissance scholars by means of using the word “Pöbel,” a favorite term 
of Gottsched for dismissing those whose tastes differed from his own (see earlier 
citations for its explicit use in reference to Gottsched’s rejection of the Faust theme 
itself): 
  WAGNER. Allein die Welt! Des Menschen Herz und Geist! 
  Möcht jeglicher doch was davon erkennen.  
  FAUST. Ja, was man so erkennen heißt! 
  Wer darf das Kind beim rechten Namen nennen?  
  Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt,  
  Die töricht g'nug ihr volles Herz nicht wahrten,  
  Dem Pöbel ihr Gefühl, ihr Schauen offenbarten,  
  Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt. – (HA 3: 373 lines 233-242) 
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This reference can be better understood if one examines the very Renaissance sources 
that Goethe himself admits having consulted during the time in which he began thinking 
about the Faust theme and eventually working on his Urfaust draft, when he was 
convalescing in Frankfurt as the 1760s passed into the 1770s. 
 The contrast of Lessing’s failed and aborted attempt with Goethe’s eventual turn 
to magic in the Urfaust is also instructive in considering how Goethe’s approach differed 
from one based firmly within Enlightenment principles.  In addition, it shows the modern 
reader that Gottsched himself represented a certain polarity within Enlightenment thought 
itself, against which other Enlightenment thinkers such as Lessing wrote and theorized.  
The failure of Lessing, however, to provide a successful “turn to magic” as a counterpole 
within the Enlightenment underscores the limitations of this approach (in which the status 
of reason above all else is axiomatic), and helps one to understand why Goethe would 
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5 Goethe’s Frankfurt Convalescence and the von Klettenberg Circle 
Much is known about Goethe’s life in the period of his convalescence (1768-
1770) in Frankfurt, principally by means of his own retracing of his intellectual 
development in this period recounted later in Dichtung und Wahrheit.  This 
autobiographical history, has often been overlooked in studies of this time in relation to 
the question of how much Urfaust itself, considered as a work in its own right, reflects 
the coming together of important influences on the young Goethe that profoundly shaped 
his relationship with the Enlightenment.  The Goethe that one finds in Frankfurt is newly 
arrived following his experiences with Gottsched in Leipzig, having already been 
immersed in the debates regarding poetics among Enlightenment thinkers.  In the 
Frankfurt circle surrounding Susanna Katharina von Klettenberg (1723-1774), he 
encounters an entirely different sort of knowledge, from a wisdom tradition not taught in 
the university or propounded by Enlightenment thinkers, but, in fact, deemed beyond the 
bounds of the scientific approach to knowledge.   
The beginning of Goethe’s interaction with von Klettenberg, who was a friend of 
his mother, after his return to Frankfurt from Leipzig due to illness, is generally dated to 
the autumn on 1768 (Dohm 111ff., Witte 22).  In Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe’s first 
mention of her comes in the eighth book, when he explains that von Klettenberg later 
served as the basis for “die schöne Seele” in the “Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele” in 
the sixth book of his work, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795-6): 
Meine Mutter, von Natur sehr lebhaft und heiter, brachte unter diesen 
Umständen sehr langweilige Tage zu.  Die kleine Haushaltung war bald 
besorgt.  Das Gemüt der guten, innerlich niemals unbeschäftigten Frau 
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wollte auch einiges Interesse finden, und das nächste begegnete ihr in der 
Religion, das sie um so lieber ergriff, als ihre vorzüglichsten Freundinnen 
gebildete und herzliche Gottesverehrerinnen waren.  Unter diesen stand 
Fräulein von Klettenberg obenan.  Es ist dieselbe, aus deren 
Unterhaltungen und Briefen die »Bekenntnisse der schönen Seele« 
entstanden sind, die man in »Wilhelm Meister« eingeschaltet findet. Sie 
war zart gebaut, von mittlerer Größe; ein herzliches natürliches Betragen 
war durch Welt- und Hofart noch gefälliger geworden. Ihr sehr netter 
Anzug erinnerte an die Kleidung Herrnhutischer Frauen. Heiterkeit und 
Gemütsruhe verließen sie niemals.  Sie betrachtete ihre Krankheit als 
einen notwendigen Bestandteil ihres vorübergehenden irdischen Seins; 
sie litt mit der größten Geduld, und in schmerzlosen Intervallen war sie 
lebhaft und gesprächig. Ihre liebste, ja vielleicht einzige Unterhaltung 
waren die sittlichen Erfahrungen, die der Mensch, der sich beobachtet, an 
sich selbst machen kann; woran sich denn die religiosen Gesinnungen 
anschlossen, die auf eine sehr anmutige, ja geniale Weise bei ihr als 
natürlich und übernatürlich in Betracht kamen. Mehr bedarf es kaum, um 
jene ausführliche, in ihre Seele verfaßte Schilderung den Freunden solcher 
Darstellungen wieder ins Gedächtnis zu rufen. (HA 9:338 line 31-339 line 
18, as noted and explained in Dohm 111)  
Goethe goes on to describe von Klettenberg in contrast to others in the Klettenberg circle, 
whom he describes as “dreary” (eintönig), “indem sie sich an eine gewisse Terminologie 
hielten, die man mit jener der späteren Empfindsamen wohl verglichen hätte,” in terms 
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which call to mind the emptiness of words proclaimed in the Urfaust, and indeed, he 
explains von Klettenberg’s interest in him in a manner that almost seems to provide the 
very same sort of opposing characterization to himself that he uses in characterizing the 
Faustian Streben in the Urfaust: 
Fräulein von Klettenberg führte ihren Weg zwischen beiden Extremen 
durch, und schien sich mit einiger Selbstgefälligkeit in dem Bilde des 
Grafen Zinzendorf zu spiegeln, dessen Gesinnungen und Wirkungen 
Zeugnis einer höheren Geburt und eines vornehmeren Standes ablegten. 
Nun fand sie an mir, was sie bedurfte, ein junges, lebhaftes, auch nach 
einem unbekannten Heile strebendes Wesen, das, ob es sich gleich nicht 
für außerordentlich sündhaft halten konnte, sich doch in keine 
behaglichen Zustand befand, und weder an Leib noch Seele ganz gesund 
war. Sie freute sich an dem, was mir die Natur gegeben, sowie an 
manchem, was ich mir erworben hatte. (emphasis added; HA 9: 339 line 
31 – 340 line 4) 
To be clear, this itself is not proof that the personal relationship with von Klettenberg per 
se provided any sort of basis for the character development within the Urfaust; it is, 
rather, taken in the context of Goethe’s description of the relationship, and of himself, 
many years after the fact, suggestive that he later associated – at least in this description – 
the themes present in the Urfaust, vis-à-vis the contrast between stale words and the 
search for truth through a concerted striving of the soul, with that which formed the bond 
between himself and von Klettenberg.  Indeed, the description of himself through 
Klettenberg’s eyes is interesting, given that it implies that this person viewed him 
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holistically as an individual, as one whose physical and spiritual conditions were 
interrelated, and also as an individual whose pursuit of a higher truth was connected with 
“streben,” a theme that is quite pertinent to the Faustian theme.  Goethe’s reflection upon 
his relationship with von Klettenberg many years after the fact suggests that, at least in 
his own autobiographical narrative, his self-development and understanding in this period 
was connected with the themes that he later developed in Faust, themes that he began to 
explore at that very time in the Urfaust. 
This, of course, is not mere conjecture, given the spiritual pursuit in which he was 
engaged with von Klettenberg at the time, as will be described later via the historical 
figure of Dr. Metz, involved reading the very texts, such as that of Welling, which 
probably provided the basis for the mythological component of the Urfaust.  It must also 
be added that, in the passage which immediately follows from the former, however, 
Goethe points to the same restlessness and striving and notes that von Klettenberg and the 
others in the circle regarded his lack of religious conviction as the cause of this, and 
therefore, spoke to him at times as though he were a foolish young boy (HA 9:340 lines 4 
- 24).  This context is important, so that one does not take the parallels too far or read into 
them more than what is present in the account given. 
 
5.1 Influences on Goethe during the von Klettenberg Period 
 Goethe’s time in the von Klettenberg circle needs to be examined from the 
standpoint of the context it provided for the mixing of influences that relate to the 
cosmogonic-mythological component informing the Urfaust, that, when taken into 
combination with the poetic influences related to the Enlightenment debates about genre 
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and dramatic construction, formed a unique response to the Enlightenment by means of 
the dramatic vehicle constructed by Goethe. 
 What, precisely, did Goethe gain from his time in the von Klettenberg circle?  For 
clues to this, one might examine the letter that he sent to Frau von Klettenberg on 26 
August 1770, after he had finished his stay in Frankfurt and returned to his studies in 
Strasbourg.  In this letter, he seems to distance himself from religion, implying that he 
finds the religious types in Strasbourg to be “von Herzen langweilig,” and that they do 
not know anything other than their religion.  After all of this, he makes a brief reference 
to chemistry (“Chymie”) as “still [being his] secret lover” (“noch immer meine heimlich 
Geliebte”), with this assurance seemingly meant to demonstrate that he is still very much 
the same person that she knew when he was in Frankfurt: 
[...]Ubrigens ist mein Körper iust so gesund um eine mäßige, und nötige 
Arbeit zu tragen, und um mich bey Gelegenheit zu erinnern daß ich weder 
an Leib noch an Seele ein Riese binn.  Mein Umgang mit denen frommen 
Leuten hier ist nicht gar starck, ich hatte mich im Anfange sehr starck an 
sie gewendet; aber es ist als wenn es nicht seyn sollte.  Sie sind so von 
Herzen langweilig wenn sie anfangen, daß es meine Lebhafftigkeit nicht 
aushalten konnte. Lauter Leute von mäsigem Verstande, die mit der ersten 
Religionsempfindung, auch den ersten vernünftigen Gedanken dachten, 
und nun meynen das wäre alles, weil sie sonst von nichts wissen; dabey so 
hällisch und meinem Graffen so feind, und so kirchlich und püncktlich, 
daß – ich Ihnen eben nichts weiter zu sagen brauche. 
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Es kömmt noch was dazu. Die Vorliebe für unsre eignen Empfindungen 
und Meynungen, die Eitelkeit eines ieden Nase dahin drehen zu wollen 
wohin unsre gewachsen ist; Fehler denen solche Leute die eine gute Sache 
haben mit der größten Sicherheit nachhängen.  Wie offt habe ich ** die 
Sache seiner Grillen und die Sache Gottes vermischen hören wenn er 
seinen Vetter ausschalt.  Ich hab den Mann gern wir sind gute Freunde; 
aber schon als Hausvater ist er zu streng, und Sie können sich dencken 
was herauskommt wenn er die seiner Pflichten der Religion von seinen 
iungen rohen Leuten beobachtet haben will. 
Eine andre Bekandtschafft, grad das Widerspiel von dieser, hat mir bisher 
nicht wenig genutzt. Ich soll durch alle Klassen gehn, so scheints gnädge 
Fräulen.  Herr ** ein Ideal für Mosheimen oder Jerusalemen, ein Mann, 
der durch viel Erfahrung mit viel Verstand gegangen ist; der bey der Kälte 
des Bluts womit er von ieher die Welt betrachtet tat, gefunden zu haben 
glaubt: daß wir auf diese Welt gesetzt sind besonders um ihr nützlich zu 
seyn, daß wir uns dazu fähig machen können, wozu denn auch die 
Religion etwas hilfft; und daß der Brauchbaarste der beste ist. Und alles 
was draus folgt. 
    [...] 
Die Jurisprudenz fangt an mir sehr zu gefallen. So ists doch mit allem wie 
mit dem Merseburger Biere, das erstemal schauert man, und hat mans eine 
Woche getruncken, so kann mans nicht mehr laßen. Und die Chymie ist 
noch immer meine heimlich Geliebte. 
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Es ist doch immer noch der alte Geck! der  (WA 1:246, emphasis added) 
This letter is curious from the standpoint of the contrast of the final content with the bulk 
of the letter, and from both what is said and remains unsaid in this final contrasting 
paragraph.  If some members in the von Klettenberg circle had somewhat 
condescendingly looked at Goethe’s poor health as being a reflection of his lack of 
spiritual development (i.e. relationship to the Christian God), then this letter, with its 
pronouncement of his renewed vigor and physical vitality preceding his clear distancing 
of himself from the religious/pious circles in Strasbourg might be taken as mocking in 
tone, but this would be a rather superficial reading, given that it is clear not merely from 
the friendly terms of the letter but from its ending that Goethe wishes to assure von 
Klettenberg that, in spite of his criticism of the religious community, he remains “noch 
der alte Geck.”  Rather, it would seem that he expected her to understand this criticism, 
and that his prefatory comments related to his vitality seem more intended if anything as 
merely relating information to a friend, in order to juxtapose his state with those of the 
one-sided religious types.  Boyle takes more or less this view, in describing this 
correspondence from Goethe to von Kletternberg as follows: 
Back in Strasbourg, 'I live rather from one day to the next', Goethe wrote, 
'and thank God, and sometimes too his Son, when I may, that I am in 
circumstances which seem to impose this on me.' There was now a 
growing distance from the central figure of the Christian religion. Goethe 
had at first eagerly sought out the Pietist community in Strasbourg, he told 
Susanna von Klettenberg at the end of August, but found them so narrow 
and unimaginative, so ecclesiastically minded and hostile to the Herrnhut 
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tendency, and also 'so profoundly boring when they once start, that my 
vivacity could not endure it'. Salzmann's rationalistic, even Voltairean, 
religion may also have been responsible for this alienation, and Goethe's 
last recorded Communion took place on 26 August. Almost seamlessly, 
however, the sacred enthusiasm passed over into the secular. A letter to 
Horn written at this time, but now lost, showed, we learn from Eckermann 
and from Goethe's later correspondence, 'a young man with an inkling of 
great things lying before him', 'but as yet no sign of a whence or a whither, 
an out or an in'. The vacancy left by religion in Goethe's emotional life 
was about to be filled, and overfilled, from other sources. He was just 
strong enough for the necessary academic work in moderation, he told 
Fräulein von Klettenberg, tactfully, if a little disingenuously, in view of 
his recent exertions. (Boyle 93) 
While Boyle’s commentary seems sensible and accurate in respect to Goethe’s lack of 
enthusiasm for organized religion per se and his need to fill his own emotional life with 
other sources, it does not address the curious ending of the letter, in which the assurance 
given by Goethe that he is still the same person is immediately preceded by the statement 
“Und die Chymie ist noch immer meine heimlich Geliebte.”   
 
5.2 “Chymie” and the Holistic Synthesis and the Understanding of Knowledge 
What might Goethe have meant by this reference, and how might it help us to 
connect his time with the von Klettenberg circle to the themes present in the development 
of the Urfaust?  An important clue might be found in Goethe’s own description of his 
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time in Strasbourg, which puts his letter to Frau von Klettenberg in context, not only by 
the timeframe, but also by virtue of its indication of interests that he was keeping secret 
from Herder at that time, interests that included Faust, and most pointedly, mystical and 
cabbalistic “Chemie,” which was, in Goethe’s own words, the most hidden of these 
secrets (“Am meisten aber verbarg ich vor Herdern meine mystisch-kabbalistische 
Chemie und was sich darauf bezog”): 
Am sorgfältigsten verbarg ich ihm das Interesse an gewissen 
Gegenständen, die sich bei mir eingewurzelt hatten und sich nach und 
nach zu poetischen Gestalten ausbilden wollten. Es war Götz von 
Berlichingen und Faust. Die Lebensbeschreibung des erstern hatte mich 
im Innersten ergriffen. Die Gestalt eines rohen, wohlmeinenden 
Selbsthelfers in wilder anarchischer Zeit erregte meinen tiefsten Anteil. 
Die bedeutende Puppenspielfabel des andern klang und summte gar 
vieltönig in mir wider. Auch ich hatte mich in allem Wissen 
umhergetrieben und war früh genug auf die Eitelkeit desselben 
hingewiesen worden. Ich hatte es auch im Leben auf allerlei Weise 
versucht, und war immer unbefriedigter und gequälter zurückgekommen. 
Nun trug ich diese Dinge, sowie manche andre, mit mir herum und 
ergetzte mich daran in einsamen Stunden, ohne jedoch etwas davon 
aufzuschreiben. Am meisten aber verbarg ich vor Herdern meine 
mystisch-kabbalistische Chemie und was sich darauf bezog, ob ich mich 
gleich noch sehr gern heimlich beschäftigte, sie konsequenter auszubilden, 
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als man sie mir überliefert hatte. (HA 9:413 line 31 - 414 line 11, 
emphasis added) 
Here one notes the explicit connection of interests that Goethe maintained at the time that 
he was first exploring the poetic figure of Faust, including what would appear to be a 
description of alchemy, as it had been handed down or taught to him.  This reference, in 
combination with his veiled reference to “Chymie” in the letter to von Klettenberg, 
implies that it was at least somewhat due to his time in the von Klettenberg circle that he 
became aware of and interested in such subjects.  Not only that, but this passage from 
Dichtung und Wahrheit makes clear that Goethe’s interest in poetic development of 
figures such as Götz and Faust was not merely part of the Sturm und Drang program of 
his youthful development of drama, but also related to areas of interest that he maintained 
and pursued separately from his programmatic study of that movement under the 
leadership of Herder. 
 If one returns to the description of von Klettenberg in Dichtung und Wahrheit, 
one finds also that even if the von Klettenberg circle was essentially religious in nature, 
Goethe himself was connecting ideas formed in the circle with his literary pursuits and 
with the poetic debates of the time.  In a much later passage from the initial description of 
Frau von Klettenberg and her circle, he draws an analogy between one of the leading 
figures of this group of Pietists, Moser, and the “Magus of the North,” Hamann (who had 
influenced Herder), in the sense that both men were deep thinkers, well-rounded in the 
knowledge of literature and the world, and with a feel for the secretive (“Geheimes”) and 
ineffable (“Unerforscherlisches”): 
	  
	   103	  
Da ich mich nun sowohl zu dem sibyllinischen Stil solcher Blätter als zu 
der Herausgabe derselben eigentlich durch Hamann hatte verleiten lassen, 
so scheint mir hier eine schickliche Stelle, dieses würdigen einflußreichen 
Mannes zu gedenken, der uns damals ein ebenso großes Geheimnis war, 
als er es immer dem Vaterlande geblieben ist.  Seine »Sokratischen 
Denkwürdigkeiten« erregten Aufsehen, und waren solchen Personen 
besonders lieb, die sich mit dem blendenden Zeitgeiste nicht vertragen 
konnten.  Man ahndete hier einen tiefdenkenden gründlichen Mann, der, 
mit der offenbaren Welt und Literatur genau bekannt, doch auch noch 
etwas Geheimes, Unerforschliches gelten ließ, und sich darüber auf eine 
ganz eigne Weise aussprach.  Von denen, die damals die Literatur des 
Tags beherrschten, ward er freilich für einen abstrusen Schwärmer 
gehalten, eine aufstrebende Jugend aber ließ sich wohl von ihm anziehn. 
Sogar die Stillen im Lande, wie sie halb im Scherz, halb im Ernst genannt 
wurden, jene frommen Seelen, welche, ohne sich zu irgend einer 
Gesellschaft zu bekennen, eine unsichtbare Kirche bildeten, wendeten 
ihm ihre Aufmerksamkeit zu, und meiner Klettenberg, nicht weniger 
ihrem Freunde Moser war der »Magus aus Norden« eine willkommene 
Erscheinung.  Man setzte sich um so mehr mit ihm in Verhältnis, als man 
erfahren hatte, daß er, von knappen häuslichen Umständen gepeinigt, sich 
dennoch diese schöne und hohe Sinnesweise zu erhalten verstand.  Bei 
dem großen Einflusse des Präsidenten von Moser wäre es leicht gewesen, 
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einem so genügsamen Manne ein leidliches und bequemes Dasein zu 
verschaffen.  Die Sache war auch eingeleitet, ja man hatte sich so weit 
schon verständigt und genähert, daß Hamann die weite Reise von 
Königsberg nach Darmstadt unternahm. Als aber der Präsident zufällig 
abwesend war, kehrte jener wunderliche Mann, aus welchem Anlaß weiß 
man nicht, sogleich wieder zurück; man blieb jedoch in einem 
freundlichen Briefverhältnis. Ich besitze noch zwei Schreiben des 
Königsbergers an seinen Gönner, die von der wundersamen Großheit und 
Innigkeit ihres Verfassers Zeugnis ablegen.  Aber ein so gutes Verständnis 
sollte nicht lange dauern. Diese frommen Menschen hatten sich jenen 
auch nach ihrer Weise fromm gedacht, sie hatten ihn als den Magus aus 
Norden mit Ehrfurcht behandelt, und glaubten, daß er sich auch so fort in 
ehrwürdigem Betragen darstellen würde. Allein er hatte schon durch die 
»Wolken, ein Nachspiel Sokratischer Denkwürdigkeiten« einigen Anstoß 
gegeben, und da er nun gar die »Kreuzzüge des Philologen« herausgab, 
auf deren Titelblatt nicht allein das Ziegenprofil eines gehörnten Pans zu 
sehen war, sondern auch auf einer der ersten Seiten ein großer, in Holz 
geschnittener Hahn,[…] (HA 9: 512 line 20 – 513 line 29) 
Importantly, Goethe draws a link between the literary world and the world of the Pietists, 
in the sense that he was able to understand figures such as Hamann and Moser from the 
standpoint of their ability to function in both worlds, whereas those who were one-sided 
in their devotion to one or other world would not appreciate the true greatness of either 
figure.  This gives one a clue toward the holistic worldview that is present in the Urfaust 
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between the intellect/reason (Kopf) und feeling (Herz), and indicates how the time in the 
von Klettenberg circle may well have functioned for him: perhaps one can say, in 
Hegelian terms, that the “thesis” of his literary education, when presented with the 
“antithesis” of his Pietist studies, produced a “synthesis” of the holistic approach present 
in the Urfaust, a holism that similarly allowed him to appreciate figures such as Hamann 
and Moser who did not confine themselves to the limits prescribed by their chosen 
disciplines (and were therefore often un- or underappreciated by their own). 
 This holistic synthesis and understanding of knowledge, resulting from this period 
in Goethe’s development, is also pointed toward in Goethe’s remarks in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit regarding the difference in approaches between von Klettenberg and Lavater 
concerning the function of their belief, in which Goethe points out the difference between 
belief and knowledge, and ultimately describes knowledge in such a way to contrast with 
belief with respect to limits, and as being itself of a whole: 
Der Streit zwischen Wissen und Glauben war noch nicht an der 
Tagesordnung, allein die beiden Worte und die Begriffe, die man damit 
verknüpft, kamen wohl auch gelegentlich vor, und die wahren  
Weltverächter behaupteten, eins sei so unzuverlässig als das andere.  
Daher beliebte es mir, mich zu gunsten beider zu erklären, ohne jedoch 
den Beifall meiner Freunde gewinnen zu können. Beim Glauben, sagte 
ich, komme alles darauf an, daß man glaube; was man glaube, sei völlig 
gleichgültig.  Der Glaube sei ein großes Gefühl von Sicherheit für die 
Gegenwart und Zukunft, und diese Sicherheit entspringe aus dem 
Zutrauen auf ein übergroßes, übermächtiges und unerforschliches Wesen. 
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Auf die Unerschütterlichkeit dieses Zutrauens komme alles an; wie wir 
uns aber dieses Wesen denken, dies hänge von unsern übrigen 
Fähigkeiten, ja von den Umständen ab, und sei ganz gleichgültig.  Der 
Glaube sei ein heiliges Gefäß, in welches ein jeder sein Gefühl, seinen 
Verstand, seine Einbildungskraft, so gut als er vermöge, zu opfern bereit 
stehe. Mit dem Wissen sei es gerade das Gegenteil; es komme gar nicht 
darauf an, daß man wisse, sondern was man wisse, wie gut und wie viel 
man wisse.  Daher könne man über das Wissen streiten, weil es sich 
berichtigen, sich erweitern und verengern lasse. Das Wissen fange vom 
einzelnen an, sei endlos und gestaltlos, und könne niemals, höchstens nur 
träumerisch, zusammengefaßt werden, und bleibe also dem Glauben 
geradezu entgegengesetzt. (HA 10:23 lines 3-29) 
Again, this holistic approach to knowledge appears to be something that Goethe 
appreciates upon reflecting on the religious debates he witnessed in the von Klettenberg 
circle.  With respect to this characterization of knowledge, moving from the individual to 
the greater scale (microcosm to macrocosm), there were certainly influences from the 
readings that Goethe did while in Frankfurt that could account for this understanding as 
well. 
 
5.3 Alchemy: Goethe’s Introduction to the Work of Georg von Welling 
 Returning to the passages that introduced von Klettenberg in the narrative of 
Dichtung und Wahrheit, there is a passage that follows in the immediate context, with 
reference to both Goethe’s doctor and surgeon at the time, who were members of the 
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same von Klettenberg circle.  This lengthy passage is of particular importance to this 
study, in that it shows a direct link between the ideas being circulated within the group 
and certain esoteric practices and texts, which could help one to understand, in the wider 
context, how Goethe synthesized his previous literary studies with the teachings of the 
von Klettenberg circle into a holistic, mythic approach in the Urfaust; in the first part of 
this passage, he describes the medical practices in terms sounding very much like 
alchemical pursuits: 
Da ich mit der Geschwulst am Halse sehr geplagt war, indem Arzt und 
Chirurgus diese Exkreszenz erst vertreiben, hernach, wie sie sagten, 
zeitigen wollten, und sie zuletzt aufzuschneiden für gut befanden; so hatte 
ich eine geraume Zeit mehr an Unbequemlichkeit als an Schmerzen zu 
leiden, obgleich gegen das Ende der Heilung das immer fortdauernde 
Betupfen mit Höllenstein und andern ätzenden Dingen höchst 
verdrießliche Aussichten auf jeden neuen Tag geben mußte. Arzt und 
Chirurgus gehörten auch unter die abgesonderten Frommen, obgleich 
beide von höchst verschiedenem Naturell waren. Der Chirurgus, ein 
schlanker wohlgebildeter Mann von leichter und geschickter Hand, der, 
leider etwas hektisch, seinen Zustand mit wahrhaft christlicher Geduld 
ertrug, und sich in seinem Berufe durch sein Übel nicht irre machen ließ. 
Der Arzt, ein unerklärlicher, schlau blickender, freundlich sprechender, 
übrigens abstruser Mann, der sich in dem frommen Kreise ein ganz 
besonderes Zutrauen erworben hatte. Tätig und aufmerksam war er den 
Kranken tröstlich; mehr aber als durch alles erweiterte er seine 
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Kundschaft durch die Gabe, einige geheimnisvolle selbstbereitete 
Arzneien im Hintergrunde zu zeigen, von denen niemand sprechen durfte, 
weil bei uns den Ärzten die eigene Dispensation streng verboten war.  Mit 
gewissen Pulvern, die irgend ein Digestiv sein mochten, tat er nicht so 
geheim; aber von jenem wichtigen Salze, das nur in den größten Gefahren 
angewendet werden durfte, war nur unter den Gläubigen die Rede, ob es 
gleich noch niemand gesehen, oder die Wirkung davon gespürt hatte. Um 
den Glauben an die Möglichkeit eines solchen Universalmittels zu erregen 
und zu stärken, hatte der Arzt seinen Patienten, wo er nur einige 
Empfänglichkeit fand, gewisse mystische chemisch-alchemische Bücher 
empfohlen, und zu verstehen gegeben, daß man durch eignes Studium 
derselben gar wohl dahin gelangen könne, jenes Kleinod sich selbst zu 
erwerben; welches um so notwendiger sei, als die Bereitung sich sowohl 
aus physischen als besonders aus moralischen Gründen nicht wohl 
überliefern lasse, ja daß man, um jenes große Werk einzusehen, 
hervorzubringen und zu benutzen, die Geheimnisse der Natur im 
Zusammenhang kennen müsse, weil es nichts Einzelnes sondern etwas 
Universelles sei, und auch wohl gar unter verschiedenen Formen und 
Gestalten hervorgebracht werden könne.  (HA 9:340 line 25 -341 line 27) 
In connection with these alchemical practices, there was a certain program of reading, 
and in this respect, the holistic approach is shown to be tied directly to the works of 
various alchemical authors listed by Goethe, with none receiving as much attention as 
Georg von Welling and his Opus mago-cabbalisticum, to which Goethe makes reference 
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to von Klettenberg herself as having “secretly” (“insgeheim”) studied, before he himself 
took it up: 
Meine Freundin hatte auf diese lockenden Worte gehorcht. Das Heil des 
Körpers war zu nahe mit dem Heil der Seele verwandt; und könnte je eine 
größere Wohltat, eine größere Barmherzigkeit auch an andern ausgeübt 
werden, als wenn man sich ein Mittel zu eigen machte, wodurch so 
manches Leiden gestillt, so manche Gefahr abgelehnt werden könnte? Sie 
hatte schon insgeheim Wellings »Opus mago-cabbalisticum« studiert, 
wobei sie jedoch, weil der Autor das Licht, was er mitteilt, sogleich 
wieder selbst verfinstert und aufhebt, sich nach einem Freunde umsah, der 
ihr in diesem Wechsel von Licht und Finsternis Gesellschaft leistete. Es 
bedurfte nur einer geringen Anregung, um auch mir diese Krankheit zu 
inokulieren.  Ich schaffte das Werk an, das, wie alle Schriften dieser Art, 
seinen Stammbaum in gerader Linie bis zur neuplatonischen Schule 
verfolgen konnte. Meine vorzüglichste Bemühung an diesem Buche war, 
die dunklen Hinweisungen, wo der Verfasser von einer Stelle auf die 
andere deutet und dadurch das, was er verbirgt, zu enthüllen verspricht, 
aufs genauste zu bemerken und am Rande die Seitenzahlen solcher sich 
einander aufklären sollenden Stellen zu bezeichnen. Aber auch so blieb 
das Buch noch dunkel und unverständlich genug; außer daß man sich 
zuletzt in eine gewisse Terminologie hineinstudierte, und, indem man mit 
derselben nach eignem Belieben gebarte, etwas, wo nicht zu verstehen, 
doch wenigstens zu sagen glaubte. Gedachtes Werk erwähnt seiner 
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Vorgänger mit vielen Ehren, und wir wurden daher angeregt, jene Quellen 
selbst aufzusuchen. Wir wendeten uns nun an die Werke des Theophrastus 
Paracelsus und Basilius Valentinus; nicht weniger an Helmont, Starkey 
und andere, deren mehr oder weniger auf Natur und Einbildung beruhende 
Lehren und Vorschriften wir einzusehen und zu befolgen suchten. Mir 
wollte besonders die »Aurea Catena Homeri« gefallen, wodurch die Natur, 
wenn auch vielleicht auf phantastische Weise, in einer schönen 
Verknüpfung dargestellt wird; und so verwendeten wir teils einzeln, teils 
zusammen viele Zeit an diese Seltsamkeiten, und brachten die Abende 
eines langen Winters, während dessen ich die Stube hüten mußte, sehr 
vergnügt zu, indem wir zu dreien, meine Mutter mit eingeschlossen, uns 
an diesen Geheimnissen mehr ergetzten, als die Offenbarung derselben 
hätte tun können. (HA 9: 341 line 27 – 342 line 29) 
Here one sees, in the connection between the secret practices of medicine and heretical 
theology, a basis for Goethe’s challenge toward both science and religion in the mythic 
form of Faust.  Goethe’s interest in Welling, in particular, has been underappreciated and 
not closely investigated in its own right.  In this respect, one might argue that the most 
important overlooked or under examined aspect of Goethe’s time in the von Klettenberg 
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6 Goethe’s use of Welling’s Opus mago-cabbalisticum et theosophicum 
 Goethe’s approach to this poetic dispute through drama as opposed to rational 
argument, in which he manipulates the Faust myth far beyond its characterization by 
Gottsched, owes much to the influence from the “heretical” myth-makers that he was 
reading at the time that he composed the Urfaust.  In Dichtung und Wahrheit Goethe 
makes reference to a number of authors that he read during his convalescence in 
Frankfurt, during which time he associated with the von Klettenberg circle.  Among these 
authors, he specifically cites the work of one, Georg von Welling’s Opus mago-
cabbalisticum et theosophicum (1719, 1729, 1735).  Welling’s work was originally 
published in 1719, under the pseudonym Gregorius Anglus Sallwigt.  A later, expanded 
edition appeared in 1735.  According to records of Goethe’s personal library, he owned a 
1760 reprint of the 1735 version (Ruppert 465).  Therefore, all quotes from Welling used 
in this dissertation, unless otherwise stated, will refer back to this edition, archived at 
archive.org.  Also consulted in the course of this research was the 1729 version of the 
shorter, original text, which I accessed at the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois, the 
title of which is: Tractatus mago-cabbalistico-chymicus et theosophicus von des Saltzes 
Uhrsrung und Erzeugung, Natur und Nussen : wobey zugleich die Erzeugung derer 
Metallen, Mineralien und anderer Salien, aus dem Grunde der Natur beweisen wird ... : 
alles, nach einem systemate magico Universi, nebst andern in Kupffer getrochenen 
Problematibus, denen Wahrheit liebenden, zur Einleitung in die allerheiligste Göttliche 
Geheimnisse, sammt vollständigen Register aufgesetzet / von einem emfigen Liebhaber 
der ewigen Wahrheit.  This latter text is helpful in that it provides an extensive register of 
the terms used and their correspondences, one that is far more detailed than the 
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corresponding register from the 1735 version.  This is particularly helpful to the modern 
reader.  In relation to the later text, it comprises the first section of the larger tripartite 
work, dealing with ‘salt,’ with the two newer sections relating to ‘sulfur’ and ‘mercury.’ 
Goethe mentions the holistic approach to his convalescence, one that connected 
the healing of the body with that of the soul, and how he was introduced by von 
Klettenberg (the “sie” in the following passage refers to her) to Welling: 
Sie hatte schon insgeheim Wellings »Opus mago-cabbalisticum« studiert, 
wobei sie jedoch, weil der Autor das Licht, was er mitteilt, sogleich 
wieder selbst verfinstert und aufhebt, sich nach einem Freunde umsah, der 
ihr in diesem Wechsel von Licht und Finsternis Gesellschaft leistete. Es 
bedurfte nur einer geringen Anregung, um auch mir diese Krankheit zu 
inokulieren.” (HA 9:341)   
In spite of its seeming importance to Goethe at the time, he mentions as well its 
incomprehensible nature, despite his repeated attempts to work with the text (cited earlier 
HA 9:342).  The debate among scholars regarding the extent and the importance of this 
influence upon Goethe at this time has tended to follow several main lines of argument, 
which would appear to take their beginnings from either the first or the second citation 
above: either Welling’s text was a critical influence for Goethe, given that it was the only 
text cited by title and author from this period of recuperation in Frankfurt, or it was not, 
given that he seems to have been frustrated in his many vain attempts to understand it.  
Those taking the latter view with respect to the work’s direct influence might still argue, 
for instance, that the work had an influence in terms of stimulating Goethe’s creativity, 
such as in the case argued by Boyle; those inclined to see the Welling text as a vital 
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influence, or as an initiation of sorts into one or other alchemical, hermetic, neoplatonic 
or cabbalistic traditions, argue that it greatly influenced Goethe’s work (to varying 
degrees), such as in Zimmermann and Gray. 
With respect to the Urfaust, it is necessary to mediate between these two above 
camps.  That is to say, literary creativity was the main effect of the exposure to Welling 
(in accordance with the view of Boyle), but at the same time, Goethe’s interest in Welling 
was more than passing, and indeed, appears to have been coupled with the poetic 
approach that I have outlined.  This is not merely evident in his own development of a 
“Luzifer-Mythos,” but also in his use of specific terms and imagery for his own version 
of the Faust myth.  It is not possible, however, to follow the lines of argument articulated 
by those who value Welling’s influence on Goethe’s thought and writing, but then 
proceed to locate Goethe within a specific hermetic tradition (à la Zimmermann), an 
alchemical tradition (à la Gray) or to use Welling as a skeleton key for understanding 
Faust I and II (à la Grumach).  These attempts ultimately miss the point of Goethe’s 
appropriation of Welling for his own creative purposes and poetic aims. 
 Furthermore, this mediating approach helps ultimately to clarify Goethe’s own 
statements in Dichtung und Wahrheit regarding Welling, which appear contradictory if 
one adopts either of the aforementioned approaches: the “mainstream” approach 
generally seeks to minimize or ignore the importance of Welling, which seems odd given 
that Goethe went out of his way to name this work -- and only this work -- by title and 
author when discussing the works that he read while convalescing in the von Klettenberg 
circle; whereas the more esoterically-inclined researchers must account for the fact that 
Goethe also explicitly states that he found the work as a whole to be incomprehensible.  
	  
	   114	  
One is aware of the fact that using terms such as “mainstream” as opposed to “esoteric” 
could be construed by the reader as indicating a preference or prejudice in favor of one 
set of commentaries as opposed to the other.  This is not the intention of the use of these 
terms in this study: the “mainstream” view here simply connotes the view of Welling in 
the most accepted general commentaries (such as the Hamburger-Ausgabe, Münchener-
Ausgabe, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag commentary by Schöne), etc., as opposed to the 
more speculative studies focused on locating Goethe’s Faust within a particular esoteric 
or philosophical tradition, whether it be hermeticism, alchemy, cabbala, neoplatonism, 
etc.  It should be kept in mind that this dissertation argues not in favor of either position, 
but in favor of a third position that mediates between the two.  If Goethe’s inspiration 
from Welling can be located in his poetic attempts to create myth, as opposed to trying to 
fit it within a neoplatonic, hermetic or alchemical cosmogony, his interest at the time of 
the Klettenberg circle and his willingness decades later to mention Welling in that 
context in Dichtung und Wahrheit come into clearer focus. 
 
6.1 The “Mainstream” Approach to Goethe’s Urfaust  
 Boyle has noted that von Klettenberg’s introduction of these works to Goethe was 
less an attempt to influence Goethe’s beliefs than to stimulate his literary creativity by 
means of heterodox ideas.  He also hints that this may have a connection to Goethe’s 
taking up of the Faust myth itself (Boyle 76). 
 While this supposition is not unreasonable, given the context of Goethe’s having 
mentioned this work in a passage that describes his influences at the time leading up to 
his composition of the Urfaust, a more careful examination of this possibility is 
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worthwhile, both as means of understanding Goethe’s approach to myth-making in the 
Urfaust and of outlining the possible provenance of some of the specific elements used 
within his reimagined Faust myth.  The influence of Welling has, generally speaking, 
been reduced to a passing mention in most of important contemporary scholarship and 
commentary on Faust.   
 
6.1.1 The Schöne Commentary 
 Schöne’s commentary, for example, merely includes Welling in the list of 
esoteric, alchemical and Neoplatonist writers whose work Goethe consulted at the time, 
reiterating the names mentioned in Dichtung und Wahrheit.  In his Kommentare 
regarding both Faust I and Faust: Frühe Fassung, Schöne refers to the passage naming 
Welling in Dichtung und Wahrheit in his notes regarding “Zeichen des Makrokosmus” 
reference in line 77 (Schöne commentary volume 214 and 836 , respectively), merely 
naming Welling among those cited by Goethe in that passage.  In his notes on the ensuing 
lines of the Urfaust, Schöne not only does not refer to Welling, but in his argument 
against what he takes to be the overvalued (“übergewertet”) influence of Swedenborg by 
other commentators, maintains that the lines 89-93, beginning with “was der Weise 
spricht...,” refer not to anyone specifically, but to a general neoplatonic and theosophic 
authority: 
  Doch die Einflüsse Swedenborgs [...] hat man wohl übergewertet. 
Neuplatonische und theosophische Vorstellungen über die Geisterwelt 
sind Goethe aus vielerlei Quellungen zugekommen, und als der Weise 
(identisch mit Nostradamus in 67?) wird hier offenbar kein bestimmter 
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ungenannter Autor vorgestellt, sondern eine überpersonale Autorität 
imaginiert. (Schöne Kommentar 837, emphasis in original) 
This seems a reasonable conclusion on Schöne’s part, but it begs the question of why a 
Welling reference would not have gone amiss here, considering that in the previously 
referenced statement of Goethe’s from Dichtung und Wahrheit, it was Welling who 
provided the entree into the neoplatonic and theosophic sources for Goethe (i.e. Welling’s 
work having provided the impetus for him to seek other sources in the neoplatonic 
“Stammbaum”). 
 
6.1.2 Münchner-Ausgabe Commentary by Gerhard Sauder 
 Similarly, in the Münchner-Ausgabe commentary on Faust, edited by Gerhard 
Sauder, Welling is brought up in connection with the “Zeichen des Makrokosmus” line, 
here referencing the fact that the 1760 version of Welling’s work could be found in 
Goethe’s father’s library (MA1.2: 752).  As opposed to Schöne’s general “overpersonal” 
authority, the Nostradamus reference in line 67 is mentioned by Sauder in connection 
with a number of specific thinkers from the alchemical/astrological tradition, among them 
van Helmont, Welling and Swedenborg (MA1.2:751). Additionally, the line from 132/3, 
in which the Erdgeist addresses Faust, “Du hast mich mächtig angezogen, / An meiner 
Sphäre lang gesogen” is mentioned in the Münchener-Ausgabe in connection with 
Welling: “nach Welling der Prozeß des ‘steten Atemholens,’ der Gestalten und Idee 
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6.1.3 The Trunz Commentary on Dichtung und Wahrheit 
 In the Trunz commentary found within the Hamburger-Ausgabe (volume 9) 
edition of Dichtung und Wahrheit, Welling is mentioned numerous times in pages 749-
751, 756 and again from760-764.  These references fall into three major categories: 1) a 
discussion of whether Goethe had Welling’s Opus in his personal library at the time of 
Dichtung und Wahrheit (749-751, 760), 2) a discussion of relevance of Welling’s 
alchemical terms to those used by the young Goethe in describing the alchemical 
experiments of his youth (756), and 3) an overview of Welling’s cosmogony (761-764).  
A possible connection to Faust and/or the Urfaust is not explored, although a reference to 
an illustration in Welling is made in connection with Goethe’s thought, but this is more to 
show the exception than the rule, as it is clear that Trunz is writing here with respect to 
the older Goethe, who had, according to Trunz, long turned away from such things 
(Trunz commentary in HA 9:761). 
 
6.1.4 Nisbet’s “Mainstream” Approach to Welling 
 In looking, then, at Boyle, Schöne, Sauder and Trunz, one notes a conservative 
approach, in which Goethe’s acknowledgement of Welling is taken more as a fact to be 
listed than a theme to be explored, although there seems not to be a consensus on how 
important Welling is, ranging from the most dismissive of Welling’s importance 
(Schöne) to the most open to the possibility of influence (Boyle), with only Trunz 
actually bothering to outline Welling’s specific cosmogony. 
 In Nisbet’s work, one sees Boyle’s openness with a nod toward Trunz’s overview 
of Welling’s cosmogony.  For instance, Nisbet is quite open to the discussion of 
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neoplatonic influence on Goethe’s thought in general, and in his brief but outstanding 
work from 1972, Goethe and the Scientific Tradition, he even begins with a discussion of 
the neoplatonic tradition before discussion the empirical and rationalistic traditions with 
respect to Goethe’s thought.  However, there is no mention of Welling here.  Nisbet does, 
however, in other work, mention in passing Goethe’s interest in Welling in connection 
with the construction of a “speculative cosmogony,” but this is more a matter of direct 
reference to Dichtung und Wahrheit, and not a specific argument that he chooses to 
develop beyond the “orthodox” view of Welling’s influence upon Goethe, mentioning 
Welling while discussing the archetype of Lucifer as a leitmotif in Goethe’s work from 
the Sturm und Drang period: 
It is plain from this and other similar utterances that Goethe was not an 
atheist – although he occasionally liked to style himself as such in order to 
shock the curious or those who tried to convert him. He simply refused to 
recognize any of the Christian churches, or indeed the Bible itself, as the 
ultimate authority in religious matters, and when he read Gottfried 
Arnold’s Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte (History of Churches and 
Heretics, 1699– 1700) during his Pietist phase in Frankfurt, he found 
himself in sympathy with numerous heretics (HA ix, 350). During his 
Storm and Stress period, this interest led to a series of plans for dramas 
and other literary works on such figures as Mohammed, Prometheus, 
Ahasverus – and, of course, Faust (cf. HA x, 45–8). The archetype of most 
of these figures was the fallen angel Lucifer, around whose rebellion 
against God the young Goethe constructed a speculative cosmogony (HA 
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ix, 351–3), influenced by various hermetic and alchemical works, such as 
Welling’s Opus mago-cabbalisticum (1735), which he read during his 
convalescence (HA ix, 341–2). (Nisbet 2002 220-221) 
While Nisbet’s point appears undoubtedly accurate, it is also, perhaps, too concentrated.  
Lucifer the rebel angel serves as a good prototypical Sturm und Drang rebel, but from the 
wider standpoint of mythology and the Enlightenment, Goethe is standing Gottsched’s 
argument on its head.  Whereas for Gottsched the Faust myth has lost its use due to its 
implausibility, in Goethe one sees the freeing effect of the Enlightenment in the face of 
an increasingly discredited Christian cosmogony.  In the wake of the Enlightenment, one 
is free to re-imagine Lucifer as one would a stock character in a drama, as opposed to a in 
a world-defining cosmology.  This playing with archetype is consistent with the re-
imagining of character roles seen in Goethe’s re-appropriation of the stock character 
types in the commedia dell’arte.  The Enlightenment has, effectively, disqualified the 
“truths” associated with past religious imagery, and Goethe seizes upon these images as 
nothing more than images, just as upon the “masks” of the commedia dell’arte, as a 
means of playing with meaning. 
 
6.2 The Mystical versus the Mythological  
 There are, of course, a number of works that touch upon Goethe’s interest in 
Welling, some in great detail, but very few with reference to the Urfaust.  Some authors 
attempt to outline Goethe’s own cosmogony via Welling, such as Rotemund (1954), or 
bring up Welling as part of a narrative of Goethe’s interest in magic, such as Wachsmuth 
(1943).  Many of the more widely-read and referenced studies purporting to demonstrate 
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Welling’s influence upon Goethe focus upon trying to demonstrate, in one way or 
another, how this influence fits within a specific mystical tradition. 
 
6.2.1 Zimmermann’s Work on Goethe and the Hermetic Tradition 
 One of the better known and scholarly referenced studies that touches upon 
Goethe’s interest in Welling with respect to outlining a mystical approach to interpreting 
Goethe, is R.C. Zimmermann’s monumental study, Das Weltbild des Jungen Goethe 
(1969), which treats the question of Goethe’s interest in Welling in some detail, although 
mostly in terms that do not directly concern this dissertation, by focusing rather upon 
locating the influences upon the young Goethe as part of a decidedly Hermetic program 
of study.  In particular, Zimmermann sees in the mention by Goethe of texts such as 
Welling’s and also the “Aurea Catena Homeri” evidence of the direct influence of 
Rosicrucianism upon Goethe via his doctor Metz, who is assumed to have provided the 
texts in question to Klettenberg, and who is assumed to have been more a proponent and 
practitioner of Rosicrucianism than admitted by Goethe, ultimately connected to the 
circle around the Swabian Hermeticist Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. (see especially 
Zimmermann 180-2, also 196, 202).  This dissertation is not meant as an endorsement or 
criticism of Zimmermann’s work, the thrust of which is concerned with an altogether 
different issue.  This work is rather focussed upon how Goethe used the influences 
involved in the formation of the Urfaust as a means of fashioning his own, original, take 
on the Faust myth, in a response to the poetic debates of the eighteenth century.  In this 
respect, while I find Zimmermann’s forensic analysis and attempt at tracing the 
Rosicrucian lineage of Goethe’s involvement with and possible influence by Welling to 
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be, if somewhat speculative, provocatively interesting, my own examination of Goethe’s 
appropriation of themes and elements from Welling will be decidedly less esoteric in 
nature, and, in contrast to scholarship in general on this question, will involve a much 
more text-immanent examination of passages from the wider Welling work itself. 
 
6.2.2 Gray’s Study on Goethe and Alchemy 
 Other scholars attempt to establish yet other mystical connections via Welling to 
Goethe’s wider work in general.  Of these, one of the most notable is Ronald Gray, 
whose work Goethe, the Alchemist: A Study of Alchemical Symbolism in Goethe's 
Literary and Scientific Works (1952) has the following stated purpose: 
This book sets out to show that Goethe was profoundly influenced 
throughout his life by the religious and philosophical beliefs her derived 
from his early study of alchemy. Alchemy can be interpreted in many 
ways. […] As Goethe knew it, it was primarily concerned with mysticism.  
In his hands, however, it underwent some transformation: the mystical 
aspect became less important, while he attempted to provide more logical, 
more scientific evidence of the symbolical truth of alchemy. (Gray ix) 
Although Goethe transformed the mystical approach into something different, Gray’s 
effort to project a wider and persistent esoteric viewpoint overlooks the ways in which 
Welling appears transformed in mythological terms in the Urfaust.  
 Gray, for instance, focuses upon Welling as being part of the wider tradition of 
alchemy from which Goethe was reading: 
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As far as precise titles are concerned, we are in fact restricted to the Opus 
Mago-Cabbalisticum and the Aurea Catena Homeri, together with a few 
chapters of Paracelsus mentioned by name in the Strasbourg notebook.  It 
must be recalled however that the alchemists were not a set of 
philosophers each with his own system.  All felt themselves part of a 
tradition, and while each might expound the common doctrine in an 
individual way there was general agreement as to the fundamental tenets.  
In all his wide reading Goethe can have found only an elaboration of the 
basic doctrines. (Gray 7-8) 
While it is quite reasonable in many ways to assume this is the case, one sees in the 
assumptions made by Gray a certain point of view that prevents further study specifically 
of how there could be a singular influence of Welling upon Goethe in the composition of 
the Urfaust.  If one is to look not at systems or mystical doctrines, but rather, at the 
specific use of images or motifs present in Goethe from any of these authors, it can (and 
will) be seen that there are specific references in Goethe’s Urfaust that appear to have 
their origin in Welling’s text, not as part of a transformed system, but as a borrowing of 
elements from that system for use in a mythological construct.  Therefore, to focus upon 
Welling’s system, as Gray does, is to miss the point of its immediate influence upon the 
young Goethe in his composition (see Gray 19-25, 43). 
 
6.3 Welling and the Erdgeist 
 Without going into great detail, it should be noted that of those who have sought a 
direct textual connection between Welling and Urfaust, such a connection has been 
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essentially limited to a discussion of Lucifer and the Erdgeist.  While this line of 
argument was opened by Ernst Grumach (1953), it was done in the wider context of a 
study of the development of the Faust plan of 1797. For a succinct, if dismissive 
treatment of Grumach’s that the Erdgeist invocation scene can be seen as linked to 
Welling’s cabbalistic system, see Mason (1967 168-170, 272).  Another modern work 
that seems to rely heavily upon Grumach with respect to the possible influence of 
Welling on Goethe is Nollendorfs (1967). 
 In recent years, there is one study by Sinziana Ravini (2008) that takes Welling’s 
cosmology into account as a possible influence on Goethe from a mythological point of 
view, and indeed, even mentions its influence on the Urfaust in this connection.  In the 
course of this work, there are three pages devoted specifically to the question of 
“Kosmologie im Urfaust” that bear direct relevance to this question.  Ravini goes beyond 
previous scholarship by briefly exploring the question of how the conception of Goethe’s 
Erdgeist in the Urfaust might be related to Welling’s Luftgeister.  Of note here is the 
following observation, “Der Erdgeist kann in „Tatensturm“, „Geburt und Grab“, „Erden 
Weh und Glück“ auf Wellings Luftgeister zurückgeführt worden“ (Ravini 58). After 
quoting from Welling in support of this statement, Ravini offers the following 
observations: 
In keiner von Goethes Quellen findet man diese unterschiedlichen 
Wesenszüge in einer Gestalt vereinigt.  Wellings Luftgeister haben nicht 
eine so herausragende Rolle wie Goethes Erdgeist.  Zumal sie sich 
ausschließlich in der Luft befinden.  Demgegenüber kann sich der Erdgeist 
sowohl auf der Erde als auch in der Luft aufhalten.  Dessen ungeachtet 
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darf man Welling als Quelle nicht vernachlässigen.  Denn nicht nur 
einzelne Teile, sondern auch das ganze kosmologische System im Urfaust 
lassen sich ausgehend von Wellings Werk beleuchten. (Ravini 59) 
The relevant quote from Welling that precedes this remark is the following: 
Dann wahrhaftig ist die Luft die grosse Zeugemutter, worinnen empfangen 
und aufbehalten werden, alles Thun und Würcken der Menschen […].  
Liebe und Hass, je alle anderen Bewegungen der Seele, werden in uns also 
gehoren, und was noch mehr ist, so ist keine Zeugung der vernünftigen 
oder unvernünftigen, vegetabilischen, thierischen oder mineralischen 
Geschöpfen, so nicht in diesem grossen Welt-Geiste, der Luft, auch 
geistlicher Weise, wesentlich gezeugt werden. (Welling as quoted in 
Ravini 59; cf Welling 116f) 
In spite of the far-reaching implications of Ravini’s final assertion in this remark 
regarding the cosmological system in the Urfaust, Ravini admits that Goethe did not 
include a “Luciferszene” in the Urfaust, arguing in this respect that: 
Die Kosmologie bleibt deswegen zum Teil verhüllt.  Wenn Goethe Faust 
zur Zeit seiner alchemistischen Untersuchungen geschrieben hätte, wäre 
seine Auffasung ganz im Rahmen des wellingschen Weltbildes geblieben.  
Die Niederschrift entsteht jedoch später, nachdem Goethe bereits eine 
andere kosmologische Grundauffassung noch nicht vollständig entwickelt 
hat, als er den Urfaust verfasst. (Ravini 59) 
This argument, when connected with the first mentioned above, is suggestive of the need 
for a more in-depth analysis of Welling’s cosmogony, in order to see if further points of 
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correspondence and/or influence Welling on Goethe’s Urfaust, do, indeed, exist.  The 
idea that the Erdgeist could relate to Welling in such a way as to none of the other 
sources consulted by Goethe at the time is highly suggestive, although as Ravini notes, 
there is no Luciferszene per se in the Urfaust.  Ravini’s further point about the lack of a 
fully-developed cosmogony on Goethe’s part at the time of the composition of the 
Urfaust is also a very salient one, and, it would seem, tends to support the idea of a 
mythical, rather than mystical, interpretation of the influence of Welling on Goethe. 
 
6.4 Welling and Goethe’s Myth-Making 
 Following a brief overview of Welling’s cosmogony, this examination will 
proceed in two parts.  First, it is relevant to analyze the Lucifer myth as it is constructed 
in Welling.  Doing so is decidedly not to establish a one-to-one correspondence between 
Welling and Goethe’s own “Luzifer-Mythos,” and furthermore, not to pursue the line of 
argumentation of others such as Grumach, Ravini, et al with respect to showing a link 
between Welling’s Lucifer myth and the Erdgeist but rather to show Welling as (possibly 
the chief) inspiration for Goethe on the issue of manipulating and creating myth.  Second, 
various elements of Welling’s text may serve as possible starting points for the treatment 
of similar elements in the Urfaust, showing the likelihood that Goethe’s appropriation of 
Welling’s approach to myth manipulation extended as well to his use of mythic elements 
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6.4.1 The Approach to Welling’s Opus 
 A comprehensive analysis of Welling’s work would be beyond the scope of this 
work.  Perhaps the best work available at helping the reader to understand the basics of 
Welling’s thought is Petra Jungmayr’s Georg von Welling (1655-1727): Studien zu Leben 
und Werk (1990), which contains biographical data, an overview and description of the 
contents of the Opus, a description of Welling’s view of chemistry and metallurgy, and 
also a section regarding the reception of his ideas.  Goethe’s reception of Welling is 
mentioned, but not analyzed, in the context of Goethe’s remarks in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit in connection with his readings during his convalescence (Jungmayr 88, 92-94 
and 116).  The essential question is not whether Goethe was a follower of Welling, or 
whether his ideas in the Urfaust corresponded precisely with those of Welling.  The point 
here is rather to show the context in which Welling’s use of various terms and images is 
to be understood, so that one can ultimately better understand how it was that Goethe 1) 
borrowed aspects of Welling’s cosmogony and 2) appropriated them for his own 
mythology. 
 
6.4.2 The Structure of Welling’s Work and his Challenge to Orthodoxy 
 Welling’s work is separated into three main sections, with each section being 
based upon the discussion of one of the three alchemical primes as found in the work of 
Paracelsus, namely, salt, sulfur and mercury.  The theosophical content of the work is 
succinctly described by Petra Jungmayr as follows: “Vereinfacht gesagt, beschreibt 
Welling den göttlichen, geistigen Anfang aller Dinge, ihr Absinken in einem materiellen, 
irdischen Zustand sowie schließlich ihre Rückkehr zum Ursprung” (Jungmayr 32).  
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 Welling’s explanation of Christian theology is unapologetically unorthodox, his 
invocation of the work of Gottfried Arnold helps explain the appeal that the work would 
have held in the Pietist circles in which Goethe found himself in the 1769 period.  Indeed, 
Welling argues that a reader unfamiliar with Arnold’s work would be unable to 
understand his own: 
[…] dasselbe gleichnam ein Schlüsel unsers ganzen Wercks seyn möge.  
Wobey jedoch zu erinnern, daß dem Leser die Kirchen=Historie wohl 
bekannt seyn, oder die Kirchen= und Kerzer=Historie Gottfried Arnolds, 
it. dessen Abbildung der ersten Christen, oder andere dergleichen 
glaubwürdige Historien bey der Hand haben müsse, sonsten ihm sehr 
vieles unverständlich vorkommen wird, indeme Weitläufigkeit zu 
vermeiden, wir hiervon wenig oder gar nichts angeführt haben, damit es 
nicht zugleich eine Kirchen=Historie geworden wäre, sich zu unserm 
Zweck nicht geschickt haben würde. (Welling 289) 
Here it is worth recalling Goethe’s enthusiasm for Arnold’s work, as noted in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit: 
Einen großen Einfluß erfuhr ich dabei von einem wichtigen Buche, das 
mir in die Hände geriet, es war Arnolds »Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte«. 
Dieser Mann ist nicht ein bloß reflektierender Historiker, sondern zugleich 
fromm und fühlend. Seine Gesinnungen stimmten sehr zu den meinigen, 
und was mich an seinem Werk besonders ergetzte, war, daß ich von 
manchen Ketzern, die man mir bisher als toll oder gottlos vorgestellt hatte, 
einen vorteilhaftem Begriff erhielt. Der Geist des Widerspruchs und die 
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Lust zum Paradoxen steckt in uns allen. Ich studierte fleißig die 
verschiedenen Meinungen, und da ich oft genug hatte sagen hören, jeder 
Mensch habe am Ende doch seine eigene Religion, so kam mir nichts 
natürlicher vor, als daß ich mir auch meine eigene bilden könne, und 
dieses tat ich mit vieler Behaglichkeit. Der neue Platonismus lag zum 
Grunde; das Hermetische, Mystische, Kabbalistische gab auch seinen 
Beitrag her, und so erbaute ich mir eine Welt, die seltsam genug aussah. 
(HA 9: 350; lines 22-39). 
Welling not only endorses the Pietist Arnold, but also takes aim at orthodox religious 
scholars in scathing terms in the passage that follows this endorsement: 
[…] daran zweifelt kein wahrer Theologus.  Daß aber von so viel 
treflichen Männern in ihren herausgegebenen Auslegungen über diese 
Heil. Offenbarung so schrecklich gefehlet worden, darüber hätte man sich 
billig zu verwundern, daferne man nicht eigentlich einsiehet, theils 
derselben Eifer, in ihrer eingebildeten Religion, theils ihre Vorurththeile, 
zum Theil auch, daß man sich in Eigendünckel selbst zu viel geheuchelt 
oder sonst die Eintheilung dieser herrlichen Offenbarung nicht recht 
betrachtet, und sonderlich auch, daß man in allen Secten, (Religionen, wie 
man sie nennet,) wegen der 1000. Jahre Apoc. XX. so widrige Meynungen 
heget, und diejenige, denen der Geist Gottes hierinnen einige Erleuchtung 
mitgeheilet, als böse Erzkezer (sic) bis auf diesen Tag vefolget hat, weilen 
diese Lehre den guten Leuten wider ihre regelmässige Religions=Formula 
zu straiten schiene. (Welling 289-290) 
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Welling’s open challenge to the accepted interpretation of scripture, given at this point in 
the work, should not surprise the reader, given the highly unorthodox creation myth 
already espoused by Welling in the opening section, “Vom Salz,” but here one reads not 
merely a pointed attack against accepted teachings, but also a defense of the rights of the 
“heretic” to defy the purveyors of existing cultural myths, one that calls to mind Faust’s 
mention of these same persecuted heretics in his discussion with Wagner: 
  Wer darf das Kind beim rechten Namen nennen?  
Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt,  
Die töricht g'nug ihr volles Herz nicht wahrten,  
Dem Pöbel ihr Gefühl, ihr Schauen offenbarten,  
Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt. (HA 3:373; lines 236-240) 
Welling’s comment may also be read as a challenge to the reader, given the general style 
and tone of the book, described quite well by Jungmayr: “Seine Hinweise für den Leser, 
auch die Einteilung der Textmasse in Paragraphen und die häufige direkte Anrede des 
Lesers dürften die Ansicht entkräften, bei dem ‘Opus’ handle es sich um ein privates 
Andachtsbuch” (Jungmayr 33). 
 Indeed, at the start of the fifth chapter of his “Vom Mercurio” section, Welling 
makes it clear that he expects censure from the religious authorities (the orthodox 
“Ketzermacher”), and openly denounces them: 
Nun schreiten wir im Namen GOttes  zu einer Sache, durch wir ohne 
Zweifel in die Censur der Hn. Orthodoxen verfallen warden.  Dann weilen 
viele solcher gelehrten Herren in den Gedancken stehen, sie seyen allein 
berechtiget, und geschickt, von Theologischen Dingen zu lehren und 
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zuschreiben, und daß die Priester im Gesez (sic) nicht irren könten; So 
packen die diejenige, so nicht aus ihrer Zuft sind, sogleich an, wann sie 
sich nur blicken lassen, von dergleichen Dingen zu handeln, und da wird 
dann alles von ihnen zum argsten durch gezogen, getadelt, gerichtet und 
geurtheilet, was sich nicht gar eben nach ihren Maaß=Stab messen lässet; 
Und wann sie auch wohl selbst nichts darinnen finden können, welches sie 
als irrig und böse erklären können, so ist es ihnen doch gemeiniglich 
schon genug, die Sache zu verwerffen, wann nur der Autor nicht aus ihrem 
Orden, und nicht gleich ihnen recht regelmäßig auf denen hohen Schulen 
die Kunst gelernet, und allda von der Theologia reden und schreiben zu 
dürfen, privilegirt worden ist.  Alleine, weil aber doch sowohl Christus der 
HERR selbst als auch seine Jünger nicht aus dem Orden der Priester und 
Schriftgelehrten waren, und die wahren Lehrer und Jünger JESU Christi 
nicht sowohl auf den hohen Schulen der Welt, als in der Schule Christi 
und seines Heiligen Geistes gelehret werden müssen; So wird dann auch 
kein rechtschaffener erleuchteter Theologus die thörigte und recht 
abgöttliche Einbildung der orthodoxischen Ketzermacher billigen, und 
versehen wir uns auch vonsolchen ein vernünftiges und Christi Regeln 
gemässes Urtheil, der anderen Schmächen und Tadeln aber wird uns 
wenig bekümmern; Schreiten also zu unserm Vorhaben. (Welling 444) 
This passage calls to mind not merely the limits on book-learning and knowledge spoken 
of by Faust to Wagner, but also the “leider auch Theologie” remark by Faust in the 
opening Nacht scene: 
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FAUST. Hab nun, ach, die Philosophei,/ 
  Medizin und Juristerei, / 
  Und leider auch die Theologie / 
  Durchaus studiert mit heißer Müh.  
  Da steh ich nun, ich armer Tor, / 
  Und bin so klug, als wie zuvor. (HA 3:367) 
Furthermore, the disdainful view of the scholars of theology here is very much in line 
with the depiction of the scholar by Mephisto in Faust, whose advocacy of “logic” takes 
precedence over the “cross”: 
  MEPHISTOPHELES. 
Ihr seid da auf der rechten Spur,  
Doch müßt Ihr Euch nicht zerstreuen lassen.  
Mein teurer Freund, ich rat Euch drum,  
Zuerst Collegium Logicum.  
Da wird der Geist Euch wohl dressiert,  
In Spansche Stiefeln eingeschnürt,  
Daß er bedächtger so fortan  
Hinschleiche die Gedankenbahn,  
Und nicht etwa die Kreuz und Quer  
Irrlichteliere den Weg daher. (HA 3:376) 
Welling’s denunciation of these scholars is accompanied by his conviction that true 
theology is not that which is taught by these same “heretic-making” theologians, but that 
which comes through the holy spirit, and is, therefore, without limitation or rule: 
	  
	   132	  
Weilen wir nun unsere Theologie nicht auf Schulen, das ist, von 
Menschen, sondern von dem Heiligen Geist gelernet haben, so werden uns 
die Herrn Ketzermacher auch entschuldigen, daß wir allhier nicht reden, 
wie sie Apoc. XIII.II und nicht ihren zusammen gekünstelten Lehrätzen, 
sondern dem Geist der Wahrheit, welcher an keine Regeln gebunden, 
folgen. (Welling 271) 
Such a juxtaposition again shows the sort of appeal that Welling may have had to Goethe 
at the time that he was composing the Urfaust, as a myth that fought rules and limits on 
knowledge and form.  Welling’s challenge to orthodoxy lends itself to the disposition of 
the Sturm und Drang, and here, to the beginning point of Goethe’s original Faust draft, 
not in terms of a ready set collection of beliefs, but in terms of the radical opposition to 
orthodoxy.  Welling’s importance here is not his cosmogony itself, but his rejection of 
orthodox learning and belief. 
 In this respect, the Lucifer myth of Welling is relevant, not from the standpoint of 
its correspondence to any content in Goethe’s own “Luzifer-Mythos” in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit, but from the standpoint of how its motifs are reflected in the disposition of 
Goethe’s Urfaust mythology (here one might see Rotermund 1954). 
 For our purposes, perhaps the most important of the three sections of Welling’s 
work is the first (and original) section, in which Welling gives the outline of this 
alternative Christian creation.  In particular, the so-called Lucifer myth, with its 
corresponding explanation of the individuation of matter and relationship to light and 
darkness, is relevant to the discussion of Goethe’s own “Luzifer-Mythos.” 
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6.5 The Importance of Welling’s “Luzifer-Mythos” for Goethe 
 Indeed, in looking first at the Lucifer myth in Welling’s work, it is important to 
understand that this myth functions as part of a larger cosmogony being offered in the 
work as a whole.  The “Luzifer-Mythos” described in Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit 
does not have this same relationship to the reworking of his Faust myth: rather than an 
essential element of the story, the “Luzifer-Mythos” serves as more of an example of 
Goethe’s approach to mythology itself, as a poetic argument, as discussed in previous 
sections in this dissertation.  
 The core of the Lucifer myth in Welling’s work is in the first book of his tripartite 
work, the original treatise on salt, dating back to 1719.  Early on in this work, Lucifer’s 
role in Welling’s cosmogony reflects that which is beyond human comprehension, and 
thus, shrouded in a divine mystery: 
Denn da der Allmächtige den Lucifer und alle seine Heerscharen 
geschaffen, und ihm dieses grosse Universum nemluch dieses unser 
Sonnen=Systema zu beherrschen eingegeben, und ihm in freyen Willen 
darstellte, daß er seiner glorwürdigen Majestät mit ganz freyem, in GOtt 
versenckten Willen dienen solte, ohne all Nöthigung und Zwang, hat sich 
der Lucifer in seiner sogrossen Macht und Herrlichkeit, gleich als in einem 
Spiegel, vergaft, und sich dem schuldigen Gehorsam entzogen, und also 
wider die Göttliche Macht und Herrlichkeit gesezt/gesesst (?), darum denn 
der Allmächtige GOtt die Trennung vornehmen müssen, davon in der 
Folge ein mehrers, so viel uns GOttes Geist verleyen wird, geredet  werden 
solle: diese müssen wir allhier nur noch erinnern, daß der menschlichen 
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Creatur in diesem sterblichen Leibe, diese Geheimnisse zu begreifen, 
sonderlich auch, die da vor seinem Anfange geschehen, darunter die 
Schöpfung, und der Fall Lucifers, nicht der geringsten eines, ein ganz 
nichtiges Unterfangen (sic?) ist, sondern werden versiegelt bleiben, bis auf 
dis ganzliche Offenbarung Göttlicher Majestät, und bleibt uns also ganz 
unbegreiflich, warum er den Hochmuth und Ungehorsam, als das wahre 
wesentliche Böse, nicht gehindert, sondern zugelassen. (Welling 60) 
This passage appears to reflect an aspect of Welling’s work that Goethe found 
noteworthy, when one considers the following from Dichtung und Wahrheit, which 
immediately follows the earlier-cited passage from the same work, related to Goethe’s 
introduction to Welling via Klettenberg. 
Ich schaffte das Werk an, das, wie alle Schriften dieser Art, seinen 
Stammbaum in gerader Linie bis zur neuplatonischen Schule verfolgen 
konnte. Meine vorzüglichste Bemühung an diesem Buche war, die 
dunklen Hinweisungen, wo der Verfasser von einer Stelle auf die andere 
deutet und dadurch das, was er verbirgt, zu enthüllen verspricht, aufs 
genauste zu bemerken und am Rande die Seitenzahlen solcher sich 
einander aufklären sollenden Stellen zu bezeichnen. Aber auch so blieb 
das Buch noch dunkel und unverständlich genug; außer daß man sich 
zuletzt in eine gewisse Terminologie hineinstudierte, und, indem man mit 
derselben nach eignem Belieben gebarte, etwas, wo nicht zu verstehen, 
doch wenigstens zu sagen glaubte. (HA 9:342, emphasis added here) 
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From Goethe’s description of the work, it is the impenetrability of the work itself that 
seems to have, in some sense, compelled him to study it, not so much from the standpoint 
of an intellectual challenge to master the knowledge within it, but because it seemed to 
reflect, at least from the outside, a hidden and self-contained store of wisdom, something 
unattainable through rational argumentation but only to be understood through experience 
and immersion into this new mythology (whether in an initiatory sense, as Zimmermann 
seems to think, or otherwise).  From the standpoint of the poetic debates of the eighteenth 
century, one might say that Goethe saw in this the possibility of other worlds for poetic 
construction based on mythologies lying outside of the dominant cosmology of the 
culture -- the very basis from which he would construct his own “Luzifer-Mythos,” Faust 
conception, etc.   
 The essential question here is not the content of the Lucifer myth in Welling, nor 
is it particularly important to locate Goethe within any particular esoteric tradition, but 
rather, the explanation of originality, as Goethe himself avers that he found the content 
difficult to understand.  It is more a question of perspective that is of concern here, 
namely, that Welling inspired the young Goethe with the vision of creating his own 
mythology. 
  
6.5.1 Inscrutability as an Element in Goethe’s Myth-Making in the Urfaust 
 On a more concrete level, one sees already in Goethe’s dramatic adaptation in the 
Urfaust a nod toward the inscrutable and secret wisdom that he found appealing in 
Welling, whether it be the Erdgeist’s admonition to Faust that Faust could not actually 
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conceive of the Erdgeist’s nature (“Du gleichst dem Geist, den du begreifst, / Nicht 
mir!”) or in Faust’s challenge to Wagner’s comments about the progress of wisdom: 
  “O ja, bis an die Sterne weit! /  
  Mein Freund, die Zeiten der Vergangenheit /  
  Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln. 
  Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt, /  
  Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist, /  
  In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln. /  
  Da ist's denn wahrlich oft ein Jammer! (HA 3 : 371, 373). 
The same limits to knowledge and understanding are present in two other aspects of 
Welling’s cosmogony and Lucifer myth, namely 1) description of the fall in terms of the 
light / divine essence, related to Genesis, and 2) the relationship of divine essence to 
matter in individuation.  Each of these aspects is related to motifs of darkness and light.   
 
6.5.2 Welling’s Description of the Fall of Lucifer 
 In the first case, lightness and dark are both aspects of the essential substratum of 
the universe in Welling’s cosmogony, Schamajim, as well as related to the limits of 
human understanding/knowledge in the absence of divine guidance: 
Und weilen nun das Licht, so da seinen andern Ursprung, als in GOtt hat, 
in ihme und allen seinen Anhange nicht mehr gespühret ward, war in 
diesem grossen Raum nichts, als eine erschrecklicje Finsterniß: nemlich 
das Wesen, woraus der Raum und die Kreyse, so dieser Lucifer innen 
hatte, die da waren seine Schamajim, das ist, ein feuriges Licht=Wasser, 
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ode wässiriges Licht=Feuer, ward gleichsam zu einer greiflichen und 
materialischen Finsterniß, in welcher der Lucifer, der nunmehro Satanas, 
das ist, ein Widersacher, geworden war, mit allen seinen Millionen des 
Gottlichen Lichts ermangelnde, in abscheulicher finstern Feuers=Gestalt 
rasete und tobete.  Diese Finsterniß nennet der heilige Text Gen. I.v.2 
Erden, nemlich diese ganze Universum, weilen diejenige Schamajim, in 
welcher der Lucifer in seiner Herrlichkeit gewohnet, nunmehro eine dief 
finster greiflich Wesen geworden waren, daher der Text sagt: Die Erde 
aber war öde und leer, (eine verwirrete wüste Ungestalt,) und es war 
finster oben auf dem Abgrunde, (weil dieses ganze Universum greiflich, 
finster, dicke, undurchsichtig,) und der Geist GOttes schwebte oben über 
dem Gewässer.  Dieser Vers ist in Wahrheit so voller Geheimnissen der 
Schöpfung, daß er ohne das Licht Göttlicher Gnade ganz und gar nicht 
begriffen werden mag. (Welling 103-104) 
In Welling’s mythological conception of the universe, lightness and dark are aspects of 
one and the same essence, of the same whole, within which any individual differentiation 
implies not an essential or physical separation, but a different perspective.  This essence, 
here referred to as Schamajim, is fundamental to understanding creation itself, as the 
mysterious substance that binds together all creation. 
 
6.5.3 The Process of Individuation in Welling’s Cosmogony 
 In the process of individuation, the opposition of light and dark is, for Welling, 
the principle by which the individual being is intrinsically limited upon creation through 
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its mortal nature by divine rule as a consequence of the fall of Lucifer (and the ensuing 
fall of man): 
[…] weilen GOtt der Allmächtige durch den Fluch, alle ertzgeschaffene 
Simplicität und Reinigkeit in jeder Creatur hinein gekehret, das ist, das 
Lichtwesen in ihnen concentriret, und mit finsterer Greiflichkeit 
umgeschlossen, auch zugleich in aller Creatur dieses Erd=Kreyses einen 
Gafs, Jährung oder Ferment, durch die erweckte geistliche auch 
materialistische Widerwärtigkeit des Lichts und der Finsterniß, der Hitze 
und der Kälte, der Nässe und der Erdekene, erwecket, der nunmehro in der 
ganzen Natur stets geschäftig und im Würcken ist, bis er alle gemischte 
Cörper wieder in ihre erstere materialische Anfänge refolviret, welches 
dann heisset, die Absterbung, der Tod und Verfaulung, wodurch alles 
irrdische und verdammliche, der durch den Fluch in die Finsterniß 
gefallenen Welt, gänzlich wiederum zerstöret werde, auf daß alles 
Geschöpffe in seinem ersten Lichtwesen (worinn es vor dem Fluch 
gestanden) wiederum hervor kame […] (Welling 149) 
Here the important thing to note is that although creation comes from God, in Welling’s 
cosmogony, the process of individuation within creation is a consequence of the fall of 
Lucifer.  The significance of myth, as well as of the description of Schamajim, for the 
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6.5.4 Welling’s Cosmogony in the Motifs Used in the Urfaust 
A similar neoplatonic understanding of the relationship of all beings through 
essence is manipulated by the Mephistopheles character in the Urfaust, who mocks the 
Student by arguing that what passes for knowledge is insufficient, because the individual 
thing can only be understood insofar as it is cut off from the essential aspect of its being: 
  Wer will was Lebigs erkennen und beschreiben, /  
  Muß erst den Geist heraußer treiben, /  
  Dann hat er die Teil' in seiner Hand, /  
  Fehlt leider nur das geistlich Band. /    
  Encheiresin naturae nennt's die Chimie! (HA 3: 376-377) 
This passage is notable for a number of reasons.  First of all, it places in the mouth of the 
devil a succinct description of both the living essence of all things, the divine essence or 
“das geistliche Band,” similar to the Schamajim described by Welling, and also points to 
an understanding of individual objects as being, by necessity, cut off from this essence.  
If this were the only similarity between language of the Urfaust and the motifs of 
Welling’s cosmogony in this respect, the connection might be tenuous at best, for there 
were other sources of neoplatonic tradition available to the Goethe (cited previously in 
his comments in Dichtung und Wahrheit).  However, when discussing such 
interconnectedness of all Being through divine substance, Welling also makes use of a 
particular metaphor that is of striking importance to the reader of the Urfaust: that of 
weaving.  There are many passages in the Urfaust that make reference to “weaving” 
(Weben).  Of particular interest, in the ironic description of reality by Mephisto in his 
sarcastic remarks to the student, which directly precedes the discussion of “das geistliche 
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Band,” the image of the weaving (weben) is invoked to describe the interconnectedness 
of all creation: 
  Zwar ist's mit der Gedankenfabrik / 
  Wie mit einem Webermeisterstück, / 
  Wo ein Tritt tausend Fäden regt, / 
  Die Schifflein 'rüber hinüber schießen, / 
  Die Fäden ungesehen fließen, / 
  Ein Schlag tausend Verbindungen schlägt.  
  Der Philosoph, der tritt herein / 
  Und beweist Euch, es müßt so sein.  
  Das Erst wär so, das Zweite so / 
  Und drum das Dritt und Vierte so. 
  Und wenn das Erst und Zweit nicht wär, / 
  Das Dritt und Viert wär nimmermehr.  
  Das preisen die Schüler allerorten,  
  Sind aber keine Weber worden. (HA3:376-377 lines 353-366) 
Here, in order to avoid confusion, it is important to note that while Mephisto is using 
irony in his attempt to confuse the student, the weaving metaphor is ultimately being 
employed to undermine the rational, scholarly attempts at knowledge and learning.  In 
Mephisto’s language, one who knows understands things in their essence is a “weaver,” 
that is, one who understands the interconnectedness of all things in terms of the living 
essence or “das geistlich[e] Band” that is represented as a “Webmeisterstück” graspable 
by only holistic thought, metaphorically represented as “Gedankenfabrik.” 
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 One notes that in the first part of Welling’s work, “Vom Salz,” a recurring 
metaphor used in discussing the alchemist’s understanding of the essence of various 
metals is that of the “weave” or texture (Webung) of the metals.  The term “Webung” is 
used repeatedly.  In Book I, Section 21, immediately prior to his first use of this term, 
Welling makes clear that the context is which he is talking concerns understanding the 
metals in their essence as determined by God: 
Von den Metallen, wie auch Mineralien und allen andern Corpora, müssen 
wir auch noch dieses zuvor aus gar sonderbaren Ursachen sagen, daß sie 
nahc ihrem Wesen von dem Allmächtigen Gott also specificirte Cörper, 
und zudem vorbescheidenen harmonischen Zweck der Haushaltung dieser 
ganzen Welt kommen sind, wie sonderlich in dem 16. § zu sehen, und 
auch folgends noch erwiesen werden wird. (Welling 21) 
When speaking of the composition of metals in Section 22, Welling speaks not of an 
atomic understanding of metals, but rather of handling metals and understanding them in 
their essence (e.g. core primes such as salt, sulfur and mercury, etc.), and here 
specifically with the metaphor of a weaver handling different types of thread: 
Von der Webung der Metallen, müssen wir auch noch, ehe wir weiter 
gehen, ein wenig reden, und dieselbe in etwas erklären, dann an diesem 
Beweiß und Erkänntniß nicht wenig gelegen, und soll uns hierzu die 
Mechanica dienen, sehen also erstlich in allen Handwercken, die das 
leinenes, seidene, wollene und häcene Zeuge weben, daß je langfäsichter 
und zärter diese Fäselein oder Fädemges sind, die sie weben wollen, he 
tüchtiger und stärcker ihr Werck wird, auch die gar zu kurzhaarige Wolle, 
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Seide zu nichts als groben Silke dienet,  Zum zweyten sehen wir bey 
denen Papiermachern, daß wann sie ihre Lappem sortiret haben, und jede 
Sorte unter den Stempeln arbeiten, damit sie zart und flockigt wie eine 
Pflaumfeder werden, und ihnen ferner das rechte Leim=Wasser geben, so 
bekommen sie nach jeder Sorte ein gutes und tüchtiges Papier; da sie die 
Lappen aber gar zu starck arbeiten, daß die Fäderlein sich gar zertheilen, 
und unter den Stempeln gar zerreissen, und sich zu kleinen kügelchen 
arbeiten, gleich einen durchs Feuer aufgetriebenen , so wird es ein 
brüchiges und nichtsnutzendes Papier.  Gleiche Bewandniß hat es auch 
mut denen Metallen und Mineralien; dann gleich wie bey den 
Papiermachern und Silkwürcken die Lappen und Wolle mit Wasser 
gearbeitet, und mit dem Leim=Wasser zur Festigkeit gebracht werden, 
also werden der rothe und weisse  der Metallen durch das hieunten 
zum erstenmale cörperlich ausgewürckte zärtere Salz, (so ihnen in ihrer 
Webung anstatt des Wassers dienet,) zu fast gleichen metallischen Fäden, 
in ihrer eignen Art und Specie ausgewürcket, da je eines gröber als das 
andere, wie uns die Mechanica klärlich vor Augen leget, sonderlich bey 
dem Schmiede= und Dratzieher=Handwercke, dann je besser die zwey 
ra in den Metallen ausgewürcket worden, je besser und beständiger 
sie sich arbeiten und ausdehnenfassen, so wir sonderlich und 
unwidersprechlich an dem Gold und Silber, sowohol an ihren sehr dünnen 
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und zarten Blättern, als auch verguldeten und solibern Drat zu sehen 
haben. (Welling 21-22) 
Such an description, using symbolic reference to alchemical primes along with the term 
“Webung” as a metaphor for the essential interconnectedness of all things, is particularly 
striking in the context of Goethe’s Urfaust, given that the term “Webung” is a rather 
peculiar one, used by Welling, without much of a history in the German language in such 
a context.1 
The similarity of the context and usage of the term weben in Goethe’s Urfaust to 
Welling’s Webung is unmistakable.  Of further significance in this context is the fact that 
the essences contained in Welling’s “Webung” are living essences that bind the metals in 
their forms, much like the notion of “das geistliche Band” mentioned by Mephisto: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  According to the Deutsches Wörterbuch of Jakob und Wilhelm Grimm, the history of 
this term falls into two general categories: WEBUNG, f.: textura, webunge Diefenbach 
gl. 582b; nrhein. wevinge, textura, textus Teuthonista 497a Verdam; webung Calepinus 
XI ling. 1462a (auch von Stieler, Steinbach, Campe angeführt). litterarisch nicht häufig: 
erdencken alle wollin gemechte und dero webung N. v. Wyle translationen 396 Keller; 
daselbst wiesz man mir ... einen mit güldenen sternen besäeten purper-rock ... diese 
webung aber soll zu Alexandria aufkommen seyn v. Lohenstein Arminius 2, 188; kleine 
löcher in der leinwand ... so bei webung dessen ... verursachet werden Amaranthes 117. 
übertragen: die frevelhafte fädelung und webung des dunkeln handels Arndt nothgedr. 
bericht 86.  WEBUNG, f. zu weben 'sich hin und her bewegen': die webung, das weben, 
das gewebe, vigor, vegetatio, viriditas, motus, motio ... excitatio, impulsus Stieler 2448; 
denn was ist diese webung anderst anzusehen denn ein creutzmachung? Wicel 
annotationes (1536) 77b. zu weben vom opfer: darauff alszbald nach geschehener 
erhebung und webung dieser ehrengabe, die geistliche erndte in der welt angehen solte 
Pomarius grosze postilla (1590) 1, 413b. zu weben 'wehen': (holz wird in brand gesetzt 
durch anhauchen, wind und) webung Alemannia 11, 203 (Straszburg 1658). (Grimm web 
citation)  For the first definition, see: 
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=webung, also  
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?bookref=27,2676,15. For the second, see 
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=webung, also  
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?bookref=27,2676,28. 
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[…] dahero dann genug yu schliessen, daß ihre Textur oder Webung, 
gleich einen verderbten oder groben Papier durch das unterirdische Feuer, 
( wiederkurzhieroben erwehnet) gar zu starck oder gar zu wenig gewest, 
daher ihr Corpus dem unausgeartbeiteten Corpore oder metallischem 
Wasser, nemlich dem  am nähesten geblieben; und gleich wie 
dieses au seiner unbegreiflichen Zahl der allerkleinesten Kügelchen 
bestehet, und also das Feuer im geringsten nicht bestehen, noch sich 
hammer und ausdehnen lassen kan, weil die unzehlbare Kügelchen gleich 
einem Wasser aus Mangel lebendigen  nicht aneinander halten, noch 
sich ausstrecken und hammer lassen können, wie die vier ausgewebten 
Metallen .  Also und eben dergestalt 
bestehen diese zwey Cörper aus solchen doch gröbern Kügelchen, 
wodurch die Reduction dieser bezden Cörper zu einem lebendigen  
dargethan und leichtlich  bewiesen werden mag, auch solches allen 
wahren Chymicis zur Gnüge bekannt; dann wann sie von ihrem 
Heterogeneo, nemlich brennenden  geschieden, sind sie nichts als 
; und daß des lebendigen ris wenig bey ihnen seyn müsse, 
lehret die unwidersprechliche Erfahrung, indem wir selbsten durch Mittel 
einiger Alcelinorum aus einem Pfund Bley fast über 11. Untzen guten 
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 geschieden, und ist uns vor deme ein Artist bekannt gewest, der 
durch eben diesen Weg, doch mit etwas längerer Zeit und andern 
Handgriffen, fast auf die XIV. Untzen aus einem Pfund geschieden.  
Welches dann klärlich darthut, was itzo gesagt, nemlich daß sie meist aus 
 bestehen, und wenig lebendigen  bey sich haben. (Welling 22) 
At the end of this complicated Section 22, Welling leaves the reader with several points 
that are relevant to our discussion of Goethe; first, that he is speaking of metal not per se 
but rather, in the sense of “geistlichen Vitriol,” second, that these metals are composed 
almost entirely of mercury, and at the same time of sulfur as well, and thirdly, that the 
learned scholars or “Physici” cannot comprehend this, in contrast to true chemists --
“wahren Chymicis”—a phrase that calls to mind Goethe’s letters to Frau von Klettenberg 
and his comments in Dichtung und Wahrheit regarding the secretive and mysterious 
chemistry in which he was interested: 
Wir nennen auch nicht ein hohes philosophisches Salz, durch das  
Naturae bereitet, da nemluch ein solches Corpus wiederum in sein erstes 
salinisches mercurialisches Wesen, oder zu seinem ersten Anfang reducirt 
worden sey, sondern unsere Rede ist von einem wahren Metall  
oder geistlichen Vitriol zum Unterscheid des gemeinen Vitriols, als aus 
welchem noch allemal ein metallisches Corpus wiederum zu scheiden.  
Und ein solches Salz ist denen, so das rechte schlechte und nicht kostbare 
Menstruum, und die rechte Calcination des Cörpers wohl verstehen, leicht 
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zu machen, allen wahren Chymicis wohl bekannt.  Fragen dann also ferner 
nicht unbillig, weilen diese Cörper  und  (der andern Metallen 
anjetzo zu geschweigen,) fast ganz und gar lauter  und auch eben 
zugleich fast ganz und gar lauter Salz sind, wie sich doch dieses reimen 
könne, was sonsten die Physici lehren, daß die Metallen aus drey 
Anfängen oder Principiis, nemlich  
bestehen, und wie sie bey solchem wahren und klaren Beweis solche ihre 
Principia behaupten wollen?  Und wer kan uns nun beweisen, daß in den 
Metallen drey wesentliche Anfänge sind, oder daß sie aus denselben 
bestehen?  Allein wer unsern hieroben geführten Reden Gehör geben will, 
word endlich diesen verwirrten Knoten auflösen, und sich aus diesem 
wundersamen Labyrinth finden können.  Weme die beyden obbenannten 
Natur= , der rothe und weisse, und ihr salinisches oder feurig= und 
wasseriges Herkommen (und wie dieselbe in diesen irdischen Globo in 
einem jedem specificirten Cörper, zu eben desselben Gestalt eines jeden 
Corporis qualificirt worden,) kennet, der wird die eingeworfene Frage, wie 
es seyn könne, daß die Corpora  und  fast ganz und gar , 
und auch zugleich fast ganz und gar Salz sind ? [sic in original] auch was 
es vor eine Bewandtniß habe mit den drey Principiis Salz, Schwefel und 
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, als Anfängen der Metallen ? [sic in original] leichtlich beantworten 
können; welches auch die Folge weiteres erklären wird. (Welling 23) 
In this passage, the description of mercury seems to correspond to the idea of “das 
geistlich[e] Band” as described in Goethe, and this, indeed, is appropriate, when one 
considers how Mephisto referred in the end to “das geistlich[e] Band,” saying 
“Encheiresin naturae nennt's die Chimie!”  Mercury, referred to by Welling via its 
symbolic representation as an alchemical prime as “ ,” is also known in ancient 
pharmacological terms as “Encheiresis naturae” (Peters 196-7). 
 The importance of this correspondence is not to claim that Goethe was pursuing 
an alchemical line of thought in the Urfaust, but to point out that the repeated use of the 
“Webung” metaphor in Welling, which appears alongside an alchemical description of 
“encheiresis naturae,” strongly suggests that the metaphor of “Weben” used in the 
Urfaust, used in connection with “das geistig[e] Band” and “encheiresin naturae,” was 
something that may well have resulted from Goethe’s reading of Welling. 
 
6.5.5 Würkungskraft und Samen 
Welling’s description of the “Webung” related to metals continues in Sections 23 
with a discussion of how the heavenly seed (“himmlischen Saamen”) emanating from the 
sun activates the “weaving” process and creates a matrix that shapes the specific metals 
according to their individual forms: 
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[…] und gar nichts, als ein  ist, wie allen wahren Chymicis bekannt, 
und dieser Schwefel oder schleimichte, feurige, salinische Substanz 
gebähret ferner aus dieser Erden die Matricem dieses oder jenes Metalls, 
wie solches unumstößlich an allen Rießling=Steinen und Felsen zu sehen, 
daß, wenn man sie mit einem Eifen oder einem Stein an den anderen 
schlaget, sie alsdenn solches schwefelichte Feuer von sich geben.  Je 
reiner nun die Geburth dieser Erden von der jungfräulichen Erden 
entsprossen, und mit dem himmmlischen Saamen (siehe mit allen Fleiß 
den 16. §. Und die daselbst angeführte Oerter) begabt worden, je reiner 
wird diese Matrix, und die in ihr empfangene und erzeugte Geburth der 
Metallen, nach Art ihres eignen specificirten Wesens seyn. (Welling 25) 
As noted in the quotation, the use of the term “Saamen” appears first in Section 16 of the 
first book, but it is in Section 23 that this term comes into play within the context of the 
“Webung.”  This process is further elaborated in Sections 24 and 25.  Without digressing 
into all of the details of this process, the link between the “Saamen” and “Webung” is 
made more explicit at the close of Section 25, when Welling describes the role of the 
“living” metal, mercury, in determining the natural “development” (Auswürckung, as 
translated by McVeigh) of a living thing, such as a bird, when one measures the saline 
“weaving-water” (Webungs-Wasser) and the “heavenly lunar seed” (himmlischen 
lunarischen Saamen): 
Mit dem siebenden Metall oder vielmehr Metall=Wasser, nemlich dem 
, hat es der Minerae wegen gleiche Bewandniß, denn deren rothe 
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Farbe uns klarlich zu erkennen giebet, daß diese ihre Matrix fast aus lauter 
Schwefel d.i. flüchtigen Feuers=Strahlen und fast weniger Erde bestehe, 
und des menstruosischen, salinischen Webungs=Wassers (als welches den 
Schwefel bindet), gemangelt habe, dahero sie diese himmlischen 
rischen Saamen in der ersten Coagulation in dieser wässerigen Form, ohne 
fernere Auswürckung liegen lassen müssen: hat aber die Minera eine 
andere Farbe als grau  so gehöret auch ein ander Urtheil von einem in der 
Natur Ehrfährnen in einer solchen Form, und weiset uns also der lebendige 
 den ersten Grad der natürlichen Auswürckung oder den ersten 
vorgesetzten Endzweck.  Sehen also die mercurialischen Alchymisten, mit 
was vor einem Vogel sie zu thun haben, und was vor ein Feuer sie 
benöthiget, ihme seine Schwingfedern zu verbrennen, und ihn weilen er 
annoch homogen, fix und beständig zu Gold zu machen.  Nemlich das, so 
ihme in seiner Minera gemangelt, und aus vorhergehendem leicht zu 
verstehen.  Denn weilen ihme der grobe irdische Schwefel nichts them 
können, sonderlich da ihme das menstruosische Salz gemangelt, so muß er 
haben Schwefel und Salz in rechter Proportion oder ein solches fixes 
sulphurisches Salz, so da in allem Feuer beständig fix und flüßig, und all 
fix Corpora durchdringen mag. (Welling 27) 
At the close of this passage, one notes the inability of earthly prime sulfur to affect the 
heavenly prime sulfur, whose affect on the development of a being is formally and 
proportionately fixed in all bodies.  This idea, in connection with the terms used in the 
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passage, such as Auswürckung, Saamen and Webung, calls to mind the description of 
Faust of the type knowledge of things that he is seeking, in the opening Nacht scene: 
  Drum hab ich mich der Magie ergeben, / 
  Ob mir durch Geistes Kraft und Mund / 
  Nicht manch Geheimnis werde kund. / 
  Daß ich nicht mehr mit saurem Schweiß / 
  Rede von dem, was ich nicht weiß.  
  Daß ich erkenne, was die Welt / 
  Im Innersten zusammenhält, / 
  Schau alle Würkungskraft und Samen / 
  Und tu nicht mehr in Worten kramen. (HA3:367 lines 24-32) 
In this key passage, Faust explains his turn to magic by not only expressing the 
dissatisfaction that Goethe felt for the words of those like Gottsched, but in a description 
that seems to point to the essence of Welling’s influence upon Goethe: the turn to magic 
is here mythically represented as the means of nearing truth that eludes reason and 
language.  The lasting impact of Welling’s inscrutable metaphors and myth appears here 
in the realization that reality itself is not knowable or describable by means of words or 
leaning; it must, therefore, by approached by metaphor, here represented mythically in 
Faust’s turn to magic. 
In another passage from Section 33, Welling makes clear that he is talking about 
things in their innermost essence (“in seinem innersten”), with the Saamen providing a 
link between the Macrocosm (here described as dieses ganzen Universi or [die] grosse[n] 
Welt) and the Microcosm (here described as der Mensch or die kleine Welt): 
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Das himmlische geistliche  und  oder Saamen, daraus alle 
Geschöpffe gebohren werden, und fortwachsen, welche Geschöpffe und 
Saamen sämtlich in dem Menschen vollkommen gemacht worden; daß 
also der Mensch (die kleine Welt) die einzige Versammlung ist dieses 
ganzen Universi (der grossen Welt) darinnen alle ihre Ausgeburthen, so 
unzehlbarer Formen und Gestalten, wiederum zusammen kommen, […] 
(Welling 38) 
Again, given the context of these terms appearing in the text alongside the a Macrocosm 
reference, the one idea acknowledged by all to link Welling to Goethe’s Faust texts, one 
must consider whether or not the other terms are merely coincidental, or whether it can be 
inferred that Goethe likely borrowed additional alchemical imagery used by Welling for 
his own purposes as well. 
 
6.5.6 Macrocosm 
 As noted previously, the most commonly associated aspect of Welling’s 
cosmogony that is seen as relevant to the construction of the Urfaust is the Macrocosm 
(although some see this as referring back to many sources, with Welling being merely 
one).  Because this connection, unlike the other aspects discussed in this dissertation, is 
generally acknowledged to varying degrees by all, the point to be taken by addressing it 
here is to note that the Makrokosmus passage explicitly links the viewing of the sigil of 
the Macrocosm with the “weaving” imagery: 
  Er schlägt das Buch auf und erblickt das Zeichen des Makrokosmus. 
  Ha! welche Wonne fließt in diesem Blick / 
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  Auf einmal mir durch alle meine Sinnen. 
  Ich fühle junges heilges Lebensglück,/ 
  Fühl neue Glut durch Nerv und Adern rinnen.  
  War es ein Gott, der diese Zeichen schrieb, / 
  Die all das innre Toben stillen, / 
  Das arme Herz mit Freude füllen Und mit geheimnisvollem Trieb / 
  Die Kräfte der Natur enthüllen?  
  Bin ich ein Gott? mir wird so licht! / 
  Ich schau in diesen reinen Zügen / 
  Die würkende Natur vor meiner Seele liegen./ 
  Jetzt erst erkenn ich, was der Weise spricht:  
  »Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen, / 
  Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist tot. 
  Auf! bade, Schüler, unverdrossen / 
  Die irdsche Brust im Morgenrot.« 
  Er beschaut das Zeichen. 
  Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt, / 
  Eins in dem andern würkt und lebt! (HA3:369 lines 77-95) 
(N.B.  In the Schöne edition of the “Frühe Fassung,” the term “würkende” from the above 
Urfaust passage, which is rendered as “wirkende” in Faust I (line 441), is listed as 
“winkende.”  Schöne notes the discrepancy between versions.  In the Hamburger-
Ausgabe edition of the Urfaust, cited above, the term used is consistent with the eventual 
term used in Faust I and also with the language used by Welling.)  With this direct link 
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between Macrocosm sigil and the image of “weaving” in Goethe’s Urfaust, given the 
acknowledgement by virtually all scholars of a connection between the former and 
Welling, the likelihood of a connection between the latter imagery/metaphor should be 
considered all the more probable. 
 
6.6 The Common Denominator between Welling and Goethe 
Like Goethe, who perceived Gottsched as his foremost opponent, Welling had to 
contend with potential hostility from orthodox theologians toward his imaginative 
cosmogony.  Welling stood in the line of neoplatonic thought and relied upon those 
before him, like Gottfried Arnold, who had been rejected as “heretics.”  These thinkers 
had been condemned, much in the manner noted by Faust to the Gottsched-like Wagner, 
for having dared to speak the truth, and thus suffered persecution.  The search for truth 
and the reality beneath the superficial is the common denominator between Goethe and 
Welling.  However much Goethe may have been frustrated by his inability to understand 
the arcane and intricate details of Welling’s mythological framework, it was clear to him 
that the intended end of their efforts was the same: to approach reality with images and 
metaphors that connect everything. 
Welling used of images such as “weaving” (Weben), “vital power” 
(Würckungskraft) and “seed” (Saamen).  It is not surprising that Goethe, at critical points 
in his drama, used these words as well.  The metaphor of weaving appeared in attempts to 
express the striving toward comprehension of an ultimate reality, described by the 
Erdgeist :  
 In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm  
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Wall ich auf und ab,  
Webe hin und her!  
Geburt und Grab, 
Ein ewges Meer,  
Ein wechselnd Leben! 
 So schaff ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit  
Und würke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid. (HA 3:371; lines 149-156) 
Faust likewise sees this reality as a weaving, when he asks Gretchen: 
  Schau ich nicht Aug' in Auge dir,  
Und drängt nicht alles  
Nach Haupt und Herzen dir  
Und webt in ewigem Geheimnis  
Unsichtbar sichtbar neben dir? (HA 3:408; lines 1138-1142) 
If anything, this question from Faust seems to confirm that the “weaving” in this case 
refers to an ultimate reality beyond that of the visible world, placing it squarely in the 
neoplatonic tradition espoused by Welling.  Indeed, the description of this weaving in the 
context of an eternal secret (in ewigem Geheimnis) also points to its inscrutability, which 
may very well have been the appeal to Goethe in the first place.  Perhaps the most 
important realization that Goethe came to when trying to make sense of the Welling text 
was that the hidden “reality” being alluded was itself, by nature, ineffable, beyond 
discursive description and the limitation of words, and something only to be 
approximated by metaphor, myth or cosmogony. 
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7 Conclusion 
 A gap has existed in Faust studies, a gap that seems likely to have resulted more 
than anything from the fact that the Urfaust is all too often treated as merely a rough draft 
of the later work, and not as a work in its own right.  By concentrating on Goethe’s work 
on the Faust theme as it developed in the early nineteenth century, scholars have cast 
their focus far from the origins of Goethe’s interest in the Faust theme itself.  In returning 
to the timeline of the formation of the Urfaust itself, one is able to see the organic 
progression of the project, and specifically, how it is shaped by Goethe’s quest for a 
counterpole to the arguments of Gottsched, whom he had encountered while he was a 
student in Leipzig.  This counterpole he finds in the work of Welling, whose image-
laden, holistic approach to cosmogony provided an example of how to organize a myth in 
opposition to an Enlightenment worldview dominated by reason and the discursive as 
well as rhetorical approach to defining reality by means of words. 
 Goethe encountered Welling while convalescing in Frankfurt after his sickness in 
Leipzig.  This is significant, not merely because he was then a budding figure of the 
Sturm und Drang whose intellectual program demanded a response to Gottsched, but also 
because he found in Welling the sort of counterexample that could help him with the sort 
of non-discursive response to the Enlightenment that were important not merely as a sort 
of template for a Faust mythology specifically, but more fundamentally as providing the 
sort of holistic, image-laden language that appealed to a poetics attempting to transcend 
definition and conceptualization.  In a very real sense, the “turn to magic” that is depicted 
thematically in the Urfaust mirrors Goethe’s own realization during the time of 
composition of that work that the “magical” approach of Welling was just as significant 
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in its possibility as a springboard for the creation of an alternative to the poetic 
approaches of Gottsched as it was the basis for a radically new Faust image – perhaps 
even more important, given that Goethe appears to borrow from Welling less in terms of 
theoretical coherence and more with respect to imagery and totality.   
The power of mythological images over words and rhetoric characterizes both 
Faust’s turn to magic and Goethe’s turn away from the rhetorical approach of Gottsched 
and toward the alchemical and mythological imagery offered by Welling.  The irony of 
those who seek a mystical, as opposed to mythological, influence and connection 
between Welling and Goethe is that in order to prove such, they must employ the very 
methods of theoretical explanation and justification of such a relationship, by attempting 
to show a coherence between the images of alchemical metaphor in Welling and the 
development of Goethe’s work, which seems to miss the point of Welling’s appeal 
entirely: its appeal was precisely in the non-discursive, holistic way in which Welling re-
imagined, as opposed to re-defined, reality.  Indeed, this seems to be the only plausible 
view of Welling’s appeal to Goethe, given that Goethe readily admits his inability to 
understand Welling’s work in spite of his stated fascination with and repeated reading of 
it. 
Attempting to prove or seek a harmony between Goethe’s views in Frankfurt or 
his later intellectual development and the cosmogony of Welling is a task which seems 
not only difficult, but also improbable given the lack of evidence that Goethe maintained 
any adherence (strict or otherwise) to the beliefs in Welling’s Opus.  Nevertheless, the 
convenience of using Welling’s image-rich language and mythology in combatting the 
discursive arguments of Gottsched stands on its own as a sufficient ground for the 
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importance of Welling for Goethe’s creative process within the development of the 
Urfaust.  By isolating and identifying elements within the Urfaust, such as the anti-
Gottsched poetics argument via the use of theatrical forms such as the commedia 
dell’arte, one is able to see this contrast with Welling more clearly.  Goethe’s use of 
images and metaphors borrowed from Welling suggest that the turn to magic was very 
much connected itself with the attempt to respond poetically to the Enlightenment.  
Indeed, other authors have noted that Faust’s arguments with Wagner appear in 
themselves to be a satirical replay of Goethe’s debate with Gottsched (Reich 43-86). 
Furthermore, by situating these arguments contextually within the intellectual 
development of the young Goethe as he moves from Leipzig to Frankfurt, the historical 
and biographical details only serve to strengthen the suggestion that these themes were 
interrelated in the mind of the young author. 
 By illuminating the connection between Welling and Goethe in the Urfaust, and 
defining it in poetic and mythical, as opposed to mystical, terms, one sees the possibility 
for continued and renewed focus in this area of Goethe scholarship long overlooked by 
scholars.  For instance, Goethe’s approach to myth/mythology in general can be seen in 
the light of Welling.  Goethe’s engagement with mythology persisted throughout his 
entire life.  The “totalization” process that Goethe formed in his approach, when viewed 
as an outgrowth of the mythological response to discursive thought, is an important 
finding with respect to understanding Goethe’s lifelong engagement and relationship to 
the Enlightenment, helping to establish the middle ground between those who would 
characterize him as a friend or foe of the movement, and point toward the complexity of 
this relationship as described by Schulz, Koopmann and Vierhaus. 
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It is necessary to compare and contrast Goethe and Welling on their use of 
Biblical sources in order to understand Goethe’s appreciation for “heretics” in general 
and the Pietist Gottfried Arnold in particular.  In light of Goethe’s appropriation of 
Welling’s work, the mythology behind the Erdgeist needs to be re-examined, with a 
better insight into Goethe’s appropriation of images, such as those offered by Paracelsus 
(archeus terrae) and Bruno (anima terrae), and of Lucifer in other “heretical” sources.  
The connections between Welling’s Opus and Goethe’s Urfaust are not so much 
conceptual, but are rather directly and linearly grounded in the organic unfoldment of the 
biographical timeline of Goethe’s intellectual history.  This relationship between the two 
works, in turn, when subsumed into Goethe’s own synthetic understanding of Gottsched 
and Welling as effectively being polar opposites, allows one to not only read Goethe’s 
Faust with a new eye, but also to gain renewed access to other of Goethe’s works making 
use of mythology or archetypal forms, such as in “Prometheus” (1772-1774), Iphigenie 
auf Tauris (1779-1786), Faust II (1832), etc.  Even Goethe’s scientific writings, such as 
the image-rich works Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790) and also Zur Farbenlehre 
(1810), with their additional emphasis on a holistic outlook, might be approached with a 
fresh perspective as a result of these findings.  The dramatic shift in Goethe’s thinking 
while working on the Urfaust, reflected in the Faustian “turn to magic” and understood as 
a commentary on the shortcomings of the Enlightenment, offers a perspective that not 
only helps one to approach his later Faust I anew, but that also helps yoke together other 
seemingly disparate interests pursued by Goethe, such as mythology, genre theory, color 
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